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Abstract 
The significance of seniority for individuals' wage growth has been a very popular 
topic in labour economics for the past three decades. The extent to which wages rise 
with employer-tenure is fundamental in the understanding of the dynamics of 
earnings and labour market behaviour. This thesis is an empirical study of the 
British labour market in the 1990s and attempts to shed some light on the different 
kinds of skills individuals acquire in work, and their contribution to the wage 
determination process. Specifically, the author examines the role of seniority and 
employer-specific skills in earnings and explores whether industry and 
occupational specificity in the accumulated human capital can explain part of the 
variation in wages. Furthermore, the author investigates the interaction of 
institutional arrangements with these human capital wage premia, giving a 
particular attention to union representation. Throughout the empirical analysis, the 
issue of potential endogeneity bias in the estimates of interest is also addressed and 
alternative estimators are employed for that purpose. For part of the workforce, 
mainly in 'blue-collar and low-paying jobs, employer-tenure appears to have a 
significant impact on wage progression, which is further strengthened when 
employed in a more structured environment, like in the union sector, with well-set 
promotion ladders and pay rules. Occupational expertise, in contrast, is estimated to 
playa far more important role in the earnings profiles of those in prestigious, high-
paying but more competitive jobs. This is particularly true in less restricted 
workplaces, where there is no union representation or seniority-pay scales, like in 
the non-union sector. Overall, the findings of this study provide some rather useful 
insights into the patterns that govern individuals' wage growth and are informative 
about individuals' enlployability and job mobility that could prove to be helpful to 
policy makers on unemployment and wage inequality issues. 
XI 
Chapter 1 
------- -- -- ---
1 Introduction 
The contribution of human capital analysis to the understanding of economic and 
social behaviour has long been acknowledged and become a popular area of study 
in labour economics. The process by which individuals develop their skills through 
formal education and on the job are fundamental to an understanding not only of 
why earnings differ but to an understanding of a country's economic and social 
development as well. Although the concept of human capital goes back many 
centuries it was only thirty years ago that the systematic economic analysis of 
human capital formation and its implications for labour economics initiated. Despite 
the volume of studies in this area, human capital theory still preserves its 
importance and appeal in a continuous evolving labour market to both researchers 
and policy makers. The wage, tenure relationship is a core element of the dynamic 
structure of wages that can provide to the researcher a helpful insight into how 
earnings evolve over one's career. The analysis of this relationship can also be 
informative on job mobility issues and issues related to the flexibility of the labour 
market, when examined from the transferability of skills, across jobs, point of view. 
The understanding of the wage-tenure profiles is therefore central in interpreting 
labour market behaviour and assessing the potential outcome of policies designed to 
affect this behaviour. This thesis is an empirical study of the British labour market 
and examines the significance of accumulated employer-tenure on individuals' 
earnings profiles. Using data drawn from the first eight waves of the British 
Household Panel Survey (1991-1998) the author examines the kind of skills 
individuals acquire in work and their contribution to wage determination in the 
1990s. Most of the existing studies in the literature on the returns to tenure mainly 
focus on the methodological issues related to the potential unobserved heterogeneity 
1 
bias in the estimates of interest, neglecting some other important aspects of the 
topic. 
Obtaining a single estimate of the tenure effect may probably mask considerable 
heterogeneity across the workforce. Is the contribution of employer specific skills 
and seniority on earnings the same between individuals located at the top and 
bottom of the wage distribution? If not, then a more detailed examination can 
provide to the researcher a more complete picture on the tenure effect that may 
have useful implications concerning wage growth and earnings inequality. For 
example, if the estimates on employer-tenure effect are larger in magnitude for 
those individuals located at the lower part of the wage distribution, compared to 
those at the upper part of the distribution, then one may argue that accumulated 
employer-specific skills and job seniority can reduce earnings inequality. 
Furthermore, most of the researchers in this area distinguish accumulated human 
capital in work into a firm specific and a general labour market element. However, 
in a modern labour market environment with all the technological advancements 
that take place and the increasing employers' requirements and expectations this 
framework may be rather simplistic and even misleading. The question that is 
interesting to address here is whether there is any industry or occupation specific 
dimension in the accumulated skills in work and their significance on earnings 
profiles. Is industry or occupational expertise an important determinant of wages? 
And, are there particular industry or occupation choices that are more rewarding 
than others? Finally, I believe it is also helpful to examine these issues within a 
framework where one can incorporate the changing features of union 
representation and its restricted role since the 1970s. Trade unions are traditionally 
associated with egalitarian pay policies and job security. How has their role evolved 
through the, relatively recent, restrictive legislations and the declining union 
membership? Furthermore, are there differences in the tenure-earnings profiles 
2 
between union and non-union sector? These are the main issues that I attempt to 
shed some light on in this thesis. However, in order to assess the importance and 
implications that the findings may have, it is necessary to have a broad and accurate 
view of the current labour market and its features. 
One of the public's perceptions of the British labour market in the 1990s is that the 
notion of the 'job for life' has ceased to exist. People believe that job mobility has 
become more frequent while work has become less stable and secure, composing a 
picture of a high-turnover labour market. The early evidence on job duration and 
labour turnover (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995; Burgess and Rees, 1996) is in a way 
conflicting. Gregg and Wadsworth (1995) using the British Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) for the period 1975-1993 argue that job tenure has fallen in the 1990s. 
According to the authors, median job tenure has fallen around 20 per cent since 
1975, although this aggregate figure disguises larger falls in average male tenure 
and a rise in female employment durations for the same period. Antithetically, 
Burgess and Rees (1996) using a different data source, the General Household 
Survey (GHS) for a similar period (1975-1992), suggest that average job tenure has 
not fallen much in Britain. 
A more recent examination by Gregg and Wadsworth (1999b) of job duration for 
the period 1975-1998 tries to explain and bridge these discrepancies in the referred 
above studies. Despite the public belief, job tenure on average has remained fairly 
stable since 1975. Nevertheless, this stability at the national level conceals a 
contrasting reality across gender. Job stability is falling for nearly three-quarters ()t' 
the workforce, men and women without dependent children. For men, job tenure 
rose by 10 per cent up to 1985 and fell by 5 per cent thereafter, to an average job 
tenure of G years and 1 (') months in 1995 based on GHS (G years and G months 
based on LFS). This decline continued in the coming years resulting in an average 
job duration of 5 years and 9 months in 1998 (LFS). Job tenure patterns over time 
for women without dependent children are similar to those of men. At the aggregate 
level though rising job stability amongst women with dependent children has 
largely offset these changes. For this part of the labour force, job tenure has risen by 
around 25 per cent over the period 1975-1995, with most of this increase taking 
place in the period between 1985 and 1995, probably due to the increased 
provision and use of maternity leave. Although these reported changes in the 
average job duration are quite modest for most of the labour force, two groups that 
appear to be rather vulnerable are young people below the age of 25 and men aged 
50 and over. For the former, median tenure has declined by 30 per cent between 
1975 and 1985, followed by a further 7 per cent decrease in the years to 1995, 
mainly due to the increased share of short-term jobs. It is older men though those 
who experienced the largest fall in tenure, down from 15 years and 3 months to 13 
years and 8 months between 1975 and 1995, primary due to a fall in the share of 
long -term jobs. 
The main reasoning behind the declining job stability is the fact that there are fewer 
long-term and more short-term jobs available than before. Using information in the 
LFS from 1992 to 1997 (spring), Gregg and Wadsworth (1999b) report that a 
typical new job lasts fifteen months, while the average length of a job in progress is 
around five and a half years. Of those new jobs, only one-fifth last five years, 
whereas only a third of the jobs that have lasted five years will break up within the 
next five years. Although full-time permanent posts have almost certainly not 
become less stable, the labour market now contains more unstable forms of 
employnlent than ever before (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995, 1996). Those 
individuals in part-time or temporary jobs and self-employment face far shorter job 
durations and so zreaterjob instability compared to those in full-time jobs. 
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Despite the declining job stability for most parts of the labour force and the 
increasing share of short-term jobs, there appear to be signs of improvement in the 
British labour market since the recent recession of 1993. Unemployment rate is 
often regarded as a measure of how healthy the state of the labour market is. If 
indeed unemployment is a good indicator of performance, then one may argue that 
the condition of the British labour market in the late 1990s has improved, with an 
unemployment rate below 6 per cent (the lowest for twenty years) and one of the 
highest employment-to-population ratios among developed nations. However, these 
appealing figures mask the fact that worklessness is increasingly concentrated on 
selected individuals, households, socio-economic groups and geographical areas. In 
particular, although most people experience brief unemployment spells, for the 
minority who do not leave quickly unemployment becomes prolonged. The more 
unemployment an individual faces then, the greater the extent of future 
unemployment that person faces (Arulampalam et ai., 2000; Dickens et ai., 2000; 
Gregg, 200 1). Furthermore, even though regional unemployment differentials are 
lower now than they have been for many years (Jackman and Savouri, 1999), there 
is much greater variation in unemployment performance within regions than 
between regions. Indeed, at finer levels of regional disaggregation the dispersion 
becomes greater. The worst geographical concentrations of joblessness are In 
council-housing estates, where typical unemployment rates are 25 per cent or 
above. 
Unemployment also appears to affect future earnings. Arulampalam (200 1), using 
the British Household Panel Survey 1991-1997, finds that there is a wage penalty 
attached to an unemployment spell on re-entry jobs that takes an inverted U -shape. 
In particular, an individual coming from unemployment will earn 6 per cent less in 
the first year of re-entry compared to what he would have earned in the absence of 
unemploymcnt. This \vaze penalty increases over the next three years within the 
5 
same employment to about 14 per cent before declining to around 11 per cent. The 
author does not find though any evidence that the length of the interruption itself 
has any additional significant effects. The estimates imply that it is the incidence of 
unemployment that has the wage scarring effect, and especially the first spell of 
joblessness in the case of multiple interruptions. Gregg and Jukes (2001) provide 
further evidence on the wage penalty associated with joblessness, based on a 
different British data set!. According to the authors, the impact of unemployment 
occurs in two parts, relating to both incidence and duration. In particular, they find 
that unemployment incidence gives rise to an earnings penalty on re-engagement of 
10 per cent in the first year. However, this is largely temporary and is expected to 
have a long run or permanent effect estimated at 1.9 per cent. On the other hand, 
the impact of duration is estimated to be permanent, with a six months spell adding 
a further 5.1 per cent penalty that rises to 11.1 per cent for those who had been out 
of work for a year. 
Overall though one may argue that despite the concentration of unemployment on 
particular groups of individuals and the wage penalties associated with joblessness, 
the aggregate unemployment rate has fallen to levels similar to those observed in the 
late 1970s, around 5 per cent. Yet, although both men and women have benefited 
equally during the current recovery, since 1993, employment rates for women are 
higher than any time since the war, while male employment rates are still well 
below the levels in the 1970s (Dickens et a1., 2000). What is hidden behind this is 
the worryingly increasing economic inactivity among the male labour force 
(Campbell, 1999; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995, 1999a; Dickens et [ii., 2000). 
Labour market inactivity is considered to be an unpleasant and undesired situation 
I The NESrD-]llV()S data set, which links the New Earnings Survey ranel Dataset (NESrD) with the 
loint Uncrnploymcnt and Vacancies Operating System (Jl!VOS). 
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for both the individual and the society, usually resulting to the atrophy of acquired 
job skills and human capital and commonly associated with deprivation and social 
stigma. Men have dropped out of the labour force in unprecedented numbers. In the 
mid 1970s there were around 400,000 economically inactive men (excluding those 
in full-time education), by the year 1990 this figure has increased to some 1.5 
million and in 1998, it further rose to around 2.3 million, which is more than 13 
per cent of the potential workforce. In contrast, the equivalent inactivity rate for 
women has fallen steeply from 37 per cent in 1975 to 27 per cent in 1998, an 
almost equal and opposite swing compared with men. Most of this rising labour 
force participation is concentrated amongst more highly qualified women aged 
between 25 and 49. So, while the numbers of economically inactive have not 
changed much in the last two decades, the composition of inactivity has altered 
radically. The proportion of the inactive that are male has risen five-fold since 
1975, from 7 per cent to 35 per cent. 
Economic inactivity amongst men is highly correlated with labour market 
conditions, being concentrated amongst older, less skilled people and amongst those 
living in local authority housing. While male inactivity has risen for all age groups, 
the most dramatic increase has been amongst those over-50s. For this group of the 
male workforce inactivity figures have risen from 7 per cent in 1975 to 28 per cent 
in 1998. In addition, more than 30 per cent of men with no formal qualifications 
were outside the labour market in 1998, while less than 8 per cent of men with a 
degree were inactive the same year. It appears that the lower the level of 
qualifications held, the more likely it is that a person will be economically inactive. 
Finally, poor labour market performance and lack of earning opportunities for men 
are associated with higher inactivity rates. Therefore, areas with high male 
unemployment, typically urban areas, have higher inactivity rates. Growing male 
inactivity appears to be a serious and pressing issue in the British labour market. 
7 
The poverty and social exclusion associated with inactivity necessitates policy-
makers' attention in order to reconnect these people with the labour market and 
prevent others dropping out of the labour market. 
Another alarming aspect of the British labour market in the 1990s is the increasing 
wage inequality (Machin, 1999). Wage dispersion between the rich and the poor 
has widened dramatically in Britain since the late 1970s, resulting to the highest 
wage inequality observed in this century. Inequality increased rapidly in the 1980s, 
followed by a slower rising wage inequality in the 1990s. Machin (1999), using the 
Gini coefficient, shows that hourly earnings dispersion increased by 30 per cent for 
men and by 27 per cent for women between 1979 and 1990. In the 1990s the Gini 
coefficients continued to increase for males at 1.2 per cent a year, but actually felt 
marginally for females between 1990 and 1996. The primary driving factor behind 
the increasing inequality appears to be the labour demand shifts in favour of the 
more educated and skilled due to skill-biased technological developments, as faster 
skill upgrading has occurred in more technologically advanced industries. The 
1990s have also seen rapid educational upgrading. This rise in high-skilled labour 
supply has slowed down the increase in wage inequality in the 1990s. Apparently 
though, this rising supply was not enough to meet employers' need for a high-
skilled workforce, so labour demand has continued to shift in favour of more 
educated and skilled workers. Besides the technological changes and the increased 
requirements for high-skilled labour supply, some of the rise in wage inequality can 
also be attributed to the decline of trade unions in the British labour market since 
the late 1970s. However, the latter has rather limited explanatory power as in both 
union and non-union sectors wage inequality grew over the 1980s (Goslin and 
Machin, 1995; Machin, 1997), although it rose faster in non-union workplaces. 
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Continuing on to low pay and earnings dynamics, Webb et al. (I996) show that the 
incidence of low pay, defining low pay as below two-thirds of the median for all 
workers in any year, has shifted from women to men and from younger to older. In 
1994 females were roughly two and a half times as likely to be low paid as males, 
whereas in 1968 they were more than six times as likely (based on the Family 
Expenditure Survey, for the period 1968-1994). The rate of low pay amongst men 
has roughly doubled since 1975, while for women the rate in 1994 is marginally 
below that in 1975. Furthermore, the age composition of the low-paid male 
workforce has changed notably. Whilst male low pay in 1968 was predominantly 
amongst young men, low pay for those aged over 25 rose sharper than those young 
men: the number of low-paid men between 25 and 49 roughly quadrupled over the 
period 1968-1994. The age composition amongst females remained fairly stable 
over the same period. In addition, low pay is more prevalent amongst casual 
workers, those in small firms, those in non -union firms, ethnic minorities and less-
skilled manual workers (Stewart, 1999). 
Low pay incidence also appears to be quite persistent (Stewart, 1999; Stewart and 
Swaffield, 1999). The probability of being low paid in one year is much higher if 
you were low paid in the previous year. Furthermore, the longer one remains low 
paid, the lower the probability of their moving up the wage distribution and out of 
low pay. Even for those above the low pay threshold, prior low pay experience 
increases the probability of returning to it. Dickens (2000) also in a study on the 
extent of earnings mobility in Britain shows that there is considerable immobility 
within the earnings distribution from one year to the next. In addition to persistence 
ill low pay, it is evident as well that the low paid are much more likely to leave 
employment than those in the higher part of the wage distribution .. \pparently 
(Stewart, 1999), there is a "low j7:IY - no pay' cycle, where "the low p:lld :lre 11101"e 
likell' /0 be (JlIt (J/ work i/1 the Ill/lire; t17(1."(, ()[It 0/W01* :lre 1110H' likely to be /(1W 
paid on re-entry; and are even more hkely to be so if they had been low paid prior 
to being out of worR' (pp. 239). After all, "low-paid jobs are more hkely to act as 
blind alleys than as stepping-stones to positions higher up the pay distribution" (pp. 
241). 
In conclusion, the British labour market in the 1990s appears to be characterised by 
the operation of a primary and a secondary sector. The primary sector is represented 
by well-educated, prime-age workers located at the mid and higher end of the wage 
distribution who enjoy job stability and security. In contrast, the secondary sector is 
characterised by less skilled, young, and old in atypical employment with high 
labour turnover. These individuals are usually concentrated in low paid jobs that 
tend to be far more unstable and insecure. For them, the penalties attached to job 
loss and jobless duration are quite severe and their re-entry wages are rather 
reduced. These features, describing those at the bottom, compose a picture of a 
disheartening and discouraging way of life, with limited chances of upward 
progression. The British labour market seems that it is becoming an ossified, 
inflexible environment, where early development and progress are fundamental 
ingredients to an individual's life chances. Therefore, it is important to provide 
these, more vulnerable, people the appropriate training and to match them in more 
stable jobs, where they are most suited in order for them to acquire all the necessary 
skills on the job. There are of course some programmes in place, like the New Deal 
that involves an element of education and training. Unfortunately, the scale of 
intervention is modest and skill development under this programme seems to be 
limited (Dickens et al., 2000). "If these policies are to be as successful as education 
in improl'I'ng hie chances, large investments are needed to have an impact on the 
c:lJ'ninss of lnargil1:Jii~<;t'd groups' (pp. 11). The current developnlents in the British 
labour market underline the importance and usefulness of examining the kind of 
skills that people accumulate over the years in work and their contribution ('l1 
earnIngs. Understanding what matters most in wage determination can be quite 
helpful to policy makers in the evaluation of existing labour market programmes 
and the outline of future directions that attention should be focused on. 
To briefly summarise the structure and content of the thesis, in Chapter 2 I present 
an analysis on the returns to employer-tenure. First, a summary of the data used 
throughout the thesis is provided at the beginning of this chapter along some 
descriptive summary statistics of the data sample. A standard Mincer wage equation 
model describes the main empirical framework, where accumulated human capital 
in work is divided into employer specific and general labour market skills. Here I 
address the issue of endogeneity bias in the estimates of interest and employ several 
techniques suggested in the literature to assess the robustness of my findings. In the 
second part of this chapter, I question the assumption of a homogeneous tenure 
effect across the workforce and explore the contribution of tenure at various points 
of the wage distribution. 
In Chapter 3, I challenge the conventional division of accumulated human capital 
into employer specific and general labour market skills and examine the possibility 
of industry and occupational specificity. The issue of potential endogeneity bias in 
OLS estimates on earnings equations is also address here and I present alternative 
estimates based on panel estimators. Furthermore, I explore whether the estimated 
industry and occupational experience effect are driven by particular industry or 
occupation choices. 
The third substantive chapter, Chapter 4, explores how institutional arrangements 
influence the estimated human capital premia. Particularly, the aim here is to 
distinguish the different paths that seniority-earnings profiles follow depending on 
whether there is union representation at the workplace and/or whether formal 
1 1 
wage scale rules are adopted. Trade unions are traditionally associated with the 
standardisation of pay-setting procedures, the enforcement of objectives rules 
concerning promotions and wages in the workplace. Within this framework, I set 
two propositions related to seniority profiles and union representation. In particular, 
I argue that in the union sector it is expected that job seniority and skills specificity 
will be an important determinant of wages, while in the less structured non-union 
sector true productivity, proxied by the more competitive accumulated skills and 
professional expertise, will have a key role on earnings profiles. 
The main findings of the thesis are summarised in the final chapter, Chapter 5. Here 
I bring together the evidence presented in the previous three empirical chapters and 
provide an overview of the results. Also, I outline the implications my findings have 
for the British labour market and discuss policy issues raised by the analysis 
throughout the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
2 The Effect of Employer-Tenure on Wage Growth 
2.1 Introduction 
The contribution of employer-tenure to wage determination is a popular subject of 
research in labour economics and not without reason. The understanding of the 
dynamic structure of wages is central in interpreting labour market behaviour and 
the potential impact of policies designed to affect this behaviour. The wage, tenure 
and experience relationship is a core element of this structure, and hence garners 
considerable attention. The extent to which wages rise with tenure has many useful 
implications concerning issues of government policy. First it gives an insight into the 
evolution of life-cycle earnings, which is important in a number of fields (pensions, 
labour supply, savings, etc.). Second it is informative on job mobility issues. 
Identifying the characteristics of job mobility can be very helpful in the evaluation 
of labour market programs. In particular, many European governments became 
interested in such programs as a remedy for long term unemployment. 
Governments now give a high priority to policies thought to stimulate training, 
either through direct interventions and subsidies of company training or, through 
support for a 'training markef via loan provision, dissemination of information 
about good practice and others measures. Therefore, wage growth estimates on the 
job as well as the extent to which the acquired human capital is transferable 
between jobs is a key element in the evaluation of the potential effects such 
programs may have. Furthermore, the examination of how flexible, in terms of 
transferability of skills, the labour market is and the extent to which the earnings 
power of individuals is tied to specific jobs can be very useful when thinking about 
the efficient allocation of human resources, individual's business cycle decisions, the 
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characteristics and growth of wage profiles, as well as individual's employability 
and productivity issues. 
As data on seniority and large scale panel data sets became available in the 1970's, 
several researchers (Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981, among others) concluded that 
there is a large return to seniority based on the fact that there is a strong positive 
relationship between tenure and wage rates in cross sectional or pooled cross 
section-time series data. A growing theoretical literature has taken the evidence of a 
strong wage-tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for 
the relationship. The most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human 
capital, according to which the growth of wages with tenure is attributed to the 
accumulation of firm-specific skills (Oi, 1962; Becker, 1962, 1964, 1975; Parsons, 
1972; Mincer, 1974; and Hashimoto, 1980). Individuals working in their jobs 
acquire a range of skills over the years, which can be either the result of on-the-job 
training or, the outcome of seminars or, training courses sponsored by their 
employer. These skills can be divided into two main categories: (a) general skills and 
(b) employer/firm specific skills. The latter skills refer to knowledge and abilities 
obtained on the job that are employer-specific, thus appreciated only by the current 
employer. Within this framework, the positive wages-tenure relationship is actually 
the reward for the valuable acquired firm-specific human capital. More recently, 
other models have been presented, such as a supervision model of wage growth 
(Lazear, 1981) where the prospect of higher pay in the future deters shirking and 
induces effort in the present, a model for wage growth based on an insurance 
motive (Freeman, 1977; and Harris and Holmstrom, 1982) and an adverse selection 
model of wage growth (Nickell, 1976; Salop and Salop, 1976; and Guasch and 
Weiss, 1982). 
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However, several economists have noted that unobserved heterogeneity across 
individuals and across job matches may produce inconsistent estimates of the effect 
of tenure on wages and turnover. Since tenure is a simple function of job changing 
decisions, attention has to be given to the effect of individuals' and jobs' 
characteristics on quits and layoff decisions. Recent evidence indicates that many 
job-changing decisions are the outcome of a career process by which workers are 
sorted into more durable and productive jobs. High-wage jobs tend to survive, 
which means that people with long tenures earn higher wages. In addition, it is 
possible that more productive or able workers change jobs less often, for which 
there is also empirical support. Several papers in the mid 1980's, with Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987) (hereafter AS) and Abraham and Farber (1987 a) (hereafter AF), as 
widely cited examples, challenge the previous findings, arguing that returns to 
seniority are relatively small and moving the literature to a new consensus. 
In this chapter, using data from the first eight waves of the British Household Panel 
Survey, I examine the contribution of employer-tenure to wage growth in the 
British labour market. In Section 2.2, I present an extensive analysis of the wages-
tenure profiles literature, giving particular attention to the three probably most 
influential studies in this area: AS (1987), AF (1987a) and Topel (1991). Despite the 
extensive research on the seniority effect, predominantly on US data, there is still 
controversy in the findings among the studies. One of the purposes of the literature 
review below, is to provide to the reader a comprehensive discussion of the 
methodological issues raised, primarily due to potential heterogeneity bias in the 
estimates of interest, and to examine the implications and candidate interpretations 
that these, some time contradicting, results may have. 
The literature review is followed by the empirical analysis in Section 2.4, where I 
explore the role of employer-tenure in the wage determination process. In 
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particular along OLS estimates, which serve as a benchmark point in my discussion, 
I replicate AS and Topel's methodology and assess the findings from these different 
estimators. Furthermore, I utilise the panel element of my sample and employ panel 
estimators (both random effects and fixed effects) as an alternative way of 
correcting the heterogeneity bias in the wage equation model considered. Finally, in 
the last part of this section I test the sensitivity of my findings to outliers in the 
reported wages, using quantile regressions. The results obtained from all the 
estimators described here are tested against various specifications in order to assess 
their robustness and to further discuss the implications that their choice as a 
preferred estimator may have on the examination of tenure effect. 
The quantile regression estimator is further utilised in Section 2.5, where I calculate 
a group of estimates of the contribution of tenure, corresponding to different points 
of the wage distribution. This is the first time, at least for a British study, to the 
author's knowledge that such a technique is used for the examination of tenure 
effects. The advantage of this estimator is that it does not restrict the researcher to 
estimates 'on the average, on the contrary it provides estimates over the whole 
spectrum of the wage distribution. In fact, what I attempt in this section is to 
challenge the conventional assumption of a homogeneous tenure effect and to 
present an alternative way that allows employer-tenure to have a varying (both in 
magnitude and significance) role at different quantiles of the wage distribution. This 
approach is rather insightful in the examination of the true contribution of tenure 
and raises several key issues of interest, previously 'hidden' behind average 
treatment effects. Finally in Section 2.6, I conclude my analysis with the main 
findings on tenure-wage profiles and discuss implications and directions for further 
research. 
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2.2 Wage Equations and Heterogeneity Bias (Literature Review) 
A standard Mincer (1974) wage equation model, used by many economists, 
including AF (1987a), AS (1987) and Topel (1991), is given by: 
(2.1) 
where W,JI is the log wage of person i in job j in period t, EIJI is total labour market 
experience, and rul is tenure with the employer. The equation (2.1), for illustration 
reasons, abstracts from a set of control variables, and from nonlinear terms in 
experience and tenure. The error term can be decomposed into three components, 
(2.2) 
where 111 is a fixed, time and job invariant, individual specific error component, qJlj 
is a fixed, time invariant, job match specific error component, and 171)1 is the 
transitory error component that accounts for marketwide random shocks as well as 
measurement errors. The individual effect 111 represents the individual's 
unobserved ability, while the job-match effect qJl) captures the quality of the 
employment relationship stemming from search activity. Individuals with high 
unobserved ability (high 111) most likely experience lengthy and less interrupted 
employment spells, while better matches, choices of job, (high qJl/) are more likely 
to occur to individuals with more experience, as the result of human capital and 
lengthy search, and are expected to last longer (i.e. lower labour turnover). 
The key parameters of interest are PI and P2' where PI represents the return on 
general human capital (training and the like) that accumulates with experience, 
while P~ represents the return on seniority and accumulated job-specific capital 
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that would be lost if a job were to end. The parameter /30 is an economy wide trend 
in real wages. Many researchers that use OLS to estimate these parameters. 
consistently find that seniority has a significant, large and positive effect on 
earnings. As an example of the size of this effect, AS (1987) and Topel (1991) 
reported that ten years of seniority raises the log wage by roughly 30 per cent. 
However it is argued that using OLS to estimate /31 and /32 may be inconsistent, 
since employer-tenure and experience are likely to be correlated with the 
unobserved individual and job match heterogeneity. In order to present the biases 
that arise from unobserved individual and match heterogeneity in a formal way, we 
can use the auxiliary regressions between the unobserved components and 
experience and tenure, given by: 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
In equation (2.3) matching models and conventional search models imply that job 
shopping over a career will induce a positive correlation between Eij/ and 
fA (bl > 0). In addition workers will be less likely to quit high wage jobs than low 
wage jobs. Furthermore, if firms share in the returns to a good match, rjJ" will be 
negatively correlated with the layoff probability, suggesting a positive correlation 
between tenure and rjJ" (b2 > 0). Topel though argues that the sign of b2 is 
ambiguous since the selection induced by voluntary job changes will lead low 
tenure values to be associated with large values of rjJ" and b2 may be negative. In 
equation (2.4) tenure will be positively correlated with J.1, in the likely event that 
individuals with kn\' prl")ductivity (low J.1,) have high quit and layoff propensities 
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(C2 > 0) . Individual heterogeneity associated with f.1, will bias OLS estimates of the 
wage-tenure profile upwards. Finally cI is expected to be negative. 
Summarising, the biases in the OLS estimators of /31 and /32 are: 
/31(OLS) - /31 = bl + c] 
/32(OLS) - /32 = b2 + c2 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
As it can be seen from the analysis above, neither bias can be signed. The bias in 
experience is ambiguous because the job match (bl ) and individual heterogeneity 
(c]) terms are of opposite signs. Similarly, the bias in tenure is ambiguous since the 
match heterogeneity (b2 ) may be either positive or negative. However, if c2 is large 
and positive and b2 is either positive or small and negative, then the net bias in 
/32(015) will be positive, and the estimated effect of seniority on wages will be 
overstated in OLS wage regressions. 
2.2.1 Altonji and Shakotko's Estimator 
AS (1987) address the problems of individual and job match heterogeneity in the 
wage equation using an instrumental variables estimator, I~. The principal 
instrumental variables for the tenure variable is the deviation of the tenure variable 
from its mean for the sample observations on a given job match (DT,'I). By 
construction this instrument is uncorrelated with both the individual specific error 
component of the wage equation (f.1,) and the permanent job match component 
((fJ,/) , which are assumed to be time-invariant. If the instrument is also uncorrelated 
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with the transitory error component ('71)1), then this variable (DT,'I) IS a valid 
instrument. AS use DT,jt' XI)I and t as instruments (I~ estimator). 
The data set used in AS's analysis is based upon the 1968-1981 waves of the PSID 
and is restricted to a sample of white male heads of households aged between 18 
and 60. In their analysis the OLS estimates do not defer from the typical estimates 
obtained in cross sectional analyses of the wage equation. They find a substantial 
growth of wages with tenure, with much of the growth occurring in the first year 
on the job. In contrast, the I~ estimates indicate substantially smaller first year 
growth and a virtually flat tenure profile afterwards. According to their estimates 
the accumulation of the first ten years of tenure results in a wage increase of 2.7 per 
cent, i.e. 1/ Illh of the corresponding OLS estimate. Furthermore the OLS estimates 
indicate that total labour market experience raises wages by 31.7 per cent during 
the first ten years of work and 48.2 per cent during the first 30 years, while the 
corresponding I~ estimates are 53.7 per cent and 86.6 per cent. These estimates 
are expected since the strong positive correlation between experience and tenure 
implies that the upward bias in the tenure profile, analysed above, will lead to a 
downward bias in the experience profile. 
AS recognise that their I~ estimator may be biased. In particular, while the I~ 
estimator is free of bias from 11" the likely positive correlation between EiJl and qJ" 
leads to a positive bias in fJl(lV
1
) and a negative bias in fJ2(1~)' The corrected I~ 
estimator can be defined as 
(2.7) 
Using the BlY~. estimator, AS obtain 6.6 per cent as their preferred estimate of the 
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effect of ten years of tenure. Overall, the AS instrumental variable approach on the 
wage equations indicates that tenure has a modest effect on wage growth, with total 
experience accounting for most of the growth during a career. From the analysis it 
is clear that heterogeneity bias is responsible for the much larger least squares 
estimates of the tenure profile in the literature. 
2.2.2 Abraham and Farber's Estimator 
AF (1987a) recognise as well the existence of bias in the OLS estimates of the wage 
equation deriving from the individual, job and/or match quality heterogeneity. The 
approach to removing the upward bias that they suggest, is to control explicitly for 
completed job duration in the earnings equation. According to their analysis the 
tenure coefficient is biased only because seniority is associated with the completed 
length of current job, which in turn is correlated with qJij' The method AF propose 
in order to control for heterogeneity is to include the expected completed tenure T; 
of each job in the standard cross-section earnings equation (2.1). Augmenting the 
wage equation (2.1) by adding r,; as an explanatory variable yields 
(2.8) 
AF argue that the augmented OLS approach has two important advantages. First, it 
provides a direct estimate of the relationship between completed job duration and 
earnings (1/)), which is an indicator of the importance of the relationship of 
individual, job and/or match heterogeneity with earnings through job duration. 
Second, it provides an insight for the hypothesis that better workers, jobs, or 
matches are associated with higher earnings throughout the job. 
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The sample used in their analysis, similar to the one used by AS, includes male 
household heads aged between 18 and 60 who participated in the PSID from 1968 
through 1981, excluding observations on unionised jobs. They particularly focus 
their discussion on two occupational subgroups. A subset of white-collar 
occupations including nonunion professional, technical and managerial employees, 
and a subset of nonunion blue-collar employees. Their analysis is based on three 
different approaches, (a) a standard OLS earnings that neither instruments for 
seniority nor includes completed job duration as a regressor, (b) an IV approach, 
using pre-job experience, the square of pre-job experience, and the residual from 
the regression of seniority on completed job duration as instruments for total 
experience, the square of total experience and seniority and (c) an augmented OLS 
approach, described above. 
Their standard OLS estimates suggest that there are significant sizable returns to 
both general labour market experience and employer seniority for workers in both 
occupational groups. The estimated return to seniority ranges from 1 to 1.5 per cent 
per year. On the other hand, while their IV approach has relatively little effect on 
the estimated return to general labour market experience, the estimated net return 
to seniority falls substantially. For the white-collar workers the return to seniority 
falls from 1.1 to 0.6 per cent per year, and for the blue-collar workers falls from 1.4 
to 0.3 per cent per year. This suggests that most of the cross-sectional correlation 
between earnings and seniority, controlling for experience, reflects the influence of 
omitted variables. Finally the augmented OLS estimates are virtually identical to 
those obtained using the IV approach. What stands out from the augmented OLS 
estimates is that there is a very strong positive association between completed 
duration :lnd earnings in both the occupational groups. Their results also confirm 
the findin~ that workers in longer jobs earn more in every year on the job than 
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workers in shorter jobs for both the occupational groups, though it is more apparent 
in the case of white-collar workers. 
In summary AF's results suggest that there is only a small average return to seniority 
in excess of the average return to general labour market experience. Furthermore, it 
seems that workers in long jobs earn considerably more through out their jobs than 
do workers in short jobs. This finding has important implications for the decisions 
that employers and workers make, since it affects investment in job-specific capital 
and the incentive for workers to remain on their job. 
2.2.3 Implications and Criticism on AS and AF's Studies 
Both AF (1987a) and AS (1987) suggest that the partial effect of tenure on wages is 
small, and that general labour market experience ~nd job shopping account for 
most wage growth over a career. This conclusion has important implications for the 
labour market. One can argue that it means that human capital investments are 
mainly general rather than firm specific, so that the main component of workers' 
embodied skills is portable among firms. Further, in the absence of specific capital, 
the costs of worker displacement and unemployment are likely to be small, even for 
relatively senior workers since their accumulated skills are transferable across jobs. 
Finally, the 'independence of wages and job tenure questions the compensation 
literature that treats the timing of wages as a strategic device for affecting worker 
productivity. 
However, tenure responses in the PSID are often inconsistent with calendar time. 
Brown and Light (1992) (hereafter BL) in their study identify several problems 
arising from this inconsistency. First, the failure to use internally consistent tenure 
sequt'nces can lead to misleading conclusions about the slope of wa~c -tenure 
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profiles. Second, the inclusion of jobs that contain unusually inconsistent tenure 
responses can alter the results in certain applications, which particularly true for 
the 1968-1974 PSID data, the sample used by AS and AF. Third, the reliability ot 
estimates that require precise information about job changes may be seriously 
reduced when error-ridden tenure data are used to identify job changes. Finally, it is 
quite likely that estimates of job changes from tenure responses are overstated. 
BL suggest several rules for partitioning PSID data into jobs and they examined the 
effect that these different kinds of partition have on estimates from commonly used 
wage and mobility models. They estimate a simple cross-sectional wage equation, a 
fixed-effect model of within-job wage growth, a model of within-and between-job 
wage growth and a simple logit model for job separations. In all these models, their 
findings show that the estimates are heavily dependent on the choice of partition. 
Furthermore they examine the sensitivity of the estimates when the sample is limited 
to reliable observations, deleting all the unreliable observations. BL estimate a fixed-
effect model and find that while the full sample indicates no important role for job 
tenure in determining the slope of within-job wages profiles, the reliable subsample 
indicates that the role of tenure is no less important than that of experience. 
According to the authors, the choice of whether or not to include these observations 
proves to be more important than the choice of partition. In conclusion, BL's study 
seriously questions the validity of the AS and AF's findings, which are based on PSID 
data from the years 1968-1981. 
2.2.4 Topel's Estimator 
Topel (1991) in his study practically re-establishes that the accumulation of specific 
human capital is an important ingredient of the typical employment relationship 
and of life cycle earnings and productivity as well. H is analysis is based on a tW()-
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stage estimation procedure. The idea is that within -job wage growth combines the 
return to general and job-specific experience, since both of them increase 
identically within a job. Therefore, the first stage estimates the determinants of wage 
growth without distinguishing separate returns to general market experience and 
job-specific seniority. The second stage is actually a cross-sectional comparison of 
the wages of workers who started new jobs at different points in their careers. In 
this stage an upper bound on the returns to general experience is estimated, which, 
combined with the estimates in the first stage, can be translated as a lower bound on 
the returns to tenure in the typical employment relationship. 
Topel in his analysis de-trends the data using a real wage index constructed from 
CPS cross sections in an early draft of Murphy and Welsh (1992)2. The first step is 
given by applying OLS to a within job wage growth equation for stayers 
A A 
Wijt - Wijt-l - f30 = f3 + Cijt - Cijt-l + f30 - f30 (2.9) 
where f3 = f31 + /32 . Since current experience can be written as the sum of the 
initial experience on the job (EijO ) and tenure (Tijt) , the second step of Topel's 
estimation is given by 
A A 
~jt - /3ot - /3~jt = /31 EijO + eijt (2.10) 
where eiJt = Cijt + tCBo - ~o) + 1ijt (f3 -~) and ~ is the OLS estimate from 
(2.9). Finally, the linear tenure slope (f32) is given by S - Sl. 
Topel recognises that his estimates may be correlated since both !Ll and 't',} are 
included in c1.J! , and both may be correlated with E1)0. Particularly, he notes that 
~ This is similar to regressing the Murphy- \Velsh index on a time trend using the sample composition 
to weight the various years, and then using the coefficient estimate {3() to de-trend the LtlLL 
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the job matching produces a downward bias in the estimator of 32 , According to the 
author though, the downward bias is going to be larger for the AS's IVl estimator 
than his estimator provided that ~ + ~ is positive. 
The sample used in Topel's analysis is from the PSID data for the years 1968-1983. 
The sample is restricted to white males between the ages of 18 and 60 inclusive, 
who were not self-employed, employed in agriculture, or employed by the 
government. The wage data refer to (log) average hourly earnings in calendar years 
1967 -1982. In contrast to AS and AF, Topel takes both the wage and the tenure and 
the union status measures from the year t survey. In addition he excludes 
observations of tenure duration less than one year (1ij t < 1) because wages refer to 
average hourly wages in the year preceding the survey. 
According to Topel's findings the estimated value of f31 is about 7 per cent and the 
estimated value of {32 is 5.45 per cent. In other words, in the first year of the typical 
new job, the real wage rises by over 5 per cent because of the accumulation of job-
specific experience alone. Furthermore his estimates suggest a large return to 
seniority. In particular, ten years of job seniority increase the log wage of the typical 
worker by 28 per cent, relative to alternatives, which is substantially larger than AS 
and AF's estimates. He suggests that the estimated returns to seniority represent the 
reduction in earning capacity that an individual would suffer if his job ends for 
exogenous reasons. However workers may bounce back from these losses quite 
rapidly since relative wage growth is most rapid at the beginning of new jobs. Thus 
initial wage losses may vastly overstate changes in lifetime wealth caused by a job 
termination. 
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In addition Topel explores the effect of several biases on his estimates. First, he finds 
that the downward bias in the two-step estimator of the return to seniority ((32) is 
solely due to improvement in match quality with total labour market experience. 
Further, he examines the possibility of selection bias in wage growth and ability bias 
in the returns to job tenure. However, in neither of the cases does he find that these 
sources of bias can account for the substantial returns to seniority. 
Topel also estimates the returns to job seniority among different occupational 
groups, professional and service, craftsmen, operatives and laborers. In the case of 
craftsmen, operatives and laborers he treates union and nonunion workers 
separately. His estimates imply that there are only minor differences across groups, 
with the only difference worth noting among unionised workers where there is 
substantially smaller variance in wage changes. Thus his main finding is that 
estimated returns to tenure are quite similar across broad occupational categories. 
However he makes a distinction between the returns to seniority for union workers 
when measured relative to another union job and when measured relative to the 
nonunion alternative. The estimated returns in the former will be similar to those in 
other sectors, while the estimated returns in the latter will be both larger and rising. 
According to Topel this will be true since the losses suffered by a union worker, 
whose job were to end and was forced to seek employment in the nonunion sector, 
combine both the union seniority effect and the union wage premium. 
Topel in his study nlade a serious effort to explain the discrepancy between his 
findings and those of AS and AF. Although AS and AF use the same data (PSID) for 
their analysis they find quite different results than Topel, according to their findings 
the true returns to job seniority are minor. Topel re-examining the AS's approach 
concludes that their estimates are substantially biased down. He highlights three 
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reasons accounting for this downward bias: (a) the instrumental variable procedure 
used by AS produces a greater upward bias in the return to experience and so, a 
greater downward bias in the return to tenure, (b) there is serious measurement 
error in recorded job tenure which precludes reasonable estimates of the parameters 
of wage growth to be derived from the uncorrected data, and (c) the treatment of 
the time trend as exogenous causes an additional downward bias in estimated 
returns to seniority. Further, Topel argues that the difference between his estimates 
and those of AF arises solely because AF used an inappropriate methodology, which 
yields an inconsistent estimator of {31 + (32. In conclusion, Topel's analysis 
advocates a very strong connection between job seniority and wages in the typical 
employment relationship, other things constant, ten years of job seniority are 
expected to raise the wage of a typical worker by over 25 per cent. 
2.2.5 A Re-Estimation of the Approaches to the Wage-Tenure Profile 
Many researchers investigate further the discrepancies in the findings between AS, 
AF and Topel on the seniority-earnings profiles. Williams (1991) re-examines the 
contribution of employer-tenure and general labour market experience in the wage 
determination process and attempts to assess the conflicting results that AS (1987) 
and Topel (1991) present in their studies. The data used in the analysis are from the 
Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME). These data 
have the advantage that they provide improved tenure information since more low 
tenure jobs and wage changes at low levels of tenure are recorded, contrary to PSID 
that both the AS and Topel used in their papers, which does not provide any 
information regarding multiple wage or job changes in the previous year. 
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The author suggests two approaches in order to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the estimated wage equation model. The first method is based on a 
job fixed effects estimator. Under the assumption of individual and job 
characteristics, differencing across individuals and jobs will remove the unobserved 
components from the estimated model. The main drawback of this method is that 
since tenure, experience and time increase by the same amount between wage 
arrivals, the linear term of tenure and experience and time cannot be identified. 
However, a consistent estimate of their sum is available and can be interpreted as 
the overall effect of the passage of time on wages. The alternative is an instrumental 
variable estimator, based on the AS IV, where tenure is instrumented by its deviation 
from the mean job tenure. In addition, the author presents estimates on an IV model 
where general experience is instrumented as well by substituting current 
experience with the experience level at the start of the job, similar to what Topel 
(1991) suggests. Nevertheless, the latter model is still an incomplete solution as both 
current and initial experience are likely to be correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity. The findings from the job fixed effects estimator, despite the inability 
to separately derive the tenure and experience effect, suggest that OLS overstates the 
wage growth due to tenure and experience. Furthermore, the two instrumental 
procedures indicate a much flatter slope to the wage-tenure profile than least 
squares estimates. The calculated two-year tenure effect is between 5 and 6 per cent 
in the IV models and more than double (14 per cent) when heterogeneity bias is not 
corrected. The estimates on experience are fairly similar to OLS, with a derived 
experience effect of 15 years above 30 per cent. 
Overall, the results imply that AS's findings of a moderate tenure effect, confined to 
the first several years on the job, are more likely to be true than Topel's tenure large 
wage zains. Longer tenures increase wages only for the first two years of 
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employment with additional years having little effect. Accumulated general labour 
market experience, on the other hand, raises wages substantially over the years. 
Altonji and Williams (1997) (hereafter AW) provide new evidence on the returns to 
tenure using data similar to that used by AF (1987 a), AS (1987), and Topel (1991) 
as well as a new PSID sample for the years 1983-1991. In their study they replicate 
Topel's sample in order to examine the role of the treatment of secular trends, the 
timing of the tenure and wage data, functional form, the measures of tenure, 
differences in the estimators and the samples used. 
Topel in his analysis argues against the use of a time trend (I) that both AS and AF 
used in their models, for two reasons. First, t is expected to be correlated with both 
'Pi] and J1i. A W recognise that t may be positively correlated with 'Pij , however the 
covariance between these two will not lead to bias in the tenure and experience 
coefficients of the OLS and IVi estimators. In addition, they suggest that in the case 
of correlation between t and J1i, the problem can be solved by treating time as 
endogenous and using the deviation of t from its mean for person 1~ as an 
instrument for time. Their findings show that the secular trend in wages in Topel's 
sample is larger than the trend in the CPS based wage index used by Topel to control 
for economy wide wage growth. Considering the consequences of using the wrong 
trend, A W document that there is no effect on OLS, but it causes a substantial 
difference in the IVI estimator and it has some effect on the Topel estimator. 
In the rSID, although information on employer-tenure, union status and other job 
specific variables refer to the survey date, the wage measure is annual earnings 
divided by annual hours in the previous calendar year. AS and AF in their analysis 
use the wage measure from the survey in year t and tenure and union status 
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measures from the survey t-1, while Topel takes both the wage and the tenure and 
union status measures from the year t survey, and excludes observations with 
measured tenure less than one year. A W find that Topel's choice of dating leads to 
bias, in particular the use of the period t-1 wage with period t tenure leads to a 
large upward bias in Topel's results for both the IV1 and two-step estimator. 
In addition, A W argue that although AS and Topel used different functional forms, 
the estimates are not sensitive to the functional form used, regardless of whether the 
observations with tenure less than one are included. The functional form 
assumptions seem to explain only little of the differences in the results of the two 
studies. On what it concerns measurement errors in the AS tenure measure, A W 
support AS' views that although measurement error is important, it has little effect 
on their substantive conclusions. Finally A W suggest that both the IV1 and Topel 
estimators are biased down by match heterogeneity, and the Topel estimator is 
biased up by individual heterogeneity. Their evidence showes that the downward 
bias in the Topel estimator from job match heterogeneity is more than offset by 
upward bias from individual heterogeneity. Yet, the difference between the AS' 
estimator and the Topel estimator is minor compared to the difference between 
these estimators and OLS. 
Summarising A W's findings based on the comparIson between AS and Topel's 
estimators their main conclusion is that the returns to tenure are modest and much , 
closer to the estimates of AS and AF than Topel's. They suggest that ten years of 
tenure will raise wages by around 11 per cent, which is larger than AS's preferred 
estimate of 6.6 per cent but far below Topel's estimate of 28 per cent and OLS 
estimates of 35 per cent. 
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Furthermore, A W criticising Topel's analysis of the AF estimator, they conclude that 
after one relaxes Topel's functional form assumptions and takes information on 
wages and tenure from the same period, the use of an estimate on job duration as a 
control for heterogeneity yields tenure effect between 6 and 13 per cent (1/4 and 
1/2 of the OLS estimates, respectively) even if one uses the unrestricted version of 
AF estimator that Topel advocates. Finally, A W re-estimate the return to seniority 
using the PSID data for the years 1983-1991. Using the survey wage rate, they 
obtain a return of 4.3 per cent based on IV}, which is probably downward biased, 
and a return of 12 per cent using Topel's estimator, which is probably upward 
biased. Their preferred returns to ten years of tenure lies between these values, 
around 8 and 9 per cent. Overall, A W's analysis strongly suggests that the 
contribution of employer-tenure on wage determination is rather limited. 
A W in a later study (1998) provide further support to their previous findings, 
suggesting a return to job tenure larger than the one estimated by AS, but far below 
the OLS estimates. The starting point in their analysis is a wage equation on 
experience, tenure, a fixed individual specific error component, a fixed job match 
specific error component that changes only when the individual changes jobs, 
transitory error components, and other observed components. They eliminate the 
fixed individual effect by differencing the wage equation. Afterwards they replace 
the change in the job match components with their expected values conditional on a 
quit or layoff, tenure and prior experience, which are polynomial approximations to 
the true conditional expectations. This way they eliminate the bias from the fixed 
job match heterogeneity as well. The problem arising from this analysis is that the 
coefficients on linear experience and tenure in the wage level equation, and the 
coefficients on the linear tenure terms in the polynomial approximations are under 
identified by one common parameter. The authors solve this problem by imposing 
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some inequality restrictions on the parameters of the wage growth model. They 
argue that if the effect of tenure on wages is substantial, then the relationship 
between the change in the job match component and tenure at the time of a quit 
(layoff) will be positive (negative). The idea behind these assumptions is that senior 
workers will quit only if the job match gain is sufficient to compensate for the value 
of lost tenure, and that jobs whose workers choose to stay in for long periods tend to 
be better than jobs whose workers leave quickly. In addition they assume that the 
match gain is zero or negative for persons who are laid off with significant amounts 
of seniority. The last step in their analysis is to use a Bayes estimator due to Geweke 
(1986) to combine prior information and sample information. Geweke's estimator 
combines the normal linear regression model with a prior that is the product of an 
uninformative distribution and an indicator function which is one when the 
inequality constraints is satisfied and zero otherwise. 
In their empirical analysis they discuss both weighted least square estimates and 
formal Bayesian estimates. The sample is based upon the 1975-1987 PSID data, and 
restricted to white male heads of households between the ages of 18-60 inclusive. 
The results they present are on three different samples, based on different wage 
measures. A W estimate the return of seniority using least squares, AS's instrumental 
variable approach and Topel's estimator. According to their findings, the return of 
ten years job tenure ranges between 27.7 and 35.1 per cent based on OLS estimates, 
while in the case of AS estimator the return takes values between 10.3 and 12 per 
cent and in the case of Topel's estimator between 14.6 and 20.2 per cent. The OLS 
estimates appear to be almost three times as large as those based on AS's I~ 
estimator and alnlost two times as large as the estilllates for Topel's estimator. 
Furthermore, the results based on their model, when using their preferred wage 
measure, SlI.'l,.'l,cst that ten years of tenure raises the log wage between 6 and 14 per 
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cent. These estimates are well below the corresponding OLS results, which 
according to A W's analysis implies that the OLS estimation appears to substantially 
overstate the return to tenure. A W provide also a limited analysis of data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for comparison. The estimates of the 
return to experience based on NLSY are higher than the PSID estimates, but in 
general the results are quite consistent with those for the PSID. 
In summary, the main conclusions drawn by A W's analysis are that, first there is a 
large return to general labour market experience that is independent of job 
shopping. Second, there is an economically significant tenure effect on the log wage 
that is above AS's estimates, but far below AW's estimated OLS returns and also 
below Topel's estimates. 
A W (1997, 1998) empasise that estimated returns to seniority are strongly sensitive 
to the type of wage information used from PSID. The estimated effect more than 
doubles when using the average hourly earnings, as Topel does in his study (1991), 
instead of self-reported hourly earnings. However, the authors fail to fully account 
for this sensitivity and do not give much guidance regarding which variable should 
be used. Lefranc (2001) in a recent study attempts to formally account for these 
different factors that contribute to this sensitivity of estimates to the measurement of 
earnings. The two explanations that he examines are that the two wage variables 
might refer to different definitions of earnings, therefore the observed differences in 
the estimates might be accounted to the differences in the scope of these two 
variables. In addition, even if they refer to the same definition, they might be 
differently affected by measurements errors that potentially can produce different 
results. The sensitivity analysis is performed using Topel's (1991) two-step 
estimation procedure, where the author compares results for different wage 
variables from rSID (1979- 1992). On the sensitivity of the returns to tenure to the 
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scope of the wage variables, the author finds that the inclusion of earnings from 
secondary jobs, overtime and bonuses and their corresponding hours of work in the 
definition of the wage variable increases significantly the estimated tenure effect. In 
addition he suggests that, at least for the workers paid by the hour, the 'hourly wage 
rate on mainjoli is a better measure of hourly wage rate. It is less error-ridden than 
variables based on annual declarations and its scope is more adequate for the 
examination of the wage-tenure profiles. Overall, Lefranc concludes that the use of 
inadequate and error-ridden measures of earnings can lead to serious 
overestimation of the returns to tenure. While the accumulation of job-specific 
seniority plays a significant role in the evolution of individual wages, the returns to 
seniority are much lower and less persistent that those suggested by Topel. 
2.2.6 European Studies on Seniority-Earnings Profiles 
Although the literature on tenure-wages growth models is mainly dominated by US 
studies, there are various researchers who examine this issue using European 
surveys. Barth (1997) in a Norwegian study examines the relationship between 
seniority and wages. In particular, the author addresses the question of whether the 
seniority-wage profiles arise within or between firms. If workers are more likely to 
stay longer in high -paying jobs, then seniority effect should arise between firms. 
This is what AF (1987a) and AS (1987) in their studies referred to as job/match 
heterogeneity. In order to correct for heterogeneity among firms, the author 
proposes the use of a fixed-effect model based on within-firm variation only, where 
all variables are measured as deviations from their firm-specific mean. The fixed-
effect model is preferable to the alternative random effect model, since there is 
potential correlation between the firm-specific effects and the other explanatory 
variables. The data set is from the Norwegian Survey of l")rganizations and 
Employees (NSOE) conducted in 1989. This is a sample of private-sector empk)yl'cs 
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only, representative of wage earners in firms with more than one employee. The fact 
that each individual is observed only once means that the fixed-effect model cannot 
correct for possible fixed effects across individuals. However, it is able to single out 
the seniority effect on wages arising within firms from the total seniority wage 
effect. A wage equation model is estimated based on three different specifications: a 
standard regression on the pooled sample, a random effects model and a within-
firms fixed effects estimator. The findings are quite robust with respect to the choice 
of model. Ten years of seniority within the firm increase wages by around 3.5 per 
cent. According to the author, since the seniority-wage profile derived from the 
within-firm variation only is as steep as the one estimated on the aggregate, 
seniority effect probably arises within firms. 
Furthermore, Barth examInes whether he can find support for the two most 
prominent explanations of the positive relationship between seniority and wages: 
the human capital theory (Becker, 1975) and the theory of deferred payment 
(Lazear, 1981). For the examination of the latter, he interacts the use of piece-rate 
payment with firm-specific seniority. The presence of a piece rate actually links 
wages with individual productivity. If Lazear's theory can explain the positive 
seniority effect, then piece-rate workers should have no return to seniority within 
the firm, since they would not be covered by seniority schemes. Indeed, Barth's 
estimates are in accord with the deferred payment theory. The seniority effect is 
negligible for piece-rate workers. The author assesses whether the human capital is 
behind the observed seniority-wage profiles with the use of a variable measuring 
the job's required level of on-the-job training (in duration) and a rough distinction 
between general and specific skills requirements, based on individual responses. The 
human capital theory inlplies that the more demanding, in respect to on-the-job 
training, a job is, the higher the pay and the larger the tenure effect are going to be. 
The findings provide support for the former, indeed higher training requirements 
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gIve higher wages. However, the seniority effect declines with the on-the-job 
training requirements on the job, which contradicts with the human capital theory. 
The author also tries to distinguish between general and firm-specific skills. The 
interaction between specific training and seniority has a significant negative effect 
that is against the human capital interpretation. An explanation that Barth suggests 
for this negative interaction effect for firm-specific skills is that since the firm 
rewards the firm-specific training requirements there is no so much need for a steep 
seniority-wage profile. 
Overall, Barth's study provides some rather interesting findings. Seniority effect 
appears to rise within firms, any effect driven by the fact that high-paying jobs tend 
to survive longer is either negligible or offset by mechanisms like better job matches 
for those who change jobs. Furthermore, the author provides support to Lazear's 
delayed compensation theory, since piece-rate workers experience insignificant 
seniority effect. However, the results contrast human capital theory. Workers in jobs 
with demanding training requirements experience lower returns to seniority 
compared to employees in jobs with small training requirements. In addition, higher 
levels of firm-specific training requirements are related to less steep seniority-wage 
profiles. 
Dustmann and Meghir (1999) in a recent study develop and estimate a human 
capital model of wage growth based on learning by doing, using data from the 
German Social Security records for the years 1975-1990. Among their findings, 
they show that silnple OLS regressions overestimate the returns to experience and 
tenure. Moreover, the estimated returns to tenure are quit small, ranging from 0.38 
to 1.6 per cent annually, where the lower point estimate is obtained when allowing 
for heterogeneity in the returns to tenure across firms. In any case however, the 
wage premia accounted to job tenure are very small. Finally one of their intercstin~ 
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finding is that most of the wage growth appears to be transferable. The authors 
recognise though that their results may not be directly comparable to results of 
studies based on USA data (e.g. Topel 1991), due to the differences in timing of the 
acquisition of human capital, accounted for by the different way by which on-the-
job training is organised in the two countries. 
Sloane and Theodossiou (1993) provide the first study on the effect of tenure on 
earnings using British data. Based on the 1986 Social and Economic Life Initiative3 
(SCELI) survey, they estimate the returns to tenure separately for each sex. The 
methodology employed in order to obtain consistent estimates of the returns to 
tenure relies on the estimation of a simultaneous earnings-tenure system of 
equations, using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation procedure. For the 
identification of the tenure equation, individual and job characteristics that are 
assumed to influence earnings but not tenure are used. Similarly, the wage equation 
is identified with variables proxies of the firm's demand for labour and individual or 
job characteristics that affect tenure but not earnings. The authors provide a very 
informative discussion on the choice of explanatory variables and on their expected 
behaviour in these two models. 
The findings from the tenure equations are quite similar to what we would probably 
expect. Education is likely to make individuals more mobile (this is true for both 
sexes), hence reduce expected duration of tenure. Job instability of the individuals, 
proxied by llnemployment experience and number of voluntary job quits, is 
negatively related to tenure. Last-in first-out redundancy policies, on the other 
hand, have a positive relationship with tenure, since such rules tend to increase the 
3 This survey includes only six labour markets (Aberdeen, Coventry, Kirkcaldy, Northampton, 
Rochdale, Swindon). rotentially, the fact that the survey is based on these six distinct geographical 
areas, rather than a nationally representative sample, may be a wcakness. 
average seniority of remaInIng employees. Similarly, the presence of unlOn 
representation has a positive effect on the duration of tenure. Furthermore, pay 
incentive schemes appear to increase only the tenure of male employees; as for their 
female colleagues the estimated effect is negative and insignificant. Finally, in the 
case of male employees, seniority does not appear to be affected by earnings, while 
for the female employees there is a significant and positive relationship. 
Turning to the earnings equations, as expected, education and establishment size 
have a positive effect on wages. Unemployment experience has a negative effect 
only in the case of male employees, but men also enjoy larger returns to labour 
market experience compared to women. In addition, marriage has a positive 
earnings effect in the male equation and a negative in the female model. More 
crucially though, tenure does not appear to have any effect on the earnings of male 
employees, whilst it has a strong positive effect in the case of female individuals. 
This finding can be interpreted in conjunction with the fact that the number of 
voluntary quits is strongly significant in the male earnings equation, but 
insignificant in the earnings equation for women. As the authors suggest" men gain 
from mobl1ity in that any positive return to tenure is obscured' (pp. 429). 
Overall, the analysis suggests quite distinct patterns between the sexes. For men 
earnings have no significant effect on the duration of tenure and tenure, on the 
other hand, does not influence positively earnings. While for women, higher 
earnings increase the probability of staying more with a given firm and longer 
tenure is rewarded by higher earnings. These contrasting results can be interpreted 
with the differential lifetime labour force behaviour between men and women. Men 
gain from mobility especially in the early stages of their working lives, while \\'('1men 
with less employment l1pportunities available are more difficult tL'l change emplo)'L'r, 
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so according to the authors the underlying connection between tenure and earnings 
is revealed. 
Theodossiou (1996) in a later study using the same data (SCELI 1986) examines the 
employer-tenure effect, distinguishing between employees with promotion 
prospects and those without. The idea behind this distinction lies in the two-tier 
labour market hypothesis. Within this framework, firms offer their most highly 
valued employees promotions opportunities and reward their tenure, loyalty in the 
firm, in order to discourage labour turnover and interfirm mobility. Employers are 
also quite likely to adopt a non-promotion strategy for part of their labour force. 
The workers related to the latter experience flat tenure-wage profiles and their 
wages are rather sensitive to changes in product demand. 
Theodossiou's analysis is based on the estimation of two wage equation models, one 
for employees with promotion prospects and one without, where promotion status is 
modelled as an endogenous variable. Individuals, based on their characteristics, 
have different probabilities on getting promoted. These promotion opportunities 
however influence their wages. Therefore, the observed earnings distributions of the 
promotion and non -promotion employees would not be independent of promotion 
status. The author presents estimates based both on OLS and the AS instrumental 
variable model, although he argues that heterogeneity bias is not of major 
importance. The selection model should capture part of the unobserved individual 
and job match effects. Furthermore, the main interest is in the comparison of the 
slope coefficients between the two sectors. So unless the heterogeneity bias affects 
these comparisons, it does not raise any concern. The estimates from both OLS and 
IV yield similar results about the wage-tenure profiles. Employer-tenure appears to 
have a significant and positive role only for those employees with promotions 
prospects. The derived returns to tenure in this sector are higher by almost 19 per 
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cent (for the IV model and 16 per cent for OLS) compared with those in the non-
promotion sector, which are statistically insignificant. The plotted tenure earnings 
profiles for employees in the former sector display a rising and decelerating 
trajectory that appears to reach the maximum after approximately ten years of 
tenure. On the contrary, the wage-tenure profiles for those with no promotion 
prospects are almost flat. 
Booth and Frank (1996) are the first to present a study on the importance of 
seniority in the wage determination process using data from the BHPS. In particular 
they use data from the first wave of BHPS (1991) and examine whether wages rise 
more with seniority in workplaces with or without union representation. Their 
findings suggest that tenure (measured at current job/position rather than at 
current employer) has a quite modest and statistically insignificant effect in both 
union and non-union sector. Finally, Manning (1998) using data from LFS 
(covering the period between March 1993 to February 1996) shows how a search 
model can predict the nature of the relationship between wages, labour market 
experience and tenure. Within this framework, his analysis suggests that the 
observed tenure effect can be interpreted by a 'job-shopping model, instead of the 
human capital theory. While the return to experience appear to be driven partly by 
the search activity and partly by the actual accumulation of general human capital, 
the search model can overpredict the return to tenure implying that the return to 
tenure is broadly consistent with the' true tenure return being close to zero. 
4- 1 
2.3 Data Description 
2.3.1 BHPS Sample Characteristics 
The empirical analysis throughout the thesis is based on the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), covering the period between September 1991 and May 1999 
(Waves 1-8). This is a nationally representative household panel survey of around 
5,500 households (containing about 10,000 persons) randomly selected South of 
the Caledonian Canal (thus excluding the North of Scotland and Northern Ireland). 
The first survey of the BHPS was conducted in the autumn of 1991, and annually 
thereafter (the period each survey covers is reported in Table A.2.1). Each BHPS 
survey is referred to as a wave, e.g. the first survey in 1991 is Wave 1, the second 
Wave 2 and so onwards. The sample used in my analysis is restricted to individuals 
who are Original Sample Members (OSM). These are mainly individuals within the 
randomly selected initial sample drawn from the Postcode Address File. All OSMs 
are followed throughout all future waves of the BHPS where possible. In addition, 
other respondents not initially included in the initial sample may be added to the 
group of OSMs when associated with an OSM in the formation of a new household4 . 
Continuing on the description of the sample used in the thesis, the individuals 
considered are male and female individuals between 18 and 60 years of age, who 
reported working full-time (at least 30 hours per week) and are not self-employed. 
Individuals with missing information or imputed data in the variables used in the 
empirical analysis are excluded from this sample. The earnings variable mainly 
considered in the estimated wage equations is the natural logarithm of the nominal 
gross average hourly wage, defined as the usual weekly pay divided by the usual 
4 The critcnon is that the individual needs to be a parent of an OSl\l'S baby, in a newly formed 
hOllsehold. 
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paid hours in a week, including overtime paid. For the construction of the hourly 
wage, usual paid hours and overtime paid hours in a week are normalised to equal a 
maximum of 60 hours for the former and 12 hours for the latter. Therefore, an 
upper bound is imposed on the reported hours of work in order to avoid potential 
biases from measurement errors in the estimates of interest. The reason I use hourly 
wage rates instead of weakly or monthly rates is mainly because there may be 
different patterns that govern the employment conditions and labour supply 
preferences of male and female employees. Since not all individuals work the same 
number of hours, their weekly or monthly wages are bound to differ. Using hourly 
wage rates though, allow us some degree of uniformity across the whole sample, as 
we incorporate any dispersion in the hours of work. 
The BHPS provides valuable information on the employment history of the 
respondents, which is very useful for the construction of some human capital 
variables. At each wave their current labour market status is reported, as well as 
their employment history for the period beginning on 1 st of September a year prior 
to the interview. In addition, information on the complete labour market history of 
the individuals, since leaving full-time education for the first time, is recorded in the 
second wave and, complete job data are also collected at the third wave (I 993). 
Based on these records, I am able to follow my sample of individuals since the 
beginning of their labour market history and construct their total actual labour 
market experience (full-time and part-time) and current employer-tenure. In the 
Appendix of this chapter, I provide a detailed description on the method employed 
for the construction of those variables. 
For the purposes of my analysis in this chapter, I use three different samples. The 
first is a pooled salnple, where all individual regression samples across the eight 
waves are included. The other two are panel samples: an unbalanced and :t 
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balanced. The unbalanced panel sample is a sample of employees who appear at 
least twice, thus the maximum panel length of any sample member is eight years, 
while the minimum panel length is two years. In the balanced sample, only 
employees who are observed in all eight waves are included. Therefore, the 
balanced panel sample contains eight observations for each individual. In Table 
A.2.2 (Appendix) I provide some summary statistics5 of these three samples drawn 
from the eight waves of BHPS, on the main human capital variables and the hourly 
wage rate that I use in Chapter 2. Tables A.2.3 and A.2.4 that follow next provide 
the averages and standard deviations of these variables of interest drawn from the 
pooled sample, separately for the male and female employees, summarised per 
wave. 
A brief examination of these raw data is quite indicative of some patterns that 
govern the labour market behaviour and history of the male and female individuals. 
From the means on the pooled sample in Table A.2.2 we can see that on average 
male employees have spent roughly a year more with their employer than their 
female peers. Furthermore, male individuals appear to experience mainly full-time 
employment spells (with an average part-time working experience around half a 
year), while female individuals spend around three years on part-time jobs on 
average. In accordance to these patterns and as we would probably expect, male 
individuals seem to have longer employment history with less spells of 
unemployment or out of the labour market, compared to the female sample. A 
comparison between actual labour market experience and potential labour market 
experienceG, a popular proxy of working experience in the literature, indicates that 
5 I should underline here that these descriptive statistics refer to the male and female sample of full-
time employees only, and not to the whole BHPS sample. 
() Measured as the difference between current age and age when left full-time education for the first 
time. 
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while there is no significant variation between the two measurements for the male 
individuals, for the females there is a substantial difference. Since the average age 
composition of the two samples (male and female) is fairly similar, this observed 
difference should probably be attributed to either gender discrimination issues or to 
the particular nature of women's labour market behaviour, who for maternity and 
other family reasons spend more time out of the labour market. Finally, male 
employees also earn on average higher hourly wages than their female colleagues. 
Again some candidate reasons for these discrepancies may be sex segregation in 
particular jobs and occupations and exclusion from prestigious, high-paying jobs, 
along with those already mentioned above. These observed differences in the raw 
data between male and female employees are also depicted in the averages on the 
two panel samples (unbalanced and balanced), which compose a fairly similar 
landscape. Overall, there appears to be a different attitude between male and female 
individuals towards labour market attachment. In the next section, I further 
elaborate this issue and address the implications that may be raised within the 
framework of my empirical analysis. 
2.3.2 The Traditional Empirical Division Between Male and Female Employees 
Throughout my thesis I present earnings equation models and estimates on the 
returns to accumulated skills in work. The question raised here is how relevant and 
appropriate is to divide the sample into male and female employees and estimate 
separate wage equations, given the transformation that male and female labour 
supply has undergone and the legislative changes on discrimination issues7 over the 
last decades. The discussion above on the raw data reveals some distinct gender 
patterns on labour market attachment. Male individuals on average appear to 
7 rqual Pay Act (1970) and Sex I )islTimination Act (1975, 1 ~)92). 
experIence lengthier tenure In their jobs compared to their female peers. 
Furthermore, a comparison between potential work experience and actual 
experience shows that males are more attached to the labour market, while female 
individuals spend a significant amount of time unemployed or, out of the labour 
market. Although this analysis relies on basic descriptive statistics, I believe it is 
indicative of the true trends that govern labour market supply and behaviour. 
Booth et al. (1999), using the first five waves of BHPS, present a study where they 
formally compare men's and women's participation rates in Britain. Despite the fact 
that there is convergence in men's and women's labour market participation rates, 
the study suggests that the rates still differ and so does the degree of longitudinal 
persistence. In particular, Booth at al. find that the year-on-year persistence in paid 
work propensities is higher for males than for females indicating females have less 
labour force attachment than males in the UK. They also find that the year-to-year 
persistence of non-work is higher for female than for males. Furthermore, while 
non -job elapsed spell lengths for women are more than double the length of those 
for men on average, men experience longer job spell duration compared to women, 
although the differentials between sexes are smaller in that case. The authors 
suggest that the principal sources of differences between the sexes in their 
probabilities of paid work are differences in observable characteristics and 
differences in rates of return to those characteristics. Specifically, women in the 
sample, compared to men, are not as highly educationally qualified, have less prior 
full-time working experience and appear to have greater responsibilities for 
children, on average. Nonetheless, the key determinants of these observed 
differences in the paid-work propensities seem to be the differences in the 
coefficients on household structure, in particular the number and age of children. 
Although, the impact of having children significantly reduces the probability of 
being in work fc'll' both men and women, the magnitUde of the effect is dramatically 
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higher for women. A finding that conforms with the traditional view that women 
have to bear the burden of child-care. "In spite of the rhetoric about shared famIly 
and work responsibIlities and the 'flew men' of the 1990s, famIly responsIbIlities 
have a much greater disincentive effect on the probability of being in paId work lor 
women than they do on the probabIlity for men' (pp. 189). 
Booth et al.'s study provides sufficient evidence to support the decision to examine 
the tenure-earnings profiles separately for the male and female sample. Men and 
women show distinctively different patterns in their labour market behaviour and 
attachment. Therefore, estimates on a pooled sample composed of both sexes will 
probably conceal this diversity in their labour supply. One issue that arises though 
from the estimation of an earnings equation on female employees only is the 
potential sample selection bias in the estimates of interest. Since women still appear 
to be less attached to the labour market compared to men, their participation 
decision may be a source of selectivity bias. In a wage equation framework, the 
researcher focuses only on individuals who are working, however the question of 
interest here is whether working women are representative of the popUlation of 
women as a whole, or not. If the absence of non -participants involves the omission 
of observations, which are not missing at random, OLS estimates on an earnings 
regression can potentially be biased and inconsistent. The classical regression model 
does not allow for the sample selection problem, which may occur when for 
instance women leave the labour force for domestic reasons. If those who quit work 
are not a random selection from the female sample, then OLS will be inconsistent. 
Although this is an interesting topic, the examination of selectivity bias in the female 
wage equation model exceeds the purpose of my study. Furthermore, taking account 
of this selectivity requires data on a suitable instrument that affects labour market 
participation but not wages. However, finding or, constructing such an instrument 
can often be :l r~lther difficult task. Therefore throughout the empirical analysis in 
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my thesis I do not address this issue and I interpret the estimated coefficients as the 
true returns to the variables of interest. 
2.4 Estimating the Returns to Employer-Tenure 
2.4.1 OLS Estimates 
Despite the fact that OLS method has been criticised of overestimating the 
contribution of tenure in a wage equation due to possible endogeneity bias (AF, 
1987a; AS, 1987 among others), we can still think of the OLS estimates as a 
'benchmarR, a reference point for our estimations when using alternative 
techniques. Therefore, in this section I examine the OLS returns to employer-tenure 
based on a standard Mincer (1974) wage equation. In particular, the analysis is 
focused on the effect employer-tenure has on hourly pay and how this effect may 
vary according to the functional form of the model used, the different methods of 
time trend and business cycle wage adjustment, as well as the inclusion of actual 
instead of potential labour market experience. 
The estimated model is a log linear wage equation, outlined as: 
Wijt = a + (31 Eijt + (321ij t + (3n X ijt (2.11) 
where i is the individual in job j at period t and E ijt refers to labour market 
experience, 7ijt is the employer-tenure and X ijt is a vector of n other regressors. 
The dependent variable used in the estimated wage equations in this section, unless 
otherwise is stated, is the log of the nominal gross average hourly wage. The other 
regressors included in the Basic Model (Model !) are: age left education8, a 
8 Defined as age left school or, in the case of further education, age left further education if it is less 
than or equal to 25. 
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quadratic in employer-tenure (measured in years divided by ten, i.e. decades), a 
quadratic in potential labour market experience (measured in years), dummies for 
individual's skills and a time trend, that takes values from 1 to 8 according to the 
wave the observation belongs to. The model is estimated for the pooled sample and 
separately for the male and female employees and presented in Table 2.1, first 
column. The derived effect of 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of employer-tenure are also 
provided on the table (T5, TI0, T15, T20 respectively). What stands out from these 
estimates is the fact that in all cases the returns of employer-tenure are quite modest 
(the effect ten years is 4.7 per cent for the pooled sample and 5.7 per cent and 1.6 
per cent for the male and female) and that there is a noticeable difference between 
male and female employees. 
The Basic Model is re-estimated using alternative control vectors, columns 2 to 5 in 
Table 2.1. The model presented in the second columr is the Basic Model with the 
addition of regional dummies and some controls the workplace characteristics, one-
digit industry dummies and establishment size dummies (Model 2). The third model 
estimated includes regional dummies and some occupational and qualification 
dummies (Model 3). The model presented in column four uses as regressors, apart 
from those included in the basic model, regional dummies, workplace-
characteristics controls (establishment SIze and one-digit industry), as well as 
controls for occupation and individuals' qualifications (Model 4). The last 
specification examined (Model 5) includes all the regressors used in Model 4 plus 
two dummies for union coverage in the workplace and union membership9. 
!) These five wage equations are estimated many times throughout this chapter. Therefore, in order to 
avoid repetition, for the rest of the analysis I refer to them as Models 1-5, without mentioning the 
regressors each model includes. 
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Looking at the presented estimates of the employer-tenure effect from these four 
alternative specifications, we can see that the picture has slightly changed, with the 
returns of ten years of tenure varying from 6.7 to 7.3 per cent for the pooled 
sample, 4.6 to 6.9 per cent for the male employees and 4.3 to 7.6 per cent for the 
female employees. Nevertheless, the estimated effect is still appears to be modest, not 
exceeding the 8 per cent in any case. 
2.4.1.1 Examination of Alternative Functional Forms 
The analysis in this section is focused on the choice of the functional form and on 
the sensitivity of the returns to employer-tenure to different functional forms. For 
the purpose of the analysis five alternatives to the basic quadratic wage equation 
model (Model 1) are examined. The models are estimated separately for the pooled 
and the male and female full-time employees and presented in Tables 2.2-2.4.These 
models include the Basic Model with the addition of a dummy variable for 
employer-tenure greater or equal to one year (row 2), a dummy for tenure greater 
or equal to 6 months (row 3), an interaction term between the age individuals left 
education and their potential labour market experience (row 4) and higher order 
polynomials in employer-tenure (rows 5 and 6). 
The inclusion of a dummy for tenure length greater than 6 months or one year has, 
not surprisingly, decreased the estimated effect of ten years of employer-tenure in 
all cases. It would be a reasonable argument to assume that job-specific skills are 
mostly acquired during the first short period in a new job and that the accumulation 
of skills continues after that period but at a smaller rate. The findings in rows 2 and 
3 simply confirm that hypothesis, where the addition of a dummy for tenure length 
has redul'cd the contribution of ten years of employer-tenure. In the estimated 
models presented here the potential labour market experience is included in the 
vector of regressors, which is estimated by taking the difference between the current 
age of the individual and his/her age when left education. Therefore, individuals of 
the same age are expected to have less years of potential labour market experience 
when they are well educated rather than when they have the 'bask! education. The 
interaction term between age left education and years of potential labour market 
experience controls this 'relationship between these two variables. The estimates 
presented in row 4 (Tables 2.2-2.4) suggest that the effect of employer-tenure 
remains the same, for the pooled sample and the male employees, when this 
interaction term is included in the regressors. Only in the case of female employees 
is the magnitude of tenure effect slightly increased to 2.5 per cent, but the effect still 
is statistically insignificant even in that case. 
The estimates presented in Tables 2.2-2.4 may shed some light to the question of 
how employer-tenure should be entered into the wage equation, quadratic, cubic or 
any other higher order polynomial. The inclusion of cubic in tenure appears to 
increase significantly the effect on the log wage for all the samples, pooled, male 
and female. The coefficients of tenure are individually significant even at a 5 per 
cent level of significance. Further, the join significance of the tenure terms in the 
wage modepo and the significance of the effect of ten years of tenure ll are tested 
(tests are not presented here). In both cases, the Ho is strongly rejected, suggesting 
that the 3rd order polynomial in tenure may be the appropriate form. Hence, from 
the rest of my analysis I adopt the cubic in tenure specification, and so the Basic 
Model now includes age left education, a cubic in tenure, a quadratic in experience, 
dummies for skills and a time trend. 
II Ho: /31 + /32 + /33 = 0 , i.t'. the returns of ten years of tenure are equal to zero. 
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The five models presented in Table 2.1 are now re-estimated, for the pooled sample 
and male and female employees, using cubic instead of quadratic in tenure. The 
estimates are shown in Table 2.5, where the effect of 5, 10, 15 and 20 year of 
employer-tenure on the log wage is presented as well. Compared with the estimates 
in Table 2.1, it appears that the inclusion of 3rd order polynomial in tenure has 
increased the returns to ten years of employer-tenure by at least 50 per cent in most 
cases. In particular, the estimated effect of ten years of tenure on the log wage now 
ranges from 7.9 to 11.4 per cent for the pooled sample and from 7.6 to 11 per cent 
and 6.4 to 12.8 per cent for the male and female employees respectively. The 
inclusion of grd order polynomial in tenure has significantly altered the estimated 
tenure effect suggesting that the contribution of the employer-tenure is better 
described in a wage equation like the one below: 
Even though the grd order polynomial in tenure appears to explain better the 
contribution of employer-tenure, the estimated effect remains modest and in no case 
does the ten-year tenure effect exceed the 11 per cent and 13 per cent, for the male 
and female employees, respectively. 
2.4.1.2 Real Hourly Wages and Actual Labour Market Experience 
So far the analysis is focused on nominal hourly wages. However it would be 
interesting to examine whether time trend can be a source of variation in the 
estimated returns to employer-tenure, so here I examine several treatments of time 
trend. Table 2.6 summarises the returns of 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of tenure 
estimated on 6 different models. The first model is the KISic J\1()dc/ that includes 
nominal hourly pay and a time trend (row 1) and the second model includes 7 wave 
-') ~) -
dummies instead of the time trend (row 2). The following two models include the 
real hourly wage, based on the Retail Price Index (RPI), instead of the nominal (row 
3), with the addition of a time trend in the second model (row 4). Finally, the 
remaining two models use the real hourly pay, based on the Average Earnings Index 
(AEI) (row 5), with the inclusion of a time trend in one of them (row 6). The 
information on RPI and AEI is taken from the National Statistics. RPpz refers to 
annual average with base year 1987 and AEP3 is the annual average based on all 
the employees working in the main industry sectors with base year 1995. The 
average nominal and real hourly wage rates for men and women are presented per 
calendar year in Table A.2. 3. 
The OLS estimates presented in Table 2.6 simply suggest that there is very little 
variation in the returns to tenure based on which time trend is used. The estimated 
impact of ten years of employer-tenure on the log wage is estimated to be around 
9.4 per cent for the male employees and roughly 6.4 per cent for the female 
employees. One thing though that is worth mentioning is the differing effect that 
deflating the nominal wage with the RPI (row 3) and de-trending the nominal wage 
with the AEI (row 5) have on the estimated returns to tenure. As it is shown in Table 
2.6, the returns to tenure are greater when using the RPI to deflate the nominal 
wage (row 3) than when de-trending the nominal wage with AEI (row 5). However, 
when I include a time trend in both cases (rows 4 and 6) it brings the estimated 
returns to tenure back into line with the rest of the estimates (rows 1 and 2). The 
12 "The Retail Price Index (RPJ) measures the percentage changes month by month in the :lVerage 
kvc/ of prices of the goods lllld services purchased by the great majority of households in the United 
Kingdom." Source: Office of National Statistics 
J:I "The A I'(,/,:I";C Etlrnings Index (AE!) is desJ~,?ned to me,1sure changes III the lel'c/ t J{ etll'llinSS i.e. 
, 
II':ISC infflltion ill (;rc:lt Britai!1." Source: Office of National Statistics 
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inclusion of the time trend appears to control for the difference between the trend in 
the AEI and the RPI and the actual trend in the BHPS sample used in my analysis. 
The BHPS data set provides all the necessary employment history information that 
enables the construct of the actual labour market experience. Therefore, now I 
examine what impact the inclusion of actual experience, instead of potential, in the 
wage equation has on the estimated returns to tenure. Table 2. 7 presents estimations 
of the Basic Modelon the male and female pooled, unbalanced and balanced sample 
using alternativly potential and actual experience. In all cases, it appears that the 
inclusion of actual experience, instead of potential experience, reduces the 
estimated returns to employer-tenure. The magnitude of this effect varies noticeably 
between male and female employees. For the male sample the estimated returns to 
ten years of tenure decrease from 9.4, 9.4, and 5.9 to 7.7, 7.7 and 5.2 per cent for 
the pooled, unbalanced and balanced sample, respe~tively. While for the female 
employees the effect is more dramatic with the returns to ten years of tenure falling 
from 6.4 or 5.4 to 1.3 and 0.4 for the pooled and unbalanced sample, giving even a 
negative effect when estimated on balanced sample. 
The analysis so far, based on OLS, has shown that the contribution of employer-
tenure in the wage determination is quite modest, with the estimated impact of ten 
years of tenure not exceeding 10 per cent in most of the cases, both for male and 
female full-time employees. In the next part of this chapter, I address the issue of 
potential endogeneity bias in the least square estimates and explore the robustness 
of my findings using alternative estimators suggested in the literature. 
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2.4.2 Altonji & Shakotko's (1987) Instrumental Variable Technique 
AS (1987), when examining the impact of tenure on wages, proposed the use of an 
instrumental variable to deal with the endogeneity problem deriving from the fact 
that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job match 
characteristics that affect wages. The authors suggest the use of the difference 
between the employer-tenure and the average employer-tenure for the individual as 
a valid instrument of employer-tenure. More specifically, assume a wage equation 
model: 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
for the individual j , in job j at period t, where XiJt is a control vector that includes 
labour market experience. According to their analysis a valid instrument for the 
tenure is l1T;jt = T;;I - T iJ where T iJ is the average employer-tenure for the 
individual. The authors argued that 11T;;1 sums up to zero over the sample years in 
which the individual j is in job j. Furthermore, the instrumental variable, T1V , is 
orthogonal to the error components ILi and 'Pij, which are constant during job j. If 
T1V is also orthogonal to the transitory error component 'rJijt ,then T1V is a valid 
instrumental variable. 
In the analysis presented here, two different methods are used to construct the 
instrumental variable. The time difference between two consecutive waves of the 
BHPS can be defined as either one year (method 1) or as the actual duration 
between consecutive interviews for each individual (method 2). In both cases the 
tenure value used to construct the mean tenure T'l is the one from the wave that 
55 
identifies the maximum length of time with employer. For example, using the first 
method, for an individual who is observed in all the waves (wave 1 to 8) if his 
employer-tenure in wave 8 is greater than 7 years (difference between the latest 
and the earliest wave observed) then this individual hasn't changed employer over 
the sample years. So, the average employer-tenure for this individual will be the 
tenure at wave 8 minus 3.5 (the half of the difference between the latest and the 
earliest wave he was observed). Similarly for the second method, with the only 
difference that instead of using the difference between the latest and the earliest 
wave the individual was observed, I use the length of time between the interviews of 
the latest and the earliest wave the individual was observed, given that the 
employer-tenure in the latest wave exceeds this period. 
Adopting AS's methodology here, I instrument the tenure polynomial terms with the 
deviation from their means, defined as: 
(2.15) 
2 2-2 ~v = Tijt - T ij (2.16) 
3 3-3 ~v = Tijt - T ij (2.17) 
In the following sections estimates on the return to employer-tenure, using the AS 
instrumental variable method, are presented and the sensitivity of the estimated 
tenure effect is examined to different treatments of time trend, the inclusion of 
actual experience and the use of alternative control vectors. 
2.4.2.1 Estimation of the Basic Model 
In this section I provide some initial estimates on the returns to tenure usin~ the AS 
instrumental variable method. Table 2.8 presents estimates of the basic model 
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separately for the male and female unbalanced sample of full-time employees, 
where the instrumental variable is constructed using both methods. The model used 
here includes a cubic in employer-tenure and a quadratic in potential labour 
market experience. In addition to the estimation of the model, a Hausman test is 
performed. The general idea of a Hausman test is that two estimators are compared. 
One which is consistent under both the null hypothesis and the alternative (the 
instrumental variable estimator here) and one which is consistent and typically 
efficient only under the null hypothesis (OLS estimator). The Hausman test 
examines whether there is sufficient difference between the coefficients of the 
instrumental variables regression and the standard OLS and it is best interpreted as 
evaluating whether OLS is a consistent estimator of the model. Therefore, rejection 
of the null hypothesis indicates that OLS is an inconsistent estimator for this model. 
All the estimates and the Hausman test are shown in Table 2.8. 
The estimated returns to 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of tenure for both male and female 
employees are relatively consistent across the two methods employed. In the case of 
male employees, the estimated effect of ten years of tenure is 4.5 per cent, but 
statistically insignificant. In addition, the Hausman test indicates that OLS is a 
consistent estimator of the model, implying that endogeneity bias is probably not a 
serious problem in the sample. Similarly for the female employees, tenure does not 
appear to have any effect on wages. The Hausman test in this case though suggests 
that OLS is an inconsistent estimator of the model. The wage equation is re-
estimated in Table 2.9 with the basic model including a quadratic in tenure this 
time, as AS used in their analysis. The estimates do not differ a lot from those shown 
in Table 2.8. The effect of ten years of tenure for the male employees is around 5 per 
cent while for the female enlployees tenure effect still appears to be negligible. , 
2.4.2.2 Treatment of Time Trend 
A W (1997) underline the importance of wage treatment over time. Here I examine 
six different ways of time treatment using the Basic Model, as I did with the OLS 
estimates (Table 2.6). The models are estimated separately for the male (Tables 2.10 
and 2.12) and female full-time employees (Tables 2.11 and 2.13) both from the 
unbalanced and balanced sample. The estimates presented in Tables 2.10 and 2.1 1 
are based on models with a cubic in employer-tenure and a quadratic in potential 
labour market experience, while those in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 include a quadratic 
both in tenure and potential experience, as AS do in their analysis. From the 
previous estimates we show that the choice of the method to construct the 
instrumental variable has no impact on the findings, therefore for the rest of my 
analysis I use the instrumental variable derived from the second method. 
The estimates presented in Table 2.10 imply that the returns to tenure are relatively 
sensitive to the choice of wage treatment over time. However for the unbalanced 
sample the effect of tenure is quite similar when using nominal wages and a time 
trend or wave dummies and when using the de-trended nominal wage (AEI) and a 
time trend, with the estimated returns to ten years of tenure slightly lower than 4.5 
per cent. Yet, tenure has a significant positive effect only in the model based on the 
deflated nominal wage (RPI), where the estimated returns to ten years of tenure are 
6.8 per cent. On the other hand, the estimates on the male balanced sample imply 
that tenure has no significant effect on wages, irrespective to which model is 
chosen. Furthermore, for both samples, Hausman test is almost uniformly in favour 
of the OLS estimator. In Table 2.11 the estimates on the female full-time employees 
are presented. What stands out of those estimations is that tenure appears to have a 
significant effect only ill the model that uses the deflated nominal wage (RPI) for 
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both the unbalanced and balanced sample. The estimated returns to ten years of 
employer-tenure are around 12 per cent in the case of the unbalanced sample and a 
bit lower for the balanced sample, roughly 10.2 per cent. According to Hausman 
test and contrary to the estimates on the male sample, OLS appears to be an 
inconsistent estimator for the female employees in most of the cases. 
The picture does not change radically when the models are re-estimated using a 
quadratic in tenure. In particular from Table 2.12, it appears that tenure has a 
significant effect only in the case of the model that uses the deflated nominal wage 
(RPI), estimated on the male full-time employees unbalanced sample. Compared 
with the estimates presented in Table 2.10, the effect now of ten years of tenure is 
slightly higher, around 7.7 per cent. Similarly for the female employees, Table 2.13 
suggests that tenure has a positive and significant effect when estimated on the real 
hourly wage, based on the RPI, for both the unbalanc:ed and balanced sample. The 
magnitude of this effect is larger compared to the estimates presented in Table 2.11. 
Here, the effect of ten years of tenure is 12.7 per cent for the unbalanced and 11 per 
cent for the balanced sample. 
2.4.2.3 Actual Labour Market Experience and Alternative Control Vectors 
This section examines the sensitivity of the returns to tenure to the inclusion of 
actual labour n1arket experience, instead of potential, and of alternative control 
vectors to the estimated model. Table 2.14 presents estimates on the male and 
female balanced and unbalanced sample. The n10del used for the analysis is the 
Basic Model that includes a cubic in tenure and a quadratic in experience. 
Employer-tenure appears to have a positive effect only in the estimates on the male 
unbalanced sample, where ten years of tenure have a contribution of 4.:1 per cent 
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when the model is estimated using the potential experience and slightly lower when 
actual experience is included, around 3.3 per cent. Nevertheless, all estimates on the 
male samples (unbalanced and balanced) are not statistically significant. 
Interestingly enough for the female employees, tenure is calculated to have a strong 
negative effect, mainly significant though when actual labour market is included in 
the model. Once again, Hausman test implies that OLS is a consistent estimator for 
the case of male employees, where the opposite is true for both the female samples. 
The models are re-estimated including quadratic in both tenure and experience and 
presented in Table 2.15. The findings are fairly similar, suggesting no true tenure 
effect for the male employees and a significant negative effect for their female 
colleagues. 
Finally, four groups of alternative control vectors are also considered, Models 2 to 5 
as described already in the analysis above (Tables 2.16 and 2.17). In the case of 
male employees, tenure is calculated to have a significant positive impact on wages 
only in the case of the unbalanced sample. Yet the estimated ten-year effect is below 
10 per cent. On the contrary, the contribution of tenure on the wage determination 
of the female employees appears to be trivial. Overall, two things stand out from the 
analysis based on the AS-IV. First, employer-tenure does not have any sizable impact 
on earnings. In addition, it appears that OLS is a consistent estimator for the case of 
male employees, while the contrary is probably true for the female employees. 
2.4.3 Topel's Two-Step Estimator 
Topel (1991), for the estimation of the returns to employer-tenure, suggests a two-
step estimator that controls for potential endogeneity bias. The methodology used in 
his analysis can be summarised in the following model. First let's assume a wage 
equation given by: 
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Taking the first difference we have: 
(2.19) 
Since ~ T = ~E = 1 (the difference between two consecutive periods is one year), 
equation (2.19) can be re-written as: 
(2.20) 
where /3 = /31 + /32, in other words {3 represents the within-job wage growth. 
Returning back to the wage equation model, we can re-write the model as: 
or, 
then, 
~jt = a + /31T,jt + /32TIj/ + /32 (Eij/ - Tij/ ) + /33T,j~ + /34E~1 
+ /3sT,}, + /36E;~1 + /37T,j~ + /38 E:1 + control vector 
~jt = a + /3T,jl + /32 (Eljl - T,jl ) + /33T,j~ + /34E:1 
+ /3sT,}, + /36E~1 + /37T,j~ + /38 E;;1 + control vector 
~j/ - /3T,jl - /33T,j~ - /34E:/ - /3sT,j~ - /36E~1 - /37T,j~ - /38 E';1 
= a + /32 ( Eij/ - T,j/ ) + control vector 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
Topel's two-step method relies on the estimation of equation (2.20) initially, in 
order to get an estimate of the within -job growth ({3), and in the second step the 
estimation of equation (2.23) that will provide us with an estimate of the experience 
effect ({32). Then, the tenure effect ({31) is simply the difference between the 
within-job growth and the tenure effect ({3 - (32) . 
For the replication of Topel's method I have to estimate the first difference in tenure 
and experience. In my analysis I follow two alternative ways of doing that. First I 
assume that the period between two consecutive waves of the BHPS is one year 
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(method /), or alternativly I use the length between the interviews of two 
consecutive waves as a measure of the period between the two waves (method 2). In 
both methods applied the tenure used for the construction of the first difference is 
the one from the wave that identifies the longest period of time with employer. 
Similarly the experience used is from the wave that identifies the maximum length 
of time in the labour market. Therefore, using the first method described, the first 
difference in tenure is given by: 
!J.T = 7; - 7;-1 or!J.T = 7; - (r; - 1 ) (2.24) 
and the first difference in the square of tenure is given by: 
(2.25) 
similarly also for the higher order tenure terms. 
2.4.3.1 Basic Model Estimates Using the Two-Step Method 
In this section some first estimates based on Topel's two-step method are presented. 
The model used in the first step includes 4th order polynomials in both tenure and 
potential experience, like in Topel's analysis. In the second step the estimated model 
is similar to the one described by equation (2.23), with a variable that measures the 
age individuals left education included in the regressors. The models are estimated 
separately for male and female full-time employees from the unbalanced sample. 
The wage used is the real hourly wage, based on the AE!. Table 2.18a presents the 
estimates fron1 the first step. The first row in this table is the estimated within -job 
growth ((3), while in the rest of the rows the coefficients of the higher order terms 
in tenure and potential experience are summarised. Table 2.19a shows the estimates 
from the second step. In particular the first column presents the estimated 
experience effect (132), while in the second column is the within-job gt'()wth Cd), 
taken from the previous table. The third column of the table has the tenure effect 
(f31) , derived from subtracting the first column from the second one. Finally the 
returns to 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of employer-tenure are presented in the last four 
columns. 
What stands out from the estimates presented in Table 2.190. is first of all the 
difference in the returns to tenure between the male and female employees. While 
for the male sample tenure appears to have a strong positive effect on the log wage, 
for the female employees the effect seems to be very small and negative. 
Furthermore, there is a noticeable difference in the estimated returns to tenure 
between the two alternative methods used, especially for the male employees. The 
returns to ten years of employer-tenure for the male sample are roughly 15.5 per 
cent when estimated with the first method and slightly below 1 ° per cent when the 
second method is used. 
The process is repeated again but this time instead of using the real hourly wage 
based on the AEI, I use the deflated hourly wage (RPI). Like before the estimates 
from the first and second step are presented in Tables 18b and 19b. Comparing 
these findings with the ones based on the de-trended nominal wage, we can see that 
the picture has changed dramatically, especially for the female employees. The 
returns to ten years of tenure, estimated on the female sample, are now slightly 
below 9 per cent, irrespectively to which method is used. For the male employees 
the tenure effect has increased as well, ten years of tenure have an effect of 24 per 
cent and 18 per cent on the log wage, when method 1 and 2 are used respectively. 
Still the estimated tenure effect appears to be larger when method 1 is employed. 
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2.4.3.2 Wage Treatment Over Time 
From the previous section it becomes apparent that the estimated returns to tenure 
are very sensitive to the wage treatment over time. The use of alternative real wage 
definitions, de-trended and deflated nominal wages, changes noticeably the 
estimates. Therefore, in this section I further investigate the time treatment effects as 
I did before in the case of least squares and instrumental variable estimators. 
Tables 2.20 and 2.21 present the derived tenure effect for the male and female 
unbalanced and balanced sample. All estimates presented are based on the second 
method of constructing the first difference. The returns to tenure appear to be very 
sensitive to the different methods of wage treatment over time. Yet the inclusion or 
not of a time trend when real wages are used does not seem to alter the results a lot. 
For the unbalanced male sample, the returns of ten years to tenure, when estimated 
on the nominal wages, are roughly 47 per cent, no matter if a time trend or wave 
dummies are included. This effect is reduced significantly when the model is 
estimated on the real wage, based on the RPI, to around 18 per cent. These estimates 
are further reduced more when the de-trended nominal wage (AEI) is used, with the 
effect of ten years of tenure at 12 per cent. The picture is quite similar when the 
models are estimated on the balanced sample, with the returns to tenure modestly 
larger in all cases. 
Similarly for the female employees, the estimated returns to tenure change 
dramatically across the various ways of wage treatment over time. Like in Table 
2.20, the use of non1inal wages gives the highest estin1ated tenure effect (ten-year 
tenure effect is calculated around 38 per cent and 35 per cent for the unbalanced 
and balanced sample), while the estimates on the real wage (AEI) Sll~Scst a small 
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but negative tenure effect. The alternative estimates on the unbalanced and 
balanced sample do no change noticeably the returns to tenure, apart from the case 
when real wages based on RPI are used, where the tenure effect almost doubles for 
the balanced sample. A comparison between the estimates presented in Tables 2.20 
and 2.21 strongly suggests that, in all the cases examined, the returns to tenure are 
higher for the male employees. The analysis in this section showed that there is a 
significant diversity in the estimated tenure effect, depending on the way wages are 
treated over time. Therefore for the rest of my analysis, I will present estimates using 
both the deflated (RPI) and the de-trended (AEI) nominal wage. 
2.4.3.3 Actual Instead of Potential Labour Market Experience 
The question examined in this section is whether the inclusion of actual experience 
instead of potential alters the results at all. The model considered in the first step 
includes 4th order polynomials in both tenure and experience, while age individuals 
left education is added to the regressors of the model in the second step. The method 
of constructing the first differences in the tenure and experience terms is the one 
based on the period between two consecutive interviews (method 2). 
Table 2.22a summarises the estimated effect of 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of employer-
tenure, when the de-trended nominal wage is used. For the male sample the choice 
between actual or potential experience does not alter the results significantly. 
However the reported returns to tenure increase dramatically when the effect is 
measured on the balanced sample. While the returns to ten years of tenure are 
around 1 ° per cent for the unbalanced sample, the effect is doubled to 21 per cent 
when the balanced sample is used. In contrast, for the female employees the effect ()t' 
tenure appears to be negative in all the cases considered. 
65 
The analysis is repeated again, but this time the returns to tenure are estimated on 
the deflated wage (RPI), Table 2.22b summarises the findings. The picture does not 
change dramatically for the male employees. The alternative use of potential and 
actual labour market experience does not affect the returns to tenure, with the effect 
of ten years of tenure around 18 per cent for the unbalanced sample and, like 
before, noticeably increased for the balanced sample, roughly above 26 per cent. 
The results are more interesting for the female employees, where the inclusion of 
actual experience appears to decrease the returns to tenure for both the unbalanced 
and balanced sample. In particular, for the unbalanced sample the effect of ten 
years of tenure falls from 8.5 per cent to 6.5 per cent and for the balanced sample 
from 5.8 per cent to only 2.1 per cent. Furthermore, the tenure effect is smaller 
when estimated on the balanced sample, than on the unbalanced, giving an opposite 
picture to the one taken from the male employees. The findings presented in Tables 
22a and 22b, suggest that the choice between actual and potential labour market 
experience does not have any notable impact on the estimated tenure effect on the 
male sample. However, for the female employees, the inclusion of actual, instead of 
potential, labour market experience appears to reduce the contribution of tenure. 
2.4.3.4 Examination of Alternative Control Vectors 
In this section I examIne the robustness of my findings on tenure effect usmg 
alternative control vectors in the model estimated at the second stage of Topel's 
method. There are four different control vectors added to the Basic Model, identical 
to the ones employed in the previous sections of this chapter (A hJdc'/:'>' 2-5). These 
five models are estimated separately for the male and female full-time employees, 
alternatively for the unbalanced and balanced sanlple. The method used for the 
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construction of first difference in tenure and experience terms is method 2. In 
Tables 2.23 and 2.24 the returns to 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of employer-tenure are 
presented, estimated on the de-trended nominal wages (AEI). For the male 
employees the tenure effect varies across the different control vectors used. The ten 
years effect of tenure ranges from 10 per cent (Model 1) to 19.2 per cent (Model 4) 
for the unbalanced sample, and for the balanced sample from 21 per cent (Model 1) 
to 34 per cent (Model 4). Model 4 gives the highest estimates and Model 1 the 
lowest ones in both samples. In addition, as already noted in the previous section, 
the estimated tenure effect is significantly higher on the balanced sample. For the 
female employees, the tenure effect of ten years does not exceed the 2 per cent when 
estimated on the unbalanced sample, and it is small and negative on the balanced 
sample. 
The same process is repeated but this time instead of using the de-trended nominal 
wage I use the deflated one, based on the RPI. Model 4 continues to give the highest 
returns to tenure and Modell the lowest for the male employees. The estimates are 
noticeably higher for the balanced sample compared to the unbalanced. 
Furthermore, as probably expected from the previous analysis, the estimated returns 
to tenure presented in Table 2.25 are larger compared to those in Table 2.23. For 
the female employees (Table 2.26>, the estimated returns to tenure have 
dramatically increased in all cases. Now the effect of ten years of employer-tenure 
ranges from 8.5 per cent (Model 1) to 12.5 per cent (Models 4 and 5) for the 
unbalanced sample and from 15 per cent (Model 1) to 19 per cent (Model 3) for the 
balanced sample. Contrary to the findings in the previous section, here the estimates 
are significantly larger when estimated on the balanced sample. 
Finally the analysis described so far in this section is repeated this time thouZh in the 
first-difference model used in the first step of Topel's 2-step method a cubic in 
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tenure and a quadratic in potential experience is included as opposed to the 4th 
order polynomials in both tenure and experience used so far. Tables 2.27, 2.28, 
2.29 and 2.30 present the effect of 5,10,15 and 20 years of employer-tenure. In all 
the cases the estimated returns to tenure are reduced noticeably, with the only 
exception the case of female employees from the unbalanced sample, when the de-
trended nominal wage is used. 
Two main points can be drawn from the analysis, based on Topel's two-step method. 
The estimated tenure effect, on the male employees, is significantly higher compared 
with the one derived from both OLS and the instrumental variables technique. In 
addition, the computed returns to tenure are' worryingl;? sensitive to the choice of 
time treatment for both male and female employees. 
2.4.4 Panel Data Analysis on the Returns to Tenure 
An alternative method of removing the endogeneity bias in the estimates of tenure 
effect, derived from the potential correlation between the tenure variable and the 
unobserved individual specific and job match characteristics, is the use of panel 
estimators. Consider a simple wage equation model given by: 
(2.26) 
In this model v/ + &/1 IS the residual, where cil has the usual properties, 
E./I rv IID(O, ( 2 ), and v/ is the unit-specific residual, differing between units but 
staying constant for any particular unit over time. From equation (2.26) we can 
derive: 
TV = a + fJT + \' + C I I / / (2.27) 
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where ~, T" Gj are the means over time. Subtracting equation (2.27) from (2.26) 
we get: 
(2.28) 
The fixed effect (within group) estimator uses OLS to estimate equation (2.28) and 
with this way it subsumes the omitted variables (unobserved heterogeneity across 
units). On the other hand, the random effects (GLS) estimator provides a weighted 
average of the estimates produced by the between and within estimators. 
Equivalently, it estimates of the following model: 
(2.29) 
In the case of random effects estimator the random component takes account of the 
potential heterogeneity derived from the unobserved individual and job match 
characteristics. For the purpose of completeness in my analysis, I use both fixed 
effects (within group) and random effects estimators. The unit j in my estimates 
represent an individual working for a particular employer (ij). Therefore, I take 
different values when the same individual is observed working for a different 
employer in the sample. This way I may probably employ a better control for both 
individual and job match heterogeneity, since estimates are based on deviations of 
the variables from their individual means, specific to each particular employer-
employee relationship. 
An obvious question raised is which estimator is more appropriate to use on my 
panel sample. The answer is not a straightforward one. For that reason, I use the 
Hausman specification test (1978). The Hausman test, under the assumption of 
correct specification, tests the appropriateness of the random effects estimator 
applied to the data. The null hypothesis is that the fixed effects and random effects 
estimator are the same, i.e. the random effects 1)1 and the regressors 1:, are 
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uncorrelated. While the fixed effects estimator IS consistent under the null or 
alternative, the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient only under the 
null hypothesis. Therefore, rejection of the null hypothesis means that the random 
effects estimator is not consistent, implying the appropriateness of using the fixed 
effects estimator. 
The use of FE estimator gives rise to a problem concerning the estimation of the 
returns to general labour market skills. In my analysis, I use the potential labour 
market experience (PotExp) of an individual as a proxy of his accumulated general 
labour market human capital. PotExp is defined as the difference between current 
age and the age the individual fist left full-time education, therefore we expect that 
it will increase by a year from wave to wave for all respondents irrespectively to 
their true employment status. However, in the estimated earnings models I include, 
alongside the other regressors (and PotExp), a time trend variable that increases by 
one unit each wave, in order to capture potential unobserved time effects. The 
inclusion of both the linear term of PotExp and of the time trend in the wage 
equation model makes their identification impossible when the FE estimator is 
employed, since they both increase by one (unit) each wave 14 . As a remedy to this 
identification problem, when I estimate the wage equation using FE, I exclude the 
linear term of PotExp and consider only its quadratic term. The estimate, in this 
case, of the time trend represents the joint effect of the linear term of PotExp and 
time trend peculiarities. Obviously, the downside of this solution is that we cannot 
distinguish these two effects, therefore we cannot precisely derive an estimate on the 
contribution of general labour market skills in the wage determination process. A 
similar problem arises when I consider actual labour market experience instead of 
14 The deviation from their mean (EI/ - E,) in each wan~ is exactly the same for both of them, 
makin~ the identification of these two effects impossible. 
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potential experience. Since both employer-tenure and actual labour market 
experience increase by the same amount between waves, the estimation process 
based on FE makes the distinction of the effect of the linear terms of these two 
variables impossible. Therefore, one of these terms is dropped out of the estimated 
wage equation model. This basically results in obtaining an estimate that represents 
the joint and indistinguishable effect of the linear terms of tenure and actual 
working experience. 
2.4.4.1 Random Effects and Fixed Effects Estimations on the Basic Model 
Initially the Basic Model is estimated using both fixed effects (within group) and 
random effects estimators. The estimates on the male and female unbalanced sample 
are presented in Table 2.31 and on the balanced sample in Table 2.32. The 
unbalanced sample random effects estimates show returns to ten years of tenure 
around 6 per cent for the male employees and 8 per cent for the female employees. 
When the model is estimated using the fixed effects estimator, the tenure effect is 
increased in both cases to 8 per cent and 12 per cent, respectively, with the effect 
for the female employees still significantly higher than the equivalent estimated on 
the male sample. The picture does not change dramatically when the Basic Model is 
estimated on the balanced panel sample, with the exception when the random 
effects estimator is used. In that case, the tenure effect of ten years on the log wage 
is slightly reduced to 4 per cent and 7 per cent for men and women, respectively. 
Finally, the Hausman test suggests that, for both group of employees, there IS a 
systematic difference in the estimated coefficients from the two estimators. The 
performed test rejects the null hypothesis, implying that it may be better to use the 
fixed effects estimator for the study of tenure effect. 
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The analysis is repeated this time using the actual labour market experience instead 
of the potential. The results are presented in Tables 2.31 and 2.32, second and forth 
column. Due to the identification problems related to the inclusion of actual labour 
market experience in the wage equation, in the fixed effect estimates I present only 
the obtained coefficients of tenure and experience. Although I cannot distinguish 
and calculate the tenure and experience effect, a comparison between the presented 
coefficients when actual instead of potential experience is considered can be quite 
informative of any notable changes in the tenure effect. 
From the random effect estimates, on both unbalanced and balanced samples, it 
appears that the estimated tenure effect is only marginally affected by the inclusion 
of actual labour market experience for the male employees. On the contrary, the 
magnitude of tenure effect in the case of female employees is reduced, especially in 
the unbalanced sample estimates. Although I cannot explicitly derive the tenure 
effect for the fixed effect estimates, from an examination of the coefficients we can 
conclude that the estimates are quite robust and not really affected by the choice 
between actual or potential experience in the regressors vector. 
The picture we get from the analysis so far is that, first of all, the contribution of 
employer-tenure on the wage determination is quite modest, with the returns to ten 
years of tenure not exceeding the 10 per cent in most of the cases, for both male and 
female employees. The calculated tenure effect is sensitive to the choice of estimator, 
with fixed effects estimator giving larger returns to tenure. Finally, the Hausman test 
strongly suggests that the random effect estimator is not consistent, implying that it 
may be more suitable to use the fixed effects estimator on the male and female panel 
samples. 
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2.4.4.2 Wage Treatment Over Time and Alternative Control Vectors 
The next step in my analysis is to examine the sensitivity of the estimated returns to 
tenure to alternative wage treatment over time. The findings on the unbalanced and 
balanced samples are summarised in Tables 2.33 and 2.34, respectively. Although 
there is some variation between the different methods of time treatment in the 
models, the results appear to be quite robust when a time trend is included, 
irrespective to whether nominal or real wages are used. For the male employees the 
random effects estimates give returns to ten years of tenure slightly below 6 per cent 
on the unbalanced sample, and around 4 per cent on the balanced. When the fixed 
effects estimator is employed the estimates increase to roughly 7.5 per cent for both 
panel samples. Similarly for the female employees, the random effects estimator 
suggests an equivalent effect of 8 per cent, when estimated on the unbalanced 
sample and approximately 7 per cent on the balanced sample. The equivalent 
estimates based on the fixed effects estimator are roughly 1 Z per cent and 11 per 
cent. 
The last part of this section focuses on the inclusion of alternative control vectors in 
the Basic Model described above. The estimates are summarised and presented 
separately for the male and female full-time employees in Tables 2.35-2.38 both 
from the unbalanced and balanced sample, using alternatively the random effect 
and fixed effect estimators. Although the derived returns to tenure appear to differ 
across the different control vectors used, no noticeable impact is occurred. The 
unbalanced panel sample estimates overall suggest that the returns to ten years of 
tenure do not exceed 8 per cent for the male employees and 11 per cent for the 
women. For the balanced sample the equivalent estimates are slightly reduced for 
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the male employees giving a maximum effect of 7 per cent and for their female 
peers marginally increased, with a maximum ten -year tenure effect of 12 per cent. 
Concluding the analysis based on panel estimators, three mam points can be 
outlined. About the choice between the fixed effect and random effect estimator, the 
Hausman test suggests that it may be better to use the fixed effect estimator, since 
the null hypothesis is rejected in all the cases examined. Nevertheless, no matter 
which estimator is employed, the impact of employer-tenure is quite modest, with a 
ten -year tenure effect not larger than 10 per cent for both the male and female 
employees. The fact that the estimates based on the panel estimators do not differ a 
lot from the equivalent obtained from OLS may be an indication that endogeneity 
bias, derived from the potential dependence of the employer-tenure on components 
of the error term, is not after all an important issue for my data set. 
2.4.5 Sensitivity to Outliers 
The quantile regression over the median, or median regression, is quite similar to 
the standard OLS method. In the median regression the objective is to estimate the 
median of the dependent variable, conditional on the values of the independent 
variables, while the OLS estimates the mean of the dependent. The median 
regression can be thought as a method that finds a line through the data such that it 
minimises the sum of the absolute residuals, where in the case of the standard OLS it 
is the sum of the squares. Means and subsequently OLS are sensitive to outliers; 
therefore here I employ quantile regressions in an attempt to correct for any outlier-
sensitivity deficiency in OLS. 
For the purpose of my analysis, I estimate the five alternative wage equations 
(}vlodels /- 5) and the results, based on the pooled sample, are presented separate I)' 
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for the whole sample, the male and the female employees in Table 2.39. These 
findings are directly comparable with those in Table 2.5 where the standard OLS 
method is used. For the male sample, it appears that the tenure effect is noticeably 
reduced when estimated with median regressions, compared to OLS. The estimated 
returns to ten years of tenure range from 7.6 to 11 per cent when the OLS method is 
used, while in the case of median regression it ranges between 4.4 to 8 per cent. The 
median regressions reduce the estimated effect for the female employees in most of 
the cases as well, but here the reduction is not that large. While before the effect of 
ten years of tenure was between 6.4 and 12.9 per cent, now it varies between 7.1 
and 11.5 per cent. 
Further, the returns to tenure are examined under different methods of time 
treatment. The estimated tenure effect for both male and female full-time employees 
slightly varies across the different ways of wage treatment over time (Table 2.4{}). 
The ten years employer-tenure effect on log wages ranges from 5 to 7 per cent for 
male employees, and from 6.3 to 8.5 per cent for female. Comparing these findings 
with the least square estimates in Table 2.6, we see that for the male sample the 
contribution of tenure is decreased, while for female employees the picture is not so 
clear. 
I also explore the impact that the inclusion of actual full-time experience, instead of 
potential experience, in the Basic Model may have on the estimated returns to 
tenure (Table 2.41). In the case of male employees the tenure effect marginally 
reduces when actual labour market experience is added to the regressors, but still 
appears to have a modest but significant effect. The exception is the estimates of the 
balanced sample where the derived effect is insignificant in both cases. For the 
female employees, the tenure effect reduces both in magnitude and significance 
when actual labour market experience is considered. 
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Finally, I re-estimate the five wage equation models presented in Table 2.39, this 
time using robust regressions. In general, it is expected that the estimates between 
the quantile and the robust regressions will be quite similar, with smaller standard 
errors though in the latter. The estimates are presented in Table 2.42. Comparing 
these results with the ones shown in Table 2.39, we see that for both the male and 
female employees the estimated tenure effect is slightly increased in most cases. 
However, as expected, no dramatic change is occurred. 
2.4.6 An Overview of the Findings on Tenure-Wage Growth 
In the analysis presented above, I examine the contribution of employer-tenure to 
wage determination, while addressing the issue of potential heterogeneity bias in the 
estimates of interest. For that purpose, I employ alongside the standard least square, 
AS's instrumental variable technique, Topel's two-step method and panel estimators. 
Despite the fact that there is some variation in the derived tenure effect, across the 
different methods used, we can draw some conclusions on the impact tenure has on 
individuals' wage profiles. 
The findings on the male full-time employees suggest that employer-tenure plays a 
rather limited role on an individual's earnings profiles. Overall, it appears that the 
contribution of ten years of employer-tenure, in a log linear wage equation, is 
slightly less than 10 per cent. Although throughout this chapter I employ various 
specifications regarding the earnings equation model (Models 1-5), my preferred 
specification is Model 5. This is the full specification model that includes various 
controls for both individual and workplace characteristics alongside the human 
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capital variables of interest1 5 (whereas Models 1-4 are all nested in Model 5). The 
estimates on this particular wage equation model suggest a ten-year tenure effect 
between 7.1 and 9.1 percent (fixed-effects and least squares respectively). The 
performed Hausman test between the AS instrumental variable estimates and 
standard least square estimates propose that endogeneity bias may after all not be an 
issue of concern (based on the particular instruments employed) for these data. 
Similar tests between a fixed-effects and a random-effects model are in favour of the 
former. Nevertheless, no matter which estimator is the preferred one (fixed-effects 
or OLS) what stands out from all these estimates is that employer-tenure has a 
statistical significant, positive but modest, in magnitude, contribution in the wage 
determination process. The only exception though is when Topel's two-step method 
is employed, where the estimated tenure effect appears to be quite significant and 
noticeably above the equivalent estimates obtained from the other techniques. 
The picture IS rather similar for the female full-time employees as well. The 
alternative methods employed suggest that employer-tenure can contribute only 
little in the 'jigsaw of wage determination. In particular, it is found that ten years of 
employer-tenure have an impact of around 10 per cent on the log of the wages 
based on my preferred estimator, the fixed-effects model. It is worth mentioning 
though that when the instrumental variables technique and Topel's method (based 
on de-trended nominal wages-AEI) are used, the estimates imply that there is no 
real tenure effect for the female employees. 
15 The regressors considered are a cubic polynomial in tenure, a quadratic polynomial in potential 
labour market experience, age left education, a time trend and dummy variables for individual's 
skills and qualifications, industry and occupation, region, establishment size and union coverage and 
membership. 
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2.5 Quantile Regressions 
2.5.1 Introduction 
My analysis so far is focused on the estimation of the returns to employer-tenure 
and the investigation of endogeneity bias, driven by unobserved individual 
characteristics and job-match characteristics, as addressed in the various techniques 
employed. The whole discussion above though is based on the assumption that there 
is a homogeneous tenure effect. In other words, I assume that observationally 
identical individuals, located at different points in the conditional wage distribution, 
are equally rewarded for their seniority and accumulated employer-specific skills. 
However, this approach, although commonly embraced in the literature, may be 
quite restrictive and not so enlightening on the true contribution of employer-
tenure on earnings profiles. "(On the average' has never been a satisfactory 
statement with which to conclude a study on heterogeneous populations. 
Characterization of the conditional mean constitutes only a limited aspect of 
posslbly more extensive changes involving the entire distnbution." (Buchinsky 
1994, pp. 453). 
Here, I challenge the assumption of a uniform tenure effect, and investigate whether 
the returns to employer-tenure differ across the conditional wage distribution. For 
the examination of heterogeneity in the returns to tenure I employ the quantile 
regression technique. Quantile regressions allow us to explore the contribution of 
tenure on wages at different points (quantiles) of the conditional distribution of 
wages, instead of restricting our analysis on the average treatment effects of 
employer-tenure. Any difference in the estimated tenure effect across the quantiles 
will simply suggest that the decision of observationally identical individuals to work 
for one more year with their current employer will not have the same effect on their 
wages. The analysis is outlined as follows. 
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In Section 2.5.2, I briefly describe the quantile regression model and present the 
main estimates on the returns to tenure. formal tests for heterogeneity are employed 
in Section 2.5.3. The potential endogeneity bias in the estimates of interest is 
addressed in Section 2.5.4, where I adopt the instrumental variables approach in the 
quantile regressions framework. Finally, in Section 2.5.5, I conclude the discussion 
with the main findings. 
2.5.2 Quantile Regression Models 
2.5.2.1 Fundamentals of Quantile Regression 
Koenker and Bassett (1978a) first introduced the quantile regression model or the 
'regression quantiles as they baptised them. This new class of statistics for the linear 
model has analogous properties to the ordinary sample quantiles of the location 
model. The notion of a simple maximisation problem yielding the ordinary sample 
quantiles in the location model is extended to a more general class of linear models 
in which the conditional quantiles have a linear form. Although quantile regression 
models were introduced at the end of the 1970's, it was not until the beginning of 
1990's that researchers began to utilise this new 'too!, helped by the recent 
developments in the techniques of quantile regression (Powell, 1983, 1984 and 
1986; Buchinsky, 1995). 
Quantile regression enables the researcher to have a complete view of the statistical 
landscape and the relationships among stochastic variables. Specifically, the main 
features/ advantages of quantile regression models are as follows: (a) they can be 
used to characterise the entire conditional distribution of the dependent variable 
given a set of rc~ressors; (b) they allow the researcher to focus on quantile 
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treatment effects rather than on average treatment effects, i.e. different solutions at 
distinct quantiles may be interpreted as differences in the response of the dependent 
variable to changes in the regressors at various points in the conditional distribution 
of the dependent variable; (c) when we cannot assume that the error term is 
normally distributed, quantile regression estimators may be more efficient than least 
squares estimators; (d) the estimated coefficient vector is not sensitive to outlier 
observations on the dependent variable, since the quantile regression objective 
function is a weighted sum of absolute deviations, which gives a robust measure of 
location and finally; (e) their linear programming representation (LP) makes 
estimation relatively easy. 
Here, I employ simple quantile regressIon techniques in order to examIne the 
magnitude of the employer-tenure effect across the conditional distribution of 
wages. The framework of my analysis can be described by a log linear wage 
equation model, where employer-tenure is included in the regressors vector: 
~jl = PXijl + Uijl (2.30) 
where -{it represents the individual j at a particular job j at period/time t and X ijt is 
the regressors vector. For simplicity reasons we can rewrite the model as: 
w, = PXi +ui (2.31 ) 
Then the quantile regression model is given as (Buchinsky (1994»: 
w; = X/ Pe + uei ' Quante (W; I Xi) = X/ Pe (2.32) 
where Quante (W; I X,) denotes the 8th conditional quantile, 0 < e < 1, of the 
dependent variable, rfi, given the regressors vector, Xi. The estimated vector of 
parameters is the solution of a simple minimasation problem defined as: 
T.~'.{'"~X;P BI~ -Xjflel+d"~':P (l-B)I~ -X,flel} 
= miIJ-L PfJ (W; - XJ3()) 
peR ;=1 
(2.33) 
where !3e is the vector of the estimated coefficients of the regressors at the ()th 
conditional quantile. Quantile regressions estimated at different values of () 
provide a family of returns to tenure. Variation in the estimated contribution of 
tenure across the quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages may be an 
indication of heterogeneous returns to tenure. For this reason in the analysis that 
follows I estimate a log linear wage equation model at different quantiles, in 
particular ()==.1, .2, .3, ... , .9 quantile, and examine whether the contribution of 
employer-tenure on wages has the same magnitude or not across the whole wage 
distribution. 
2.5.2.2 The Empirical Analysis 
The Basic Model is estimated on the pooled sample and the returns to ten years of 
employer-tenure are calculated and presented in Table 2.43 with the standard 
errors I6 reported in parentheses. The first half of the table refers to male full-time 
employees and the second half to female. Examining the employer-tenure effect 
across the conditional distribution of the log hourly wage for the male employees we 
can clearly see that the effect varies along the quantiles. To be more specific there is 
16 When errors are not independently and identically distributed it appears that calculated standard 
errors are underestimated. A bootstrapped estimate of the entire variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimators would be more accurate in that case. However, such a method requires lengthy 
l'omputation time. In addition, since the dependent variable in the estimated models is in log, It is 
expected that standard errors, estimalL'd by both methods, will be identical. 
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a sharp and monotonic decline in the tenure effect up to the .4 quantile. While the 
estimated returns to ten years of tenure at the .1 quantile are slightly less than 20 
per cent, the same years of tenure appear to contribute significantly less at the .4 
quantile where the effect is estimated to be 7 per cent. For the rest of the quantiles 
there appears to be only a relatively modest decline as () increases from .4 to .9, 
where one traces the entire distribution of the log hourly wage conditional on the 
vector of regressors. The estimated effect of ten years of employer-tenure at the .9 
quantile is 4 per cent, marginally lower than the one obtained from the median 
regression (() = 5), where the effect is 6 per cent. For illustration reasons the 
estimates are plotted and presented in Figure 2.18, where one can clearly see how 
the tenure effect varies across the conditional distribution of the log hourly wage. 
The 95 per cent confidence interval is depicted as well in the figure. 
It is worth mentioning that simple OLS estimate of this model gives returns to ten 
years of tenure around 9.5 per cent. Comparing the OLS estimate with the quantile 
regression model it is apparent that there is a significant value added in my analysis 
when using the second technique. The fact that the contribution of employer-tenure 
in the estimated wage equation model fluctuates across the quantiles of the 
conditional distribution, warns us that maybe an estimated uniform tenure effect, 
obtained from a simple OLS, is not sufficient to describe the whole picture. It 
appears that the employer-tenure effect has a different significance at various points 
of the wage distribution and restricting our analysis to the estimation of a uniform 
effect does not allow us to see the whole picture, the true contribution of employer-
tenure on wages. This means that the returns to tenure do not appear to be 
homozeneous across various points of the wage distribution or, in other words any 
incrcasc in tenure does not necessarily has a similar effect on wages of 
observationally identical individuals. Furthermore, looking at the difference 
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between two consecutive conditional quantiles it appears that the tenure effect 
decreases monotonically at the lower part of the wage distribution, followed by a 
rather flat rate. 
The results presented above can be interpreted in various ways depending on our 
perspective on the conditional wage distribution. One may view the wage 
distribution as reflecting the distribution of unobserved 'ability, where low ability 
workers are those located to the left end of the wage distribution and high ability 
workers those located further to the right. 'Ability here refers to individual's initial 
endowments of human capital that although they are unobservable, they are still 
marketable and translated into higher earnings. In this framework, one way of 
interpreting the findings is that employer-tenure contributes relatively more to low 
ability individuals, in other words it appears that seniority compensates more the 
less able for their 'less favorable genetic endowments. Alternatively one can say that 
employer-tenure appears to contribute more in 'low paying jobs (lower quantiles) 
rather than in 'high paying jobs (upper quantiles). What this means is that seniority 
plays an important role in the wage determination in 'low paying jobs, i.e. in jobs 
where most likely no specific skills or high skills are required. This may be the case 
for instance due to the existence of particular seniority rules in the firm, or because 
of a strong presence of trade unions in the workplace. However, this is not the case 
for the 'high paying jobs, usually jobs that require high skilled and well-educated 
employees. Maybe in these jobs other factors, like productivity, have a more 
important role than employer-tenure or there are no particular promotion policies 
related to seniority in these firms. In addition, the findings have some very 
interesting implications concerning wage inequality, which here can be thought as 
the differcnce between two conditional quantiles. The declining returns to tenure, as 
wc consider hi~her quantiles, imply that tenure contributes negatively to was,c 
inequality. In other words, seniority and accumulated employer-specific skills 
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appear to decrease wage dispersion, a finding of great interest if one considers the 
increasing wage inequality in the British labour market of the 1990s. 
The wage equation model is also estimated for the female employees and the returns 
to ten years of employer-tenure are summarised in TabJe 2.43, in the second half of 
the first column. Despite some fluctuations in the estimates across the quantiles of 
the conditional distribution, it appears that the employer-tenure effect is fairly 
uniform across the whole distribution, apart from the lowest part of the wage 
distribution (e = 1) where the estimated effect is way below the rest of the 
estimates (roughly 1 per cent) and appears to be statistically insignificant. 
According to the findings, ten years of employer-tenure contribute to the log hourly 
wage of a female full-time employee by 6 to 8 per cent. The above estimates are 
plotted in Figure 2.2a along with the 95 per cent confidence interval. One can 
clearly see that the depicted line is almost a straight horizontal line. 
The estimated employer-tenure effect at the mean, obtained from simple OLS, does 
not differ a lot from the previous findings. In particular, it seems that ten years of 
tenure have a positive effect of 6.4 per cent on the log hourly wage. The main 
conclusion from these estimates is that tenure effect is quite uniform across different 
points of the wage distribution, suggesting that seniority is equally rewarded among 
female workers. The choice of using quantile regression techniques instead of OLS 
does not provide us with any extra piece of information, in the case of women. The 
estimated ten years tenure effect is positive but quite modest and all cases is less 
than 10 per cent. In ternlS of wage inequality, employer-tenure does not appear to 
have any positive or negative impact upon inequality. 
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The analysis is repeated again; three different earnings equations are estimated, with 
different covariates included in the regressors vector (Models 2, 3 and 5) 17. The 
returns to ten years of employer-tenure are presented in Table 2.43 (columns 2-4) 
and, for illustration reasons, the estimated effects are plotted in Figures 2.1b-d and 
2.2b-d for men and women respectively, alongside the 95 per cent confidence 
interval. 
From TabJe 2.43 we can see that the picture does not change dramatically. For the 
male employees the pattern is the same, with a sharp and monotonic decline in the 
estimated returns to ten years of tenure, up to the .4 quantile, followed by a modest 
decline across the rest of the conditional quantiles. In the case of female employees, 
the only difference occurred is that the ten years tenure effect estimated at the .1 
quantile has been 'corrected and now it is at a similar level with the estimates at the 
rest of the quantiles. Similar to Model 1 estimates, the ten years tenure effect 
appears to be fairly uniform across the quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution, probably with Model 3 the only exception, where at .8 and .9 quantiles 
the estimated tenure effect drops quite a lot. 
Although the findings are quite robust no matter which specification is used, for 
both male and female employees, the level of the calculated effect slightly changes. 
In order to see that clearly I plotted the estimated ten-year employer-tenure effect 
obtained from the four different models in two diagrams, Figures 2.3 & 2.4 for men 
and women respectively. From Figure 2.3, we can see that there is some various in 
the estimated effect across the four different models used. Model 3, appears to give 
the highest estimates at all conditional quantiles, while Model 2 gives the lowest 
tenure effect at alnlost all the quantiles estimated. Nevertheless, the difference in the 
17 Modcf 4 is excluded as the findings from this model are almost identical with those from Afodd 5. 
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ten-year tenure effect between the four models, estimated at the same quantile, does 
not seem to exceed the 5 per cent in any of the cases. In addition the estimates 
appear to converge at the lower and the upper part of the wage distribution, while 
the largest differences occur around the median of the distribution. In Figure 2.4, 
female full-time employees, the lines plotted appear to be roughly parallel to each 
other, denoting that the pattern is similar irrespectively to which model is used but 
that the magnitude of the estimated effect varies. Model 1 provides the lowest 
estimates across all the quantiles, while Model 4 gives the highest returns to ten 
years of tenure at almost all the quantiles estimated. Even though the returns to ten 
years of employer-tenure fluctuate between 6 per cent and 13 per cent, the impact 
of tenure on wages remains quite modest in all cases. 
A final comment on the discussion presented here and particularly on the figures 
provided. It would be interesting to plot together the estimated returns to tenure for 
both male and female employees and do a comparison in order to deduce some 
conclusions on gender wage differentials. However, this probably would not be 
accurate since the quantile points are quite different between male and female 
employees. What this means is that we cannot directly compare the contribution of 
employer-tenure in the wage determination between male and female employees 
because the jobs for example included in a particular quantile of the wage 
distribution are very different between the two samples. In other words it is not 
correct to infer that, for example, in 'high paying jobs seniority is more appreciated 
in the case of female employees compare to male employees. The reason is that these 
'l1J~~h p!lying jobs are not the same or necessarily available to both samples. 
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2.5.3 Heterogeneity in Employer-Tenure 
2.5.3.1 A Test for Heterogeneity 
As it is already mentioned above, if there appears to be variation in the contribution 
of tenure across the quantiles of the conditional distribution, then this can be 
interpreted as evidence of existence of heterogeneity in the returns to tenure. The 
analysis in the previous section suggests that at least for the male employees 
seniority and accumulated employer-specific skills are more important in the 
earnings profiles of those located at the left tail of the conditional wage distribution. 
A formal way to test for heterogeneity, i.e. examine whether there is statistically 
significant variation, is by performing test of equality on the estimated tenure effect 
between different quantiles. 
In order to understand the basic principle (Koenker and Bassett, 1982) behind the 
methodology used to test for heterogeneity, let's assume a random variable Y, with 
c.dJ. F (y I x), depending upon a row vector of exogenous variables x, where 
XI! = I for all i (i.e. the first component of x is an intercept). Then the conditional 
quantile function of Y, as a linear function of x, can be written as: 
K 
Q .. (u I x) = L XkfJk (u) = xfJ (u) (2.34) 
k=l 
where the vector of contants {3( u) depends upon u. Now if we assume that the 
errors are independently and identically distributed we can re-write equation (2.34) 
as 
QI' ( u I x) = X f3 + Q~. ( u ) (2.35) 
with f-3 the (fixed) vector of parameters and Q£(u) the quantile function of the 
error distributioll. Therefore in the case of j.i.d. errors: 
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f3 ( u ) = f3 + (Qc ( U ) , 0 ... , 0 )' (2.36) 
What this means is that we can depict the conditional quantile functions as a family 
of parallel hyperplanes, with the slope parameters (3 identical at every quantile. In 
other words, the exogenous variables influence only the location of the conditional 
distribution F (y I x), but not the shape. However, if we relax the assumption of i.i.d 
errors then the slope coefficients depend, in a nontrivial way, on u. Consequently, 
the exogenous variables may influence several characteristics (like the shape and 
the tail behaviour) of the conditional distribution of Y. Based on this framework 
outlined here, in the next section I test for the existence of heterogeneity in the 
estimated returns to employer-tenure. 
2.5.3.2 The Findings 
According to the classical theory of linear regressIon, the conditional quantile 
functions of the response variable Y, given the vector of regressors X, are all parallel 
to one another. What this means is that slope coefficients estimated at distinct 
quantiles of the conditional distribution should all be identical (homogeneous 
effect). To adopt this into the framework of my analysis, we can say that the 
estimated employer-tenure effect should be of the same magnitude across the 
quantiles. Recall Figures 2.1a-d ,£ 2.2.a-d, where the estimated returns to ten years 
of tenure are plotted across the quantiles, alongside the 95 per cent confidence 
interval band. Homogeneity in the returns to tenure would imply that these plotted 
lines are flat so that is possible to draw a horizontal line within the confidence 
interval band. An exanlination of curvature of the figures suggests the existence of 
heterogeneity in the returns to employer-tenure only for the sample of male 
employees though. 
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A method to formally test the presence of heterogeneity bias in the returns to tenure 
is to test the equality of the quantile slope coefficients. In practice what I do is test 
whether the observed differences along the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant across quantiles. These tests of equality, introduced by Buchinsky (1995), 
are based on the bootstrap. The logic behind the bootstrap is the following. All 
measures of precision come from a statistic's sampling distribution, which in turn is 
determined by the distribution of the population. Since population distribution is 
unknown in most of the cases, bootstrapping technique assumes that the observed 
distribution is a good proxy of the population distribution. Then a number of 
samples are drawn from the (Xi' Yi) initial sample (the size of these samples does 
not necessarily need to be equal to the size of the initial sample). For each of these 
samples drawn an estimator of the parameters vector, {3(}, is computed. Based on 
these replications we obtain the estimates of interest. 
Continuing now to my analysis, I perform tests of equality of the returns to 
employer-tenure between different quantiles. More specifically, I test whether there 
is any significant difference in the ten-year tenure effect among the estimated 
quantiles. Bootstraping is a technique computationally demanding, therefore I have 
restricted the number of replications to twenty. Four alternative vectors of 
regressors are included in the estimated wage equation model same as the ones used 
in the previous section (Models 1-3 and 5) and the models are estinlated separately 
for men and women. The results (p-value) computed from these tests are reported 
in Table 2.44, where the first half of the table refers to male and the second one to 
the female employees. The tests confirm the visual impression. 
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For the male employees, the results imply the presence of heterogeneity bias in the 
estimated tenure effect, but only at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution. The 
tests of equality on the returns to tenure between the low quantiles and the middle 
quantiles and between the low quantiles and the high quantiles reject the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity. For instance, there is a statistical significant difference 
in the estimated tenure effect between the .10 quantile and the median, computed 
p-value is practically zero for all the alternative group of covariates used. The 
results presented for the male employees appear to be quite robust across the 
different regressors vectors used. For the female employees, the tests verify the 
impression we get from the figures. In almost all the cases, p-value is sufficiently 
high that the hypothesis of homogeneity cannot be rejected even at a 10 per cent 
level of significance, implying that the returns to tenure are of the same magnitude 
among female employees, located at different points of the wage distribution. 
Similar with the estimates for the male employees, the results do not appear to be 
sensitive to the choice of covariates in the wage equation model. 
So far in my analysis based on the quantile regressions I did not attempt to control 
for potential endogeneity bias. Any observed difference in the estimated tenure 
effect at different points of the wage distribution is interpreted as evidence of 
heterogeneous returns to employer-tenure. However, this heterogeneity bias may be 
the outcome of potential correlation between tenure and unobserved individual 
characteristics and job-match effects. This issue is raised in the following section, 
where controls for potential endogeneity bias are employed in the quantile 
regression framework. 
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2.5.4 Two Stage Quantile Regression 
The endogeneity bias issue addressed in prevIous sections of this chapter also 
appears to be a problem when using quantile regression. Just as OLS delivers 
inconsistent estimates when some of the explanatory variables are determined 
simultaneously with the dependent variable, quantile regression estimators suffer 
from similar endogeneity bias, due to the dependence between some of the 
regressors and the error term. Lets consider a structural equation (Powel, 1983): 
(2.37) 
where Y is the response variable, Y1 is a n X g matrix of endogeneous variables 
determined simultaneously with Y (in my analysis, employer-tenure), r is the 
vector of the associated coefficients and Xl is a n X kl matrix of exogenous 
variables. One way to control for endogeneity bias in a model like the one given in 
equation (2.37) is to use some appropriate instrumental variables for Y1 that are 
not correlated with the error term (u) . Assuming that there exists X 2 , a n x ~ 
matrix of instrumental variables, absent from equation (2.37), then we can employ 
an instrumental variables quantile regression estimator, in order to control for 
endogeneity bias. The application of instrumental variables technique in a quantile 
regression framework can be given in a two-stage interpretation. In the first stage, 
the explanatory variables are projected on the space spanned by the instruments: 
~ = xn +v (2.38) 
where X == [Xl' X 2 ] is a n x (kl + 10.) matrix collecting all the exogenous 
variables and 1/ is a vector of i./d error terms. In the second stage, quantile 
re:~rl'ssion of the response variable is performed on the projections obtained in the 
previous stage. Hence, the two-stage quantile regression (2SQR) estimator is the 
~l1lution tll the minimisation problem (2.33) as stated in Koenker and Bassett (1978) 
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for the model specified in (2.37), where Yi IS replaced by its first-stage OLSI8 
estimates obtained from (2.38). 
Here, for the purpose of my analysis I employ the AS instrumental variable 19 in the 
2SQR framework, in order to examine whether the heterogeneity observed in the 
estimated tenure effect across the wage distribution is the result of endogeneity bias 
or not. Therefore, based on OLS estimator, employer-tenure (Yi , using the notation 
above) is regressed on the instrumental variables (X2 ) and on the vector of 
exogenous (predetermined) variables (Xl). In the second stage, quantile 
regressions on the wage equation model (2.32) are estimated, where the predicted 
values on tenure (Yi) obtained from the first-stage estimations and the vector of 
exogenous variables (Xl) compose the control vector in the right-hand side of the 
model. Similar to the analysis followed in Section 2.5.2.2, a wage equation model 
with four alternative groups of (predetermined) covariates (Xd is estimated at 
several points of the conditional wage distribution. 
The choice of AS's instrumental variables may raIse some concern though. 
Previously, I replicated AS approach on the contribution of employer-tenure in a 
18 Kim and Muller (2000) argue that the 2SQR estimator based on OLS prediction is potentially 
better, compared with a 2SQR estimator based on quantile prediction, when we are interested in only 
slope parameters. 
I~) Arias et al. (200 1) underline that using differenced data on quantile regression is problematic, 
since differencing in the quantile regression context is not equivalent to a fixed effect estimator. In 
quantile regression, the order of the individuals matters, hence quantiles of the sum of two random 
variables are not equal to the sum of the quantiles of each random variable. However, there is no 
evidence that usin~ the AS IV, where employer-tenure is instrumented with its deviation from 
indivldllal mcan for eadl cmployer, will raise similar problems as in the case of differenced data. 
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wage equation model (Section 2.4.2). The performed Hausman test, in the case of 
male employees, suggests that endogeneity bias is not present in the estimates of 
interest. Based on this result, and consequently on the chosen instruments, one 
could argue that the observed heterogeneity in the tenure effect across the quantiles 
is not the outcome of varying endogeneity bias in these estimates, for the male 
sample. For the case of female employees, the Hausman test on the contrary implies 
that endogeneity bias is present. However, the estimated employer-tenure effect 
across the wage distribution, based on the quantile regressions, appears to be rather 
flat and homogeneous. Therefore, we suspect that even though employer-tenure 
may be correlated with unobserved individual and workplace characteristics, its 
estimated effect across the quantiles probably will not change dramatically when 
employing the instrumental variables. Nevertheless, I believe that it is of great 
interest to apply the IV technique into the quantile regression framework and 
examine whether the picture remains unchanged or not for both male and female 
employees. 
According to the estimates obtained, the employer-tenure effect of ten years is 
calculated and presented in TabJe 2.45, with the standard errors into parentheses. 
We can compare these estimates based on 2SQR with the results from the quantile 
regression estimator in TabJe 2.43. The adoption of IV techniques in the quantile 
regression framework slightly alters the estimates, however the overall picture 
remains fairly similar. One point that should be mentioned though is that for the 
first three models the derived tenure effect appears to be statistically significant only 
at the lower quantiles. The only exception is the last model, where employer-tenure 
is estimated to have a significant contribution at almost all points of the wage 
distribution considered. The derived ten -year tenure effect in this model still 
appears to be higher at the lower quantiles, followed by a flat rate at the mid and 
upper part of the wage distribution. For illustration reasons the estimates from Table 
2.45 are plotted in Figures 2.5a-d and 2.6a-d, along those from Table 2.43. Despite 
the variation in the findings between the two estimators, we can draw the same 
conclusion in both cases. There is heterogeneity in the returns to tenure across the 
wage distribution. Furthermore, based on the AS instruments, this observed 
heterogeneity cannot be attributed to the existence of potential (varying across the 
quantiles) correlation of employer-tenure with unobservable individual and 
workplace characteristics. 
In order to get a more accurate picture of whether there is heterogeneity in the 
returns to tenure or not in the latter model, tests of equality of the quantile slope 
coefficients are performed, similar to the analysis followed in Section 2.5.3, based 
now on the 2SQR estimator. The p-values from the performed tests are summarised 
in Table 2.46, where one can see whether the estimated tenure effect varies 
significantly across different quantiles of the wage distribution, after controlling for 
potential endogeneity bias. The findings suggest that indeed there is significant 
variation in the estimated tenure effect between the lower quantiles and the mid and 
upper part of the wage distribution, providing further support to the discussion 
above. 
The same analysis is conducted for the female employees and the findings are 
summarised in the second part of Tables 2.45 and 2.46. The use of 2SQR estimator 
reduces notably the magnitude of the derived ten-year tenure effect, particularly in 
the first two models where the effect appears to be negative at most quantiles 
examined. More importantly though, the contribution of tenure is estimated to be 
statistically insignificant, in all models examined, across the whole wage 
distribution. This last finding is similar to the one in Section 2.4.2 where I use the AS 
IV technique as an alternative to OLS in order to control for endogeneity bias in the 
estimates of interest. Based on the IV approach, employer-tenure again dol's 110t 
appear to have any significant contribution in the wage determination process. 
Overall, employer-tenure is estimated to have a reduced (compared to Table 2.43> 
and uniform effect across the whole wage distribution that does not appear to be 
statistically significant though. 
In this section I examined whether potential endogeneity bias is the driving force 
behind any observed difference in the returns to tenure, estimated at various points 
of the wage distribution. The analysis, based on the 2SQR estimator and the 
particular AS instruments, for the male employees sample suggests that there is 
actual variation in the contribution of tenure between the lower and the mid and 
upper quantiles of the wage distribution. I do not find sufficient evidence to support 
the idea that the observed heterogeneity in the returns to tenure can actual be 
explained by possible correlation between employer-tenure and unobservable 
individual and workplace characteristics. A similar examination on the female 
employees does not provide any further insight to my discussion in the previous 
section (Table 2.43>. Employer-tenure is calculated to have a flat effect across the 
whole wage distribution as before, although now it does not seem to have any 
statistical significance. 
2.5.5 Conclusion 
Here I challenged the assumption, almost universally adopted in the literature, that 
observationally identical individuals are equally rewarded for their seniority and 
employer-specific skills. The quantile regression estimator allow us to differentiate 
the contribution of tenure along the wage distribution, and focus on quantile 
treatment effects rather than on average treatment effects, as most of the studies in 
the literature do. Llrnings equation models are therefore estimated at various 
quantiles of the wage distribution and an analysis is carried out ('Il1 the estimated 
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ten-year effect of employer-tenure. The main findings of this study suggest that, in 
the case of male employees, the contribution of tenure is not uniform. In particular, 
the estimated effect is significantly larger at the lower quantiles of the wage 
distribution while at the middle and upper end of the conditional distribution there 
is only a modest effect of around 5 to 7 per cent. On the other hand, for the female 
employees the returns to tenure appear to be quite similar at the various quantiles 
estimated, with the computed employer-tenure effect not exceeding the 10 to 12 per 
cent in most of the cases. 
Furthermore, tests for heterogeneity support the visual impression we get from the 
figures presented. Heterogeneity does not appear to be an issue in the case of female 
employees, where there is an almost uniform tenure effect across the estimated 
quantiles. For the male employees, the results imply the presence of heterogeneity in 
the contribution of employer-tenure in wages, but only between the lower quantiles 
and the rest of the wage distribution. In addition, this observed variation in the 
contribution of tenure cannot be attributed to potential endogeneity bias in these 
estimates of interest. Even when I control for the likely correlation of employer-
tenure with unobservable characteristics, the heterogeneity of tenure effect between 
the lower part and the rest of the wage distribution is still present. 
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2.6 Some Concluding Comments 
The effect of employer-tenure on individuals' earnings profiles is a popular topic in 
labour economics. The understanding of the contribution of tenure to wages can 
provide us with some insights into the evolution of life-cycle earnings, as well as on 
job mobility issues. Furthermore, the investigation of the sources of wage growth 
can be quite informative to policy makers on issues like unemployment, training, 
pensions and other topics related to wage determination and individual's 
employability. It is well documented in the literature that conventional OLS 
estimates on tenure effect may overestimate the tenure effect due to heterogeneity 
bias driven by the correlation of employer-tenure with unobserved individual and 
job characteristics. Individuals with high unobserved ability are more likely to 
experience lengthy and less interrupted employment spells, while high-paying jobs 
are likely to survive more. Researchers have suggested various techniques that could 
potentially control for the heterogeneity bias in the estimates of interest. However, 
despite the several studies in the literature there is still controversy on the estimates 
of the true contribution of tenure. 
In this chapter, I examine the returns to employer-tenure, exploring some of the 
methods suggested in the literature. Specifically alongside OLS, I employ the 
instrumental variable approach of AS (1987), the two-step method of Topel (1991) 
and both random effect and fixed effect panel estimators and assess the sensitivity of 
my findings to various specifications. In spite of the slight variation in the presented 
estimates, almost universally they all converge to the same conclusion. The true 
contribution of employer-tenure on wage growth appears to be rather modest. The 
estimated tenure effect for the male employees is below 10 per cent (ten-year 
effect), while for their female peers it is around 10 per cent. Overall, these findings 
clearly imply that tenure can explain only a small part of the variation in wages. 
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However, this analysis is based on average treatment effects and may not fully 
describe the true contribution of tenure. 
In the last part of this chapter, I address the question of whether observationally 
identical individuals are equally rewarded for their seniority and examine the 
returns to tenure at several points of the wage distribution. In other words, as an 
alternative to an average tenure effect, I provide a group of estimates on tenure 
effect that correspond to different quantiles of the wage distribution. This way, I opt 
to obtain a more accurate and complete picture of the relationship between tenure 
and wage growth. The analysis, based on quantile regressions, suggests some rather 
interesting findings. While for the female employees, the tenure-earnings profiles 
can be described by a flat line plot across the distribution (with the estimated ten-
year tenure effect between 10 and 12 per cent), there is considerable heterogeneity 
in the returns to tenure for the male employees. In particular, the estimated tenure 
effect appears to be significantly higher at the lower part of the wage distribution, 
compared to the mid and upper quantiles. The interpretation of this result depends 
strongly on how one views and understands the wage distribution, and hence may 
be open to alternative explanations. Nevertheless, I think this is an important 
finding that could guide future research on tenure effects to new directions. 
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Chapter 2: Tables 
Table 2.1 
OLS Estimates on Tenure Effect 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Pooled 
Ten 11 0 .056 .065 .086 .088 .084 (.015) (.014) (.014) (.013) (.013) 
Ten2/l02 -.009 -.012 -.013 -.017 -.017 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Exp .033 .030 .031 .028 .028 (.001) (.001 ) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
EXp2 -5.964e-4 -5.488e-4 -5.71e-4 -5.053e-4 -4.990e-4 (2.94e-5) (2.74e-5) (2.7ge-5) (2.62e-5) (2.61e-5) 
Adj. RZ .361 .459 .447 .514 .517 
SamEle 13036 
T5 .026 .029 .040 .040 .038 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
TI0 .047 .052 .073 .072 .067 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.009) 
T15 .064 .069 .100 .095 .088 (.013) (.012) (.012) (.011 ) (.011) 
T20 .077 .080 .121 .110 .101 (.014) (.013) (.013) (.012) (.012) 
Male 
Ten 11 0 .076 .059 .086 .071 .066 (.018) (.016) (.017) (.016) (.016) 
Ten2/l02 -.019 -.013 -.017 -.014 -.014 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.005) 
Exp .037 .033 .036 .031 .031 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
EXp2 -6.195e-4 -5.66ge-4 -5.21e-4 -5.144e-4 -5.081e-4 (3.66e-5) (3.42e-5) (3.55e-5) (3.36e-5) (3.35e-5) 
Adj. RZ .415 .504 .470 .533 .535 
Sample 7638 
T5 .033 .026 .039 .032 
.029 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
TI0 .057 .046 .069 
.056 .052 
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.011) 
T15 .072 .059 
.091 .074 .067 
(.015) (.014) (.015) (.014) (.014 ) 
T20 .077 .066 .104 
.084 .076 
(.016) (.015) (.016) (.015) (.015) 
Female 
Ten 11 0 .036 .081 .096 
.119 .119 
(.026) (.024) (.023) (.022) (.022) 
Ten2/l02 -.021 -.038 
-.035 -.043 -.045 
(.010) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Exp .027 .026 
.022 .022 .022 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
EXp2 -5.334e-4 -5.095e-4 -4.714e-4 -4.488e-4 
-4.434e-4 
(4.46e-5) (4.12e-5) (4.02e-5) (3.84e-5) (3.82) 
Adj. RZ .355 .4 71 .509 .555 .559 
Sample 5398 
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(Table 2.1 continued) 
TS .013 .031 .039 .049 .048 (.011» (.010) (.010) (.009) (.009) 
.016 .043 .061 .076 .075 
(.017) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.015) TI0 
.008 .036 .065 .082 .079 
(.020) (.019) (.018) (.017) (.017) TIS 
-.010 .009 .052 .066 .060 
(.022) (.020) (.020) (.019) (.019) T20 
Notes: Standard errors presented in brackets. Model 1 includes: age left 
education, a quadratic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in potential labour 
market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend (Basic 
Model). Model 2 is the Basic Model plus regional dummies, I-digit industry 
dummies and establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus 
regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Basic Model plus 
dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and 
individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and union 
membership dummies. 
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Table 2.2 
OLS Tenure Effect Sensitivity to Functional Form 
Pooled 
Basic Equation 
Basic Equation plus dummy variable for tenure greater or equal to 
1 year 
Basic Equation plus dummy variable for tenure greater or equal to 
6 months 
Basic Equation plus interaction term between age left education 
and potential labour market experience 
Basic Equation plus additional polynomials in tenure (3rd order) 
Basic Equation plus additional polynomials in tenure (3rd & 4th 
order) 
T5 TIO 
.026 .047 
(.006) (.010) 
.015 .029 
(.007) (.012) 
.020 .037 
(.007) (.011) 
.026 .048 
(.006) (.010) 
.056 .079 
(.010) (.013) 
.061 .082 
(.013) (.014) 
TI5 T20 Adj. R2 
.064 .077 
(.013) (.014) .361 
.042 .055 
(.014) (.015) .361 
.053 .065 
.361 (.013) (.014) 
.067 .081 
.369 (.013) (.014) 
.081 .075 
.362 (.013) (.014) 
.082 .077 
.362 (.014) (.014) 
Notes: The basic model includes age individuals left education, a quadratic in employer tenure and potential experience, skills dummies and a 
time trend. The wage is in nominal terms. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
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Table 2.3 
OLS Tenure Effect Sensitivity to Functional Form 
Male (Pooled Sample) 
Basic Equation 
Basic Equation plus dummy variable for tenure greater or equal to 
1 year 
Basic Equation plus dummy variable for tenure greater or equal to 
6 months 
Basic Equation plus interaction term between age left education 
and potential labour market experience 
Basic Equation plus additional polynomials in tenure (3rd order) 
T5 TIO 
.033 .057 
(.007) (.012) 
.026 .045 
(.008) (.014) 
.027 .047 
(.008) (.013) 
.033 .057 
(.007) (.012) 
.067 .094 
(.012) (.016) 
TI5 T20 
.072 .077 
(.015) (.016) 
.057 .062 
(.017) (.018) 
.059 .064 
(.016) (.017) 
.071 .076 
(.015) (.016) 
.094 .079 
(.016) (.016) 
Basic Equation plus additional polynomials in tenure (3rd & 4th .068 .095 .094 .079 
order) (.016) (.017) (.016) (.017) 
Adj. R2 
.415 
.416 
.416 
.418 
.416 
.416 
Notes: The basic model includes age individuals left education, a quadratic in employer tenure and potential experience, skills dummies and a 
time trend. The wage is in nominal terms. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
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Table 2.4 
OLS Tenure Effect Sensitivity to Functional Form 
Female (Pooled Sample) 
Basic Equation 
Basic Equation plus dummy variable for tenure greater or equal to 
1 year 
Basic Equation plus dummy variable for tenure greater or equal to 
6 months 
Basic Equation plus interaction term between age left education 
and potential labour market experience 
Basic Equation plus additional polynomials in tenure (Brd order) 
T5 TIO 
.013 
(.011) 
-.007 
(.012) 
.005 
(.011) 
.016 
(.017) 
-.017 
(.019) 
.003 
(.018) 
.017 .025 
(.011) (.017) 
.069 .064 
(.016) (.020) 
TI5 T20 
.008 -.010 
(.020) (.022) 
-.030 -.045 
(.023) (.024) 
-.006 -.023 
(.022) (.023) 
.023 .012 
(.022) (.022) 
.019 -.029 
(.020) (.022) 
Basic Equation plus additional polynomials in tenure (Brd & 4th .062 .061 .019 -.034 
order) (.021) (.021) (.020) (.025) 
Adj. R2 
.355 
.357 
.355 
.379 
.358 
.358 
Notes: The basic model includes age individuals left education, a quadratic in employer tenure and potential experience, skills dummies and a 
time trend. The wage is in nominal terms. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
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Table 2.5 
OLS Estimates on Tenure Effect 
Model 1 Model 2 ModelS Model 4 Model 5 
Pooled 
Ten/lO .156 .158 .213 .216 .217 (.028) (.026) (.026) (.025) (.025) 
Ten2/l02 -.094 -.092 -.121 -.126 -.131 (.021 ) (.020) (.020) (.019) (.019) 
Tens/lOs .017 .016 .022 .023 .023 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Exp .033 .030 .031 .029 .028 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001 ) 
EXp2 -6.010e-4 -5.53ge-4 -5.734e-4 -5.121e-4 -5.060e-4 (2.94e-5) (2.74e-5) (2.78e-5) (2.62e-5) (2.61e-5) 
Adj. R2 .362 .460 .448 .515 .518 
T5 .056 .058 .079 .079 .079 (.010) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
TIO .079 .082 .114 .113 .110 (.013) (.012) (.012) (.011 ) (.011) 
T15 .081 .085 .121 .116 .111 (.013) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
T20 .075 .078 .119 .108 .099 (.014 ) (.013) (.013) (.012) (.012) 
Male (Pooled Sample) 
Ten/IO .184 .145 .206 .183 .179 (.034) (.031 ) (.032) (.030) (.030) 
Ten2/l02 -.107 -.083 -.115 -.106 -.107 (.024) (.022) (.023) (.022) (.022) 
Tens/lOs .017 .014 .019 .018 .018 (.005) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Exp .037 .033 .036 .032 .031 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
EXp2 -6.272e-4 -5.738e-4 -6.007e-4 -5.232e-4 -5.16ge-4 (3.66e-5) (3.42e-5) (3.56e-5) (3.36e- 5) (3.36e-5) 
Adj. R2 .416 .504 .4 71 .534 .536 
T5 .067 .053 .077 .067 .065 (.012) (.011) (.011) (.011 ) (.011) 
TIO .094 .076 .110 .095 .091 (.016) (.015) (.015) (.014 ) (.014 ) 
T15 .094 .077 .116 .097 .091 (.016) (.015) (.016) (.015) (.015) 
T20 .079 .068 .107 .086 .078 (.016) (.015) (.016) (.015) (.015) 
Female (Pooled Sample) 
Ten/IO .235 .274 .295 .327 .339 (.050) (.045) (.044) (.042) (.042) 
Ten2/l02 -.218 -.230 -.232 -.248 -.261 (.043) (.039) (.038) (.036) (.036) 
Tens/lOs .047 .045 .047 .048 .051 (.010) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.008) 
Exp .026 .025 .022 
.022 .021 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
EXp2 -5.206e-4 -4.97ge-4 -4.594e-4 -4.368e-4 -4.304e-4 (4.46e-5) (4.12e-5) (4.01e-5) (3.83e-5) (3.82e-5) 
Adj. R2 .358 .474 .512 .558 .562 
.069 .085 .095 .107 .110 T5 (.016) (.015) (.014) (.014 ) (.014 ) 
.064 .090 .109 .127 .128 TIO (.020) (.018) (.018) (.017) (.l'l17) 
.019 .047 .077 .095 .092 
T15 (.020) (.0 I ~) (.018) (.017) (.017) 
(Table 2.5 contin ued) 
T - 029 20 (.022) 
-.009 
(.021) 
.033 
(.020) 
.047 
(.019) 
.041 
(.019) 
Notes: Standard errors presented in brackets. Modell includes: age left education, a 
cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience, 
dummies for individual's skills and a time trend (Basic Model). Model 2 is the Basic 
Model plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and establishment size 
dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus regional, occupational and qualification 
dummies. Model 4 is Basic Model plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus 
union coverage and union membership dummies. 
Table 2.6 
018 Tenure Effect Sensitivity to Wage Treatment Over Time 
T5 TIO TI5 T20 Adj. R2 
Male (Pooled Sample) 
Time Trend .067 .094 .094 .079 .416 (.012) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Wave Dummies .067 .094 .094 .079 .416 (.012) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Real Wage (Retail Price Index) .069 .097 .097 .082 .396 (.012) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Real Wage (Retail Price Index) plus .067 .094 .094 .079 
.396 Time Trend (.012) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Real Wage (Average Earnings Index) .062 .086 .086 .072 .392 (.012) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Real Wage (Average Earnings Index) .067 .094 .093 .079 
.393 
Elus Time Trend (.012) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Female (Pooled Sample) 
Time Trend .069 .064 .019 -.028 .358 (.016) (.020) (.020) (.022) 
Wave Dummies .069 .064 .020 -.029 .358 (.016) (.020) (.020) (.022) 
Real Wage (Retail Price Index) .088 .089 .044 -.010 .325 (.016) (.020) (.020) (.022) 
Real Wage (Retail Price Index) plus .068 .063 .019 -.029 
.329 
Time Trend (.016) (.020) (.020) (.022) 
Real Wage (Average Earnings Index) .075 .071 .027 -.023 .323 (.016) (.019) (.020) (.022) 
Real Wage (Average Earnings Index) .068 .062 .018 -.030 
.323 
Elus Time Trend (.016) (.020) (.020) (.022) 
Notes: Every model includes age left education, a cubic in employer tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience and dummies for skills. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
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Table 2.7 
OLS Estimates: Actual and Potential Experience 
Male Female 
Potential Actual Potential Actual 
Pooled 
Ten/tO .184 .150 .235 .185 (.034) (.034) (.050) (.049) 
Ten2/t02 -.107 -.087 -.218 -.224 (.024) (.024) (.043) (.043) 
Tens/tOS .017 .015 .047 .051 (.005) (.005) (.010) (.010) 
Exp .037 .035 .026 .032 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.024) 
EXp2 -6.272e-4 -6.050e-4 -5.206e-4 -6.285e-4 (3.66e-5) (3.71e-5) (4.46e-5) (6.4 7e-5) 
Adj. R2 .416 .414 .358 .369 
Sample 7637 7637 5397 5397 
T5 .067 .055 .069 .043 (.012) (.012) (.016) (.016) 
TI0 .094 .077 .064 .013 (.016) (.016) (.020) (.020) 
T15 .094 .077 .019 -.053 (.016) (.016) (.020) (.020) 
T20 .079 .067 -.029 -.117 (.016) (.017) (.022) (.023) 
Unbalanced 
Ten/tO .184 .150 .221 .174 (.034) (.034) (.050) (.050) 
Ten2/t02 -.107 -.088 -.214 -.220 (.024) (.024) (.044) (.043) 
Tens/tOS .017 .015 .046 .051 (.005) (.005) (.010) (.010) 
Exp .037 .034 .028 .033 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
EXp2 -6.277e-4 -5.981e-4 -5.57ge-4 -6.404e-4 (3.72e-5) (3.75e-5) (4.53e-5) (6.55e-5) 
Adj. R2 .417 .414 .360 .370 
Sample 7517 7517 5267 5267 
T5 .067 .055 .063 .038 (.012) (.012) (.016) (.016) 
TI0 .094 .077 .054 .004 (.016) (.016) (.020) (.020) 
Tt5 .093 .076 .007 -.064 (.016) (.017) (.021) (.021) 
T20 .077 .065 -.042 -.128 (.016) (.017) (.023) (.023) 
Balanced 
Ten/tO .161 .144 .144 .120 (.053) (.054) (.080) (.079) 
Ten2/t02 -.129 -.117 
-.185 -.182 
(.037) (.037) (.065) (.063) 
Tens/tOS .027 .025 .042 .041 (.007) (.007) (.014) (.014 ) 
Exp .035 .031 
.018 .025 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) 
EXp2 -5.837e-4 -5.238e-4 -2.895e-4 -3.497e-4 (5.95e-5) (6.03e-5) (6.94e-5) O.088e-4) 
Adj. R2 .437 .433 .340 .365 
Sample 3167 3167 2231 2231 
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(Table 2. 7 continued) 
T5 .052 .046 .031 .020 (.019) (.019) (.027) (.026) 
TIO .059 .052 .001 -.021 (.026) (.026) (.034) (.033) 
TI5 .043 .037 -.057 -.091 (.026) (.027) (.034) (.033) 
T20 .024 .019 -.113 -.160 (.026) (.026) (.034) (.033) 
Notes: The estimated models include age left education, a cubic in tenure, a 
quadratic in experience, dummies for skills and a time trend. The actual labour 
market experience refers to only full-time employment. Standard errors 
presented in brackets. 
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Ten/l0 
Ten2/102 
Exp 
EXp2 
Adj. R2 
Sample 
Hausman Test 
(P-value) 
T5 
TI0 
T15 
T20 
Table 2.8 
AS (I 987) N Method: Basic Estimates 
1st Method 
.005 
(.220) 
.050 
(.281 ) 
-.011 
(.077) 
.037 
(.007) 
-6.82e-4 
(1. 74ge-4) 
.407 
7642 
.143 
Male 
2nd Method 
.009 
(.318) 
.044 
(.413) 
-.008 
(.115) 
.038 
(.010) 
-6.560e-4 
(2.627e-4) 
.406 
7642 
.130 
Female 
1 st Method 2nd Method 
.034 .038 
(.098) (.099) 
-.079 -.089 
(-.113) (-.115) 
.022 .024 
(.027) (.027) 
.015 .015 
(.002) (.002) 
-2.935e-4 -2.911e-4 
(4.11e-5) (4.14e-5) 
.336 .335 
8849 8849 
.000 .000 
.014 .014 -4.07e-5 -4.22e-5 
(.051) (.071) (.027) (.027) 
.045 .045 -.023 -.026 
(.036) (.037) (.034) (.034) 
.085 .085 -.053 -.060 
(.068) (.083) (.056) (.056) 
.127 .129 -.072 -.084 
(.104) (.124) (.087) (.088) 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a cubic in employer-
tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's 
skills and a time trend. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
Ten 
Exp 
Adj. R2 
Sample 
Hausman Test 
(P-value) 
T5 
TI0 
T15 
T20 
Table 2.9 
AS (1987) N Method: Basic Estimates 
Male Female 
1 st Method 2nd Method 1 st Method 2nd Method 
.037 .033 -.033 -.036 
(.057) (.058) (.052) (.052) 
.011 .014 .004 .002 
(.030) (.32) (.027) (.028) 
.383 .038 .015 .015 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
-6.05e-4 -6.370e-4 -2.7ge-4 -2.61 e-4 
(4.87e-5) (5.00e-5) (3.95e-5) (3.98e-5) 
.407 .406 .335 .335 
7642 7642 8849 8849 
.553 .534 .003 .002 
.021 .020 -.016 -.017 
(.023) (.023) (.021) (.021) 
.048 .047 -.030 -.033 
(.037) (.036) (.035) (.035) 
.081 .081 -.042 -.048 
(.049) (.048) (.049) (.049) 
.119 .123 -.052 -.062 
(.071) (.072) (.072) (.073) 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a cubic in employer-
tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's 
skills and a time trend. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
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Table 2.10 
AS (1987) N Method: Alternative Wage Treatment Over Time 
T5 TIO TI5 T20 Hausman 
Male full-time emplo~ees 
Unbalanced 
Time Trend .014 .045 .085 .129 .130 (.071 ) (.037) (.083) (.124) 
Wave Dummies .012 .041 .082 .126 .115 (.073) (.037) (.087) (.129) 
Real Wage (R.P .I.) .012 .068 .142 .211 .148 (.072) (.039) (.079) (.120) 
Real Wage (R.P.!.) plus Time Trend .015 .042 .079 .121 .118 (.071) (.037) (.083) (.124) 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) .017 -.012 -.050 -.061 .003 (.072) (.039) (.079) (.121) 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) plus Time Trend .012 .041 .081 .125 .111 (.071) (.037) (.083) (.124) 
Balanced 
Time Trend -.265 -.082 .245 .411 .714 (.969) (.458) (.555) (1.017) 
Wave Dummies -.448 -.177 .328 .585 .668 (1.940) (.945) (1.033) (1.963) 
Real Wage (R.P.!') -.061 -.014 .066 .106 .746 (.246) (.171) (.057) (.111) 
Real Wage (R.P.!') plus Time Trend -.251 -.075 .237 .395 .619 (.940) (.445) (.539) (.987) 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) .091 .031 -.080 -.139 .110 (.246) (.171) (.057) (.111) 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) plus Time Trend -.270 -.086 .244 .411 .710 (.978) (.462) (.560) (1.026) 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend. P-value of the 
performed Hausman test is presented in the last column. Standard errors presented in brackets 
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Table 2.11 
AS (1987) N Method: Alternative Wage Treatment Over Time 
T5 T 10 T 15 TZO Hausman 
------~-- -------- ------
Female full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Time Trend -4.20e-5 -.026 -.060 -.084 .000 (.027) (.034) (.056) (.088) 
Wave Dummies -7.61e-4 -.027 -.061 -.084 .000 (.028) (.034) (.057) (.089) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .045 .120 .207 .285 .015 (.027) (.031 ) (.053) (.087) 
Real Wage (R.P .1.) plus Time Trend -.001 -.030 -.067 -.093 .000 (.027) (.034) (.056) (.088) 
Real Wage (A.E.L) .014 .023 .032 .045 .000 (.027) (.031) (.053) (.086) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time Trend -.003 -.032 -.069 -.095 .000 (.027) (.034) (.056) (.088) 
Balanced 
Time Trend .012 -.068 -.191 -.311 .007 (.040) (.050) (.083) (.131) 
Wave Dummies .011 -.070 -.193 -.314 .006 (.042) (.050) (.084) (.134) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .050 .102 .146 .173 .261 (.039) (.039) (.056) (.095) 
Real Wage (R.P.!.) plus Time Trend .013 -.068 -.196 -.320 .006 (.040) (.050) (.083) (.131) 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) .031 .024 -.008 -.047 .254 (.039) (.039) (.055) (.095) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time Trend .011 -.072 -.199 -.322 .005 (.040) (.050) (.083) (.131) 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend. P-value of the 
performed Hausman test is presented in the last column. Standard errors presented in brackets 
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Table 2.12 
AS (1987) N Method: Alternative Wage Treatment Over Time 
T5 T 10 T 15 T20 Hausman 
Male full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Time Trend .020 .047 .081 .123 .534 (.023) (.036) (.048) (.072) 
Wave Dummies .018 .044 .077 .118 .522 (.023) (.036) (.049) (.072) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .034 .077 .128 .187 .310 (.022) (.036) (.050) (.076) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .018 .044 .077 .117 .531 (.023) (.036) (.048) (.072) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) -.016 -.026 -.029 -.027 .057 (.022) (.036) (.050) (.076) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time .018 .043 .077 .118 
.318 Trend (.023) (.036) (.048) (.072) 
Balanced 
Time Trend .035 .068 .099 .129 .343 (.030) (.053) (.074) (.103) 
Wave Dummies .034 .067 .101 .134 .342 (.031) (.053) (.075) (.104) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .025 .048 .069 .087 .401 (.026) (.041 ) (.054) (.076) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .035 .068 .098 .126 .349 (.030) (.053) (.074) (.103) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) -.027 -.055 -.083 -.113 .383 (.026) (.042) (.055) (.077) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time .034 .066 .097 .126 .35~) 
Trend (.030) (.053) (.074) (.103) 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a qudratic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend. P-value of the 
performed Hausman test is presented in the last column. Standard errors presented in brackets 
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Table 2.13 
AS (1987) N Method: Alternative Wage Treatment Over Time 
T5 T 10 T 15 T20 Hausman 
Female full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Time Trend -.017 -.033 -.048 -.062 .002 (.021) (.035) (.049) (.073) 
Wave Dummies -.018 -.034 -.049 -.062 .002 (.021 ) (.035) (.050) (.074) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .063 .128 .193 .259 .193 (.019) (.032) (.046) (.070) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend -.019 -.037 -.054 -.070 .001 (.021) (.035) (.049) (.073) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) .010 .022 .035 .050 .092 (.019) (.032) (.045) (.070) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time -.020 -.039 -.057 -.073 
.001 Trend (.021 ) (.035) (.049) (.073) 
Balanced 
Time Trend -.049 -.111 -.189 -.280 .030 (.031) (.056) (.082) (.117) 
Wave Dummies -.050 -.113 -.190 -.280 .032 (.031) (.056) (.082) (.118) 
Real Wage (R.P .1.) .062 .110 .144 .163 .117 (.023) (.038) (.052) (.079) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend -.050 -.114 -.193 -.287 .026 (.031 ) (.056) (.082) (.1 17) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) .013 .012 -.004 -.033 .732 (.023) (.037) (.052) (.079) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time -.051 -.116 -.200 -.290 
.024 
Trend (.031 ) (.056) (.082) (.117) 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a quadratic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend. P-value of the 
performed Hausman test is presented in the last column. Standard errors presented in brackets 
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Table 2.14 
AS (1987) N Method: Actual and Potential Labour Market Experience 
T5 T10 T15 TZO Hausman 
Male full-time emEloyees 
Unbalanced 
.129 .014 .045 .085 
.130 Potentia1labour market experience (.071) (.037) (.083) (.124) 
.019 .033 .050 .075 
.300 Acnuulabournurrketexperience (.071) (.036) (.092) (.138) 
Balanced 
.411 -.265 -.082 .245 
.714 Potential labour market experience (.969) (.458) (.555) (1.017) 
-.264 -.080 .247 .409 
.727 Acnuu labour nurrket experience (.863) (.397) (.524) (.933) 
Female full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
-4.200e-
-.026 -.060 -.084 
.000 Potentia1labour market experience 5 (.034) (.056) (.088) (.027) 
-.021 -.066 -.116 -.153 
.000 Actual1abour nurrket experience (,027) (.033) (.055) (.086) 
Balanced 
Potential labour market experience .012 -.068 -.191 -.311 (.040) (.050) (.083) (.131) .007 
-.010 -.084 -.191 -.298 
(.037) (.048) (.082) (.128) Actual labour market experience .013 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend. Actual labour market 
experience refers to full-time employment only. P-value of the performed Hausman test is presented in the 
last column. Standard errors presented in brackets 
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Table 2.15 
AS (1987) N Method: Actual and Potential Labour Market Experience 
T5 TI0 T15 T20 Hausman 
Male full-time emEloyees 
Unbalanced 
.123 .020 .047 .081 
.534 Potential labour market experience (.023) (.036) (.048) (.072) 
.014 .032 .054 .082 
.741 Actual labour market experience (.023) (.037) (.049) (.072) 
Balanced 
.129 .035 .068 .099 
.343 Potential labour market experience (.030) (.053) (.074) (.103) 
.034 .066 .096 .124 
.360 Actual labour market experience (.031) (.054) (.075) (.104) 
Female full-time emEloyees 
Unbalanced 
-.062 -.017 -.033 -.048 
.002 Potential labour market experience (.021) (.035) (.049) (.073) 
-.038 -.073 -.105 -.133 
.006 Actual labour market experience (.021 ) (.035) (.049) (.072) 
Balanced 
Potential labour market experience -.049 -.111 -.189 -.280 (.031) (.056) (.082) (.117) .030 
-.050 -.112 -.188 -.277 
(.030) (.054) (.080) (.115) Actual labour market experience .095 
Notes: The estimated basic model includes age left education, a quadratic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend. Actual labour market experience 
refers to full-time employment only. P-value of the performed Hausman test is presented in the last column. 
Standard errors presented in brackets 
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Table 2.16 
AS (1987) IV Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
Male Unbalanced Balanced 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Ten/IO .153 .089 .157 .186 .168 -.138 -.017 .001 (.279» (.285) (.261) (.259) (1.043) (1.105) (.724) (.734) 
Ten2/I02 -.117 -.031 -.102 -.135 -.147 .231 .085 .071 (.356» (.368) (.333) (.331 ) (1.282) 0.367) (.891) (.899) 
Ten3/I03 .033 .007 .026 .034 .039 -.065 -.023 -.022 (.097» (.101) (.091) (.090) (.342) (.368) (.238) (240) 
Exp .036 .037 .034 .034 .033 .024 .025 .024 (.009) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.040) (.043) (.029) (.029) 
EXp2 -6.715e-4 -6.402e-4 -5.955e-4 -5.968e-4 -6.30ge-4 -3.827e-4 -4.36ge-4 -4.244e-4 (2.206e-4) (2.300e-4) (2.058e-4) (2.04ge-4) (9.593e-4) (.001) (6.717e-4) (6.67ge-4) 
T5 .051 .037 .056 .063 .052 -.020 .010 .016 (.064) (.064) (.060) (.059) (.244) (.258) (. I 70) (.173) 
TIO .068 .065 .082 .084 .060 .028 .044 .050 (.35) (.035) (.034) (.034) (.11 1) (.115) (.081 ) (.084) 
TI5 .077 .087 .095 .088 .051 .093 .087 .088 (.072) (.078) (.069) (.069) (.177) (.189) (.131) (.130) 
T20 .102 .109 .118 .100 .056 .128 .118 .112 (.112) (.119) (. 107) (.108) (.3 17) (,328) (.228) (.231) 
Hausman .486 .237 .483 .673 .875 .948 .822 .924 
Notes: Model 2 is the Basic Model (age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market 
experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend) plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is 
Basic Model plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. 
Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. P-value of the performed Hausman test is 
presented in the last row. Standard errors presented in brackets 
115 
Table 2.17 
AS (1987) N Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
Female Unbalanced Balanced 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Ten/IO -.034 .063 -.003 .064 -.044 .142 .017 .068 (.088) (.083) (.078) (.079) (.120) (.114) (.106) (.107) 
Tenz/IOz .021 -.061 .026 -.042 -.040 -.168 -.027 -.072 (.101) (.096) (.091) (.092) (.13S) (.132) (.120) (.122) 
Ten3/I03 -.003 .017 -.004 .011 .007 .03S .002 .011 (.024) (.023) (.021) (.022) (.031) (.030) (.027) (.028) 
Exp .017 .013 .014 .014 .010 .006 .006 .006 (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Expz -3.138e-4 -2.668e-4 -2.844e-4 -2.69ge-4 -1.308e-4 -8.4 70e-4 -7.970e-4 -6.490e-4 (3.74e-S) (3.SSe-S) (3.37e-S) (3.37e-S) (S.71e-S) (S.48e-S) (S.17e-S) (5.18e-S) 
T5 -.012 .018 .OOS .023 -.031 .033 .002 .017 (.024) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.034) (.032) (.030) (.030) 
TIO -.016 .019 .019 .033 -.077 .008 -.008 .006 (.030) (.029) (.027) (.028) (.043) (.042) (.039) (.039) 
TI5 -.OlS .014 .040 .037 -.132 -.049 -.029 -.02S (.OSO) (.049) (.046) (.047) (.069) (.070) (.06S) (.06S) 
T20 -.009 .016 .064 .04S -.192 -.113 -.OS9 -.067 (.078) (.076) (.072) (.073) (.106) (.109) (.100) (.101) 
Hausman .000 .000 .000 .001 .002 .048 .002 .016 
Notes: Model 2 is the Basic Model (age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market 
experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend) plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is 
Basic Model plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. 
Model S is Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. P-value of the performed Hausman test is 
presented in the last row. Standard errors presented in brackets 
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Method 1 
Male 
Female 
Method 2 
Male 
Female 
Table 2.18a 
Topel (l991) Two-Step Method: Within-Job Wage Growth (lst step) 
Male Female 
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 
.124 .091 .056 .037 
(.020) (.017) (.019) (.016) ~Ten 
-.003 -.002 -.003 -.003 
(.00 I) (.00 I) (.002) (.002) ~Ten2 
1.135e-4 8.02e-5 1.102e-4 7.9ge-5 
(6.23e-5) (6.21e-5) (9.31e-5) (9.15e-5) ~Ten3 
-1.42e-6 -9.60e- 7 -1.17e-6 -6.33e- 7 
(8.95e-7) (8.95e-7) (1.5ge-6) O.56e-6) ~Ten4 
-.006 -.003 -.002 -2.43ge-4 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.00 I) Mxp2 
1.377e-4 6.8ge-5 4.40e-5 -2.20e-6 
(5.54e-5) (5.06e-5) (5.13e-5) (4.70e-5) Mxp3 
~Exp4 -1.16e-6 -4.87 e- 7 -4.14e-7 5.16e-8 (5.9ge-7) (5.57e-07) (5.4ge-7) (5.12e-7) 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log real wage, constructed as nominal wage over the average earnings 
index (AE!). Standard errors presented in brackets. 
Table 2.19a 
Topel (1991) Two-SteE Method: Derived Experience and Tenure Effects (2nd steEl 
Experience Within-Job Tenure Effect Adj. R2 T5 TI0 T15 Effect Wage Growth 
.088 .124 .037 .583 .118 .154 .161 
.033 .056 .023 .356 .041 -.018 -.121 
.063 .091 .027 .517 .085 .099 .081 
.016 .037 .021 .209 .038 -.021 -.132 
T20 
.170 
-.230 
.055 
-.258 
Notes: Estimated within-job wage growth from Table 2. 18a. Tenure effect is constructed from within-job wage growth when experience effect 
is subtracted. 
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Method 1 
Male 
Female 
Method 2 
Male 
Female 
Table 2.18b 
Topel (1991) Two-SteE Method: Within-lob Wage Growth (1 st step) 
Male Female 
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 
~Ten .126 .092 .070 .050 (.020) (.017) (.019) (.016) 
~Ten2 -.003 -.003 -.003 -.003 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) 
~Ten3 1.275e-4 9.34e-5 1.018e-4 .7.03e-5 (6.06e-5) (6.05e-5) (9.1ge-5) (9.03e-5) 
~Ten4 -1.56e-6 -1.10e-6 -1.06e-6 -5.00e-07 (8.71e-7) (8.7le-7) (1.56e-6) (1.54e-6) 
Mo/ -.005 -.003 -.002 -2.45le-4 (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) 
M:xp3 1.194e-4 4.76e-5 4.12e-5 -7.40e-6 (5.41e-5) (4.94e-5) (5.04e-5) (4.62e-5) 
Mxp4 -1.02e-6 -3.2le-7 -3.34e-7 1.57e-7 (5.85e-7) (5.44e-7) (5.41e-7) (5.04e-7) 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log real wage, constructed as nominal wage over the retail price 
index (RPI). 
Table 2.19b 
To~l (19~1) Two-Step Method: Derived E~rience and Tenure Effects (2nd step) 
Experience Within-Job 
Effect Wage Growth Tenure Effect Adj. RZ T5 T10 T15 T20 
.079 .126 .047 .569 .164 .237 .280 .330 
.036 .070 .034 .387 .096 .088 .029 -.043 
.054 .092 .038 .481 .130 .181 .200 .214 
.019 .050 .032 .225 .092 .084 .018 -.072 
Notes: Estimated within-job wage growth from Table 2. 18b. Tenure effect is constructed from within-job wage growth when experience effect 
is subtracted. 
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Table 2.20 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Wage Treatment Over Time 
T5 T10 T15 T20 Adj. RZ 
Male full-time emEloyees 
Unbalanced 
Time Trend .271 .469 .634 .792 .504 
Wave Dummies .271 .469 .634 .792 .504 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .130 .181 .200 .214 .481 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .131 .184 .204 .220 .487 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) .086 .099 .178 .362 .517 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) plus Time Trend .088 .121 .182 .367 .520 
Balanced 
Time Trend .317 .540 .732 .930 .578 
Wave Dummies .317 .540 .732 .930 .577 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .185 .261 .302 .354 .540 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .188 .266 .309 .363 .562 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) .149 .208 .234 .265 .567 
Real Wage (~"-E.I.) plus Time Trend .152 .213 .242 .275 .586 
Notes: The returns to tenure are estimated in an equation that includes age left education, 4th order polynomials in employer 
tenure and potential experience and skill dummies. 
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Table 2.21 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Wage Treatment Over Time 
Female full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Time Trend 
Wave Dummies 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) 
Real Wage (A.E.!.) plus Time Trend 
Balanced 
T5 TIO TI5 
.237 
.237 
.092 
.095 
.038 
.040 
.380 
.380 
.084 
.090 
-.021 
-.018 
.461 
.461 
.018 
.026 
-.132 
-.127 
T20 Adj. RZ 
.511 .241 
.511 .240 
-.072 .225 
-.062 .240 
-.258 .209 
-.251 .215 
Time Trend .200 .345 .436 .489 .251 
Wave Dummies .200 .345 .436 .489 .250 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .078 .152 .303 .618 .207 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .079 .154 .305 .620 .210 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) .010 -.043 -.134 -.236 .212 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time Trend .010 -.043 -.134 -.236 .211 
Notes: The returns to tenure are estimated in an equation that includes age left education, 4th order polynomials in employer 
tenure and potential experience and skill dummies. 
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Table 2.22a 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Pote~tial and_Ac~ Labour Market Experience 
Male full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Potential labour market experience 
Actual labour market experience 
Balanced 
Potential labour market experience 
Actual labour market experience 
Female full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Potential labour market experience 
Actual labour market experience 
Balanced 
T5 TI0 T15 T20 
.085 
.080 
.149 
.149 
.038 
.024 
.099 
.098 
.208 
.214 
-.021 , 
-.043 
.081 
.085 
.234 
.248 
-.132 
-.163 
.055 
.060 
.265 
.282 
-.258 
-.307 
Adj. RZ 
.517 
.546 
.567 
.580 
.209 
.300 
Potential labour market experience .010 -.043 -.134 -.237 .212 
Actua1labour market experience -.014 -.092 -.211 -.346 .218 
Notes: Estimated equation includes age left education, 4th order polynomials in employer tenure and potential experience and skill 
dummies. Dependent variable is the log real wage based on the AEI. Actual labour market experience refers to full-time and part-time 
employment. 
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Table Z.ZZb 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Potential and Actual Labour Market Experience 
T5 TI0 T15 T20 _ Adj. RZ 
Male full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Potential labour market experience .130 .181 .200 .214 .481 
Actual labour market experience .128 .185 .210 .228 .515 
Balanced 
Potential labour market experience .185 .261 .302 .354 .540 
Actual labour market experience .185 .265 .311 .367 .555 
Female full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Potential labour market experience .092 .084 .018 -.072 .225 
Actual labour market experience .079 .065 -.009 -.116 .302 
Balanced 
Potential labour market experience .067 .058 -.030 -.204 .207 
Actual labour market experience .045 .021 -.058 -.174 .218 
Notes: Estimated equation includes age left education, 4th order polynomials in employer tenure and potential experience and skill 
dummies. Dependent variable is the log real wage based on the RPI. Actual labour market experience refers to full-time and part-time 
employment. 
122 
Table 2.23 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
T5 T 10 T 15 T20 Adj. R2 
Male fUll-time emEloyees 
- ---
Unbalanced 
Modell .085 .099 .081 .055 .517 
Model 2 .116 .162 .175 .179 .607 
ModelS .127 .183 .206 .221 .585 
Mode14 .131 .192 .219 .239 .624 
Model 5 .130 .189 .215 .234 .631 
Balanced 
Modell .149 .208 .234 .265 .567 
Model 2 .191 .292 .361 .434 .643 
ModelS .211 .331 .420 .512 .646 
Model 4 .215 .340 .432 .529 .672 
Model 5 .212 .333 .422 .515 .682 
Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the AEI. Model 1 includes: 
age left education, 4th order polynomials in both employer tenure and potential labour market experience and 
dummies for individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Model 1 plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 
4 is Model 1 plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's 
qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Table 2.24 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
T5 TIO T 15 T20 Adj. RZ 
--~----
Female full-time employees 
Unbalanced 
Modell .038 -.021 -.132 -.258 .209 
Model 2 .049 6.710e-4 -.099 -.215 .434 
ModelS .059 .021 -.069 -.175 .473 
Model 4 .058 .019 -.072 -. I 79 .520 
Model 5 .059 .020 -.071 -.176 .528 
Balanced 
Modell .010 -.043 -.134 -.238 .212 
Model 2 .012 -.039 -.129 -.230 .477 
ModelS .029 -.005 -.078 -.163 .514 
Model 4 .026 -.012 -.088 -. I 76 .561 
Model 5 .025 -.014 -.090 -.179 .566 
Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the AEI. Modell includes: 
age left education, 4th order polynomials in both employer tenure and potential labour market experience and 
dummies for individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Modell plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 
4 is Model 1 plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's 
qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Table 2.25 
Topel (1991) Two-SteE Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
T5 T 10 T 15 T20 Adj. R2 
-- ------- - - - ---
Male full-time emEloyees 
Unbalanced 
Modell .130 .181 .200 .214 .481 
Model 2 .160 .243 .292 .337 .591 
ModelS .168 .258 .315 .368 .564 
Model 4 .172 .266 .327 .385 .608 
Model 5 .171 .264 .324 .380 .615 
Balanced 
Model 1 .185 .261 .302 .354 .540 
Model 2 .226 .343 .424 .516 .633 
ModelS .241 .373 .469 .577 .631 
Model 4 .245 .381 .481 .592 .661 
Model 5 .242 .375 .472 .580 .671 
Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the RPI. Model I includes: 
age left education, 4th order polynomials in both employer tenure and potential labour market experience and 
dummies for individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Modell plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 
4 is Model I plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's 
qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Table 2.26 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
TS T 10 TIS T20 Adj. R2 
Female full-time emEloyees 
Unbalanced 
Modell .092 .084 .018 -.072 .225 
Model 2 .103 .106 .051 -.029 .444 
ModelS .113 .126 .081 .011 .481 
Model 4 .112 .124 .078 .007 .527 
ModelS .113 .125 .080 .010 .536 
Balanced 
Modell .078 .152 .303 .618 .207 
Model 2 .081 .157 .309 .626 .473 
ModelS .097 .190 .360 .694 .508 
Model 4 .094 .184 .351 .681 .556 
ModelS .093 .182 .348 .678 .563 
Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the RPI. Modell includes: 
age left education, 4th order polynomials in both employer tenure and potential labour market experience and 
dummies for individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Model 1 plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 
4 is Model 1 plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's 
qualifications. ModelS is Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the AEI. Model 1 includes: 
age left education, a cubic in employer tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience and dummies for 
individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and establishment size 
dummies. Model 3 is the Model 1 plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Model 1 plus 
dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is 
Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Table 2.28 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
T5 T 10 T 15 T20 Adj. RZ 
_ .. -
- - --
Female full-time em~loyees 
Unbalanced 
Modell .037 -.016 -.128 -.265 .201 
Model 2 .048 .005 -.096 -.222 .429 
Model 3 .058 .025 -.066 -.182 .469 
Model 4 .057 .023 -.069 -.187 .516 
Model 5 .058 .024 -.068 -.184 .524 
Balanced 
Modell .012 -.037 -.123 -.220 .205 
Model 2 .014 -.032 -.116 -.211 .470 
Model 3 .032 .002 -.064 -.141 .505 
Model 4 .029 -.004 -.073 -.153 .552 
Model 5 .028 -.006 -.076 -.158 .560 
Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the AE!. Model 1 includes: 
age left education, a cubic in employer tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience and dummies for 
individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and establishment size 
dummies. Model 3 is the Model 1 plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Model 1 plus 
dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is 
Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Table 2.29 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
T5 T 10 T 15 T ZO Adj. RZ 
Male full-time emEloyees 
- ---
Unbalanced 
Modell .108 .149 .144 .112 .308 
ModelZ .138 .208 .232 .230 .505 
Model 3 .140 .213 .239 .239 .461 
Model 4 .143 .219 .248 .251 .527 
ModelS .142 .217 .246 .248 .533 
Balanced 
Modell .1 16 .148 .127 .085 .322 
ModelZ .153 .222 .238 .232 .539 
Model 3 .157 .230 .249 .247 .512 
Model 4 .160 .236 .258 .259 .563 
ModelS .158 .232 .253 .253 .570 
Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the RPI. Modell includes: 
age left education, a cubic in employer tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience and dummies for 
individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and establishment size 
dummies. Model 3 is the Model 1 plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Model 1 plus 
dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is 
Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Table 2.30 
Topel (1991) Two-Step Method: Alternative Control Vectors 
T5 T 10 T 15 T20 Adj. R2 
Female full-time emEloyees 
Unbalanced 
Modell .083 .007 -.Z59 -.748 .ZOI 
Model 2 .094 .OZ9 -.ZZ7 -.705 .430 
ModelS .103 .048 -.198 -.667 .471 
Model 4 .10Z .046 -.ZOI -.671 .518 
Model 5 .103 .047 -.ZOO -.669 .5Z7 
Balanced 
Modell .071 .070 .019 -.056 .Z07 
Model 2 .074 .074 .OZ6 -.047 .471 
ModelS .091 .109 .078 .OZZ .506 
Model 4 .088 .103 .069 .010 .553 
Model 5 .087 .100 .065 .005 .563 
Notes: The dependent variable is log real wage, constructed as nominal wage divided by the RPI. Modell includes: 
age left education, a cubic in employer tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience and dummies for 
individual's skills. Model 2 is Model 1 plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and establishment size 
dummies. Model 3 is the Model 1 plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Model 1 plus 
dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is 
Model 4 plus union coverage and union membership dummies. 
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Table 2.31 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Potential and Actual EXEerience 
Male Female 
Potential Actual Potential Actual 
Random Effects 
Ten/tO .151 .134 .259 .209 (.032) (.032) (.040) (.040) 
Ten2/(t0) 2 -.113 -.103 -.222 -.221 (.023) (.023) (.033) (.033) 
Ten3/(t0) 3 .021 .019 .044 .046 (.005) (.005) (,008) (.008) 
Exp .037 .034 .019 .029 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) 
EXp2 -5.818e-4 -5.587e-4 -3,452e-4 -5.172e-4 (4.7e-5) (4.78e-5) (5.08e-5) (7.32e-5) 
Adj. R2 .368 .362 .304 .322 
Hausman Test (t 978) 384.08 431.10 226.43 X2 (t 1) 159.67 
T5 .050 .044 .079 .055 (.011) (.012) (.014 ) (.014 ) 
TI0 .059 .050 .081 .034 (.017) (.017) (.021) (.021) 
T15 .042 .034 .037 -.028 (.020) (.021) (.027) (.027) 
T20 .015 .008 -.019 
-.096 
(.024) (.024) (.034) (.034) 
Fixed Effects 
Ten/l0 .198 .187 .313 
.321 
(.039) (.040) (.048) (.048) 
Ten2/(t0) 2 -.150 -.142 -.238 -.247 (.026) (.026) (.035) (.035) 
Ten3/(t0) 3 .028 .027 .045 .047 (.006) (.006) (.008) (.008) 
Exp 
EXp2 -4.182e-4 
-4,410e-4 -2.213e-4 -2.714e-4 
(6.21e-5) (6.31e-5) (6.10e-5) (8.38e-5) 
Adj. R2 .218 .218 .285 .285 
T5 .065 
.103 
(.015) (.019) 
TI0 .077 
.120 
(.025) (.032) 
T15 .056 
.085 
(.032) (.043) 
T20 .024 
.032 
(.039) (.055) 
Notes: Estimated model includes age left education, cubic in tenure, quadratic in labour 
market experience, skill dummies and a time trend. Actual labour market experience 
refers to full-time employment only. Sample includes full-time male and female employees 
from the unbalanced panel sample. Standard errors presented in brackets. R2 is defined as 
the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
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Table 2.32 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Potential and Actual Experience 
Male Female 
Potential Actual Potential Actual 
Random Effects 
Ten/tO .136 .125 .203 .183 (.048) (.048) (.058) (.057) 
Ten2/(10) 2 -.120 -.113 -.165 -.163 (.035) (.035) (.044) (.044) 
Ten3/(10) 3 .025 .024 .031 .032 (.007) (.007) (.010) (.010) 
Exp .031 .030 .014 .025 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
EXp2 -4.513e-4 -4.628e-4 -1.853e-4 -3.340e-4 (7.24e-5) (7.28e-5) (7.2ge-5) (I.046e-4) 
Adj. R2 .385 .378 .276 .306 
Hausman Test (1978) 168.11 172.76 X2 (12) 83.69 62.51 
T5 .041 .037 .064 .055 (.018) (.018) (.021) (.021 ) 
TtO .041 .036 .069 .051 (.026) (.027) (.031 ) (.031 ) 
Tt5 .018 .013 .038 .014 (.032) (.032) (.038) (.038) 
T20 -.008 -.012 -.007 -.034 (.037) (.037) (.046) (.045) 
Fixed Effects 
Ten/tO .183 .172 
.253 .261 
(.055) (.055) (.062) (.062) 
Ten2/(10) 2 -.134 -.127 -.172 -.181 (.038) (.038) (.045) (.045) 
Ten3/(10) 3 .026 .025 .031 .033 (.008) (.008) (.010) (.010) 
Exp 
EXp2 -3.334e-4 -3.761e-4 
-1.618e-4 -1.920e-4 
(8.22e-5) (8.2ge-5) (7.94e-5) (1.058e-4) 
Adj. R2 .233 .235 .297 .296 
T5 .061 
.087 
(.021) (.023) 
TIO .075 
.112 
(.034) (.037) 
TI5 .062 
.097 
(.045) (.048) 
T20 .041 
.066 
(.055) (.059) 
Notes: Estimated model includes age left education, cubic in tenure, quadratic in labour 
market experience, skill dummies and a time trend. Actual labour market experience 
refers to full-time employment only. Sample includes full-time male and female employees 
from the balanced panel sample. Standard errors presented in brackets. RZ is defined as the 
within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
Table 2.33 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Wage Treatment Over Time 
Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Unbalanced Sample T 5 T 10 T 15 T 20 Adj. R2 T 5 T 10 T 15 T 20 Adj. RZ 
Male full-time employees 
. .050 .059 .042 .015 .065 .077 .056 .024 218 
Tune Trend (.011) (.017) (.020) (.024) .368 (.015) (.025) (.032) (.039) . 
. .049 .058 .041 .015 .065 .078 .059 .029 221 
Wave Dumnues (.011) (.017) (.020) (.024) .368 (.015) (.025) (.032) (.039) . 
. 060 .075 .062 .037 .144 .214 .234 .227 04S 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) (.010) (.015) (.017) (.021) .346 (.012) (.019) (.025) (.032) . L 
. .049 .057 .040 .013 .064 .075 .054 .022 057 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Tune Trend (.011) (.017) (.020) (.024) .347 (.015) (.025) (.032) (.039) . 
028 .022 -.003 -.033 43 .118 .171 .179 .165 020 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) (:010) (.015) (.017) (.021) .3 (.012) (.019) (.025) (.032) . 
. 049 .057 .040 .014 .064 .076 .056 .024 026 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Tune Trend (:011) (.017) (.020) (.024) .344 (.015) (.025) (.032) (.039) . 
Female full-time employees 
Time Trend .079 .081 .037 -.019 .304 .103 .120 .085 .032 .285 (.014) (.021 ) (.027) (.034) (.019) (.032) (.043) (.055) 
Wave Dummies .080 .081 .036 -.020 .304 .103 .120 .085 .031 .28G (.014 ) (.021) (.027) (.034) (.019) (.032) (.043) (.055) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .128 .163 .141 .097 .258 .174 .243 .246 .219 .081 (.011) (.016) (.021) (.028) (.013) (.021 ) (.030) (.041) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .078 .079 .034 -.023 .273 .102 .117 .081 .027 .087 (.014) (.021) (.027) (.034) (.019) (.032) (.043) (.055) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) .088 .096 .057 .003 .265 .140 .185 .170 .130 .040 (.011 ) (.016) (.021 ) (.027) (.013) (.021 ) (.030) (.041) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time Trend .077 .078 .033 -.023 .267 .100 .115 .080 .025 .O4:~ (.014) (.021) (.027) (.034) (.019) (.032) (.043) (.055) 
Notes: Basic model includes age left education, cubic in tenure, quadratic in labour market experience and skill dummies. Standard errors presented in 
brackets. R2 is defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
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Table 2.34 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Wage Treatment Over Time 
Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Balanced Sample T 5 T 10 T 15 T 20 Adj. RZ T 5 T 10 T 15 T 20 Adj. RZ 
Male full-time employees 
Time Trend .041 .041 .018 -.008 385 .061 .075 (.018) (.026) (.032) (.037)' (.021) (.034) 
Wave Dummies .040 .040 .019 -.005 386 .061 .077 (.018) (.026) (.032) (.037)' (.021) (.034) 
Real Wage (R.P.l.) .048 .052 .032 .007 361 .118 .181 (.016) (.023) (.026) (.031)' (.018) (.0 18) 
Real Wage (R.P'!.) plus Time Trend .042 .042 .018 -.009 363 .062 .076 (.018) (.026) (.032) (.037) .'- (.021) (.034) 
Real Wage (A.E.l.) .015 -.004 -.040 -.075 360 .094 .137 (.016) (.023) (.026) (.031)' (.0 I 8) (.027) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time Trend .040 .040 .017 -.009 360 .060 .074 (.018) (.026) (.032) (.037)' (.021) (.034) 
Female full-time employees 
.064 .069 .038 -.007 .087 .112 Time Trend (.031) (.038) (.046) .276 (.023) (.037) (.021 ) 
.064 .069 .039 -.005 .088 .113 Wave Dummies (.031) (.038) (.046) .276 (.023) (.037) (.021 ) 
.092 .114 .093 .054 .134 .190 Real Wage (R.P.l.) (.025) (.030) (.037) .240 (.018) (.027) (.0 17) 
.065 .069 .037 -.009 .088 .112 Real Wage (R.P.l.) plus Time Trend (.031 ) (.038) (.046) .250 (.023) (.037) (.021 ) 
.055 .053 .018 -.030 .104 .139 
.249 Real Wage (A.E.I.) (.017) (.025) (.030) (.037) (.018) (.027) 
.063 .067 .035 -.010 .086 .110 Real Wage (A.E.l.) plus Time Trend (.038) (.046) .248 (.023) (.037) (.021 ) (.031) 
.062 
(.045) 
.067 
(.045) 
.205 
(.035) 
.061 
(.045) 
.147 
(.035) 
.061 
(.045) 
.097 
(.048) 
.099 
(.048) 
.195 
(.036) 
.096 
(.048) 
.131 
(.036) 
.093 
(.048) 
.041 
(.055) 
.049 
(.055) 
.210 
(.043) 
.039 
(.055) 
.142 
(.043) 
.040 
(.055) 
.066 
(.059) 
.069 
(.059) 
.176 
(.047) 
.062 
(.059) 
.103 
(.047) 
.060 
(.059) 
.233 
.239 
.038 
.047 
.016 
.019 
.297 
.299 
.064 
.069 
.027 
.027 
Notes: Basic model includes age left education, cubic in tenure, quadratic in labour market experience and skill dummies. Standard errors presented in 
brackets. RZ is defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
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Table 2.35 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Alternative Control Vectors 
Unbalanced 
Random Effects 
Ten/l0 
Tenz/l0z 
Ten3/103 
Exp 
Expz 
Adj. RZ 
T5 
TI0 
T15 
T20 
Fixed Effects 
Ten/l0 
Tenz/lOz 
Ten3/103 
Exp 
Expz 
Adj. RZ 
T5 
TI0 
T15 
T20 
(Male EmEloyees) 
Model 2 ModelS Model 4 Model 5 
.148 .178 .175 . 171 
(.03 I) (.03 I) (.03 I) (.031) 
-.IlO -.120 -.120 -.Il7 
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) 
.020 .022 .022 .021 
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
.036 .037 .035 .035 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
-5.780e-4 -5.655e-4 -5.504e-4 -5.507e-4 
(4.55e-5) (4.61e-5) (4.48e-5) (4.48e-5) 
.447 .433 .481 .481 
.049 .062 .060 .059 
(.0 I 1) (.01 1) (.01 1) (.011) 
.059 .079 .077 .076 
(.016) (.0 17) (.016) (.016) 
.044 .069 .067 .067 
(.020) (.020) (.019) (.019) 
.020 .048 .046 .047 
(.023) (.023) (.022) (.022) 
.200 .190 .192 .184 
(.040) (.040) (.040) (.040) 
-.150 -.147 -.148 -.14 I 
(.026) (.027) (.027) (.027) 
.028 .028 .029 .027 
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
-4.06ge-4 -4.02ge-4 -4.037e-4 -3.993e-4 
(6.25e-5) (6.30e-5) (6.30e-5) (6.30e-5) 
.221 .222 .224 .226 
.066 .062 .063 .060 
(.0 15) (.0 15) (.01 5) (.0 15) 
.078 .072 .073 .071 
(.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
.058 .050 .052 .05 I 
(.032) (.032) (.032) (.032) 
.027 .019 .021 .023 
(.039) (.040) (.040) (.040) 
Notes: Model 2 is the Basic Model (age left education, a cubic in employer-
tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience, dummies for 
individual's skills and a time trend) plus regional dummies, I -digit industry 
dummies and establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus 
regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Basic Model 
plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size 
and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and 
union membership dummies. Standard errors presented in brackets. R2 is 
defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-
effects model. 
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Table 2.36 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Alternative Control Vectors 
(Female Employees) 
Unbalanced 
Random Effects 
Ten/IO 
Tenz/IOZ 
Exp 
ExpZ 
Adj. RZ 
T5 
TIO 
Tl5 
T20 
Fixed Effects 
Ten/IO 
Tenz/IOZ 
Tens/lOS 
Exp 
ExpZ 
Adj. RZ 
T5 
TIO 
TI5 
T20 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
.244 .260 .256 .258 
(.039) (.038) (.038) (.039) 
-.206 -.211 -.205 -.208 
(.033) (.032) (.032) (.033) 
.041 .042 .041 .041 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
.021 .018 .019 .019 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
-3.847e-4 -3.637e-4 -3.712e-4 -3.752e-4 
(5.01e-5) (4.91e-5) (4.86e-5) (4.86e-5) 
.377 .460 .496 .498 
.076 .082 .082 .082 
(.014) (.013) (.013) (.013) 
.079 .091 .091 .092 
(.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
.039 .057 .060 .059 
(.026) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
-.011 .012 .018 .016 
(.032) (.031 ) (.031) (.030) 
.290 .277 .279 .276 
(.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) 
-.217 -.212 -.212 -.210 
(.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) 
.040 .039 .040 .039 
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
-2.318e-4 -2.116e-4 -2.150e-4 -2.158e-4 
(6.07e-5) (6.12e-5) (6.14e-5) (6.14e-5) 
.312 .316 .318 .318 
.096 .091 .091 .091 
(.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
.114 .105 .106 .105 
(.031) (.031) (.031) (.031) 
.083 .072 .073 .074 
(.043) (.042) (.043) (.043) 
.036 .021 .023 .024 
(.054) (.054) (.054) (.054) 
Notes: Model 2 is the Basic Model (age left education, a cubic in employer-
tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience, dummies for 
individual's skills and a time trend) plus regional dummies, I-digit industry 
dummies and establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus 
regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Basic Model 
plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size 
and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and 
union membership dummies. Standard errors presented in brackets. R2 is 
defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-
effects model. 
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Table 2.37 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Alternative Control Vectors 
(Male EmEloyees) 
Balanced Model 2 ModelS Model 4 Model 5 
Random Effects 
Ten/tO .121 .135 .132 .126 (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) 
Tenz/tOz -.105 -.112 -.110 -.104 (.034) (.034) (.034) (.034) 
Ten3/t03 .022 .023 .023 .022 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Exp .029 .029 .028 .028 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Expz -4.425e-4 -4.32ge-4 -4.372e-4 -4.35ge-4 (7.1ge-5) (7.25e-5) (7.1ge-5) (7.18e- 5) 
Adj. RZ .454 .456 .489 .487 
T5 .037 .042 .042 .040 (.017) (.018) (.017) (.017) 
TtO .038 .046 .045 .044 (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) 
Tt5 .019 .028 .028 .028 (.031) (.032) (.031) (.031) 
T20 -.003 .006 .007 .009 (.036) (.037) (.036) (.036) 
Fixed Effects 
Ten/tO .171 .174 .170 .159 (.055) (.055) (.056) (.056) 
Tenz/tOZ -.127 -.129 -.127 -.119 (.038) (.038) (.038) (.039) 
Ten3/t03 .025 .025 .025 .024 (.008) (.009) (.009) (.009) 
Exp 
Expz -3.022e-4 -2.995e-4 -3.053e-4 -2.958e-4 (8.31e-5) (8.3ge-5) (8.44e-5) (8.44e-5) 
Adj. RZ .244 .243 .248 .251 
T5 
.057 .058 .056 .053 
(.021) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
.070 .070 .067 .064 
(.034) (.035) (.035) (.035) TtO 
.056 .057 .053 .052 
(.045) (.045) (.045) (.045) Tt5 
.036 .036 .032 .035 
(.055) (.055) (.056) (.055) T20 
Notes: Model 2 is the Basic Model (age left education, a cubic in employer-
tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience, dummies for 
individual's skills and a time trend) plus regional dummies, I-digit industry 
dummies and establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus 
regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Basic Model 
plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size 
and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and 
union membership dummies. Standard errors presented in brackets. R~ is 
defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-
effects model. 
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Table 2.38 
Panel Estimates on Tenure Effect: Alternative Control Vectors 
(Female Employees) 
Balanced 
Random Effects 
Ten/IO 
Ten2/I02 
Ten3/I03 
Exp 
Expz 
Adj. RZ 
T5 
TIO 
TI5 
T20 
Fixed Effects 
Ten/IO 
Tenz/I02 
Ten3/I03 
Exp 
ExpZ 
Adj. RZ 
T5 
TIO 
TI5 
T20 
Model 2 Model 3 
.199 
(.058) 
-.162 
(.045) 
.030 
(.010) 
.016 
(.004) 
-2.030e-4 
(7.33e-5) 
.0395 
.063 
(.021 ) 
.067 
(.031) 
.037 
(.037) 
-.007 
(.044) 
.268 
(.063) 
-.178 
(.046) 
.032 
(.010) 
.203 
(.057) 
-.158 
(.044) 
.030 
(.010) 
.014 
(.004) 
-2.113e-4 
(7.20e-5) 
.488 
.066 
(.020) 
.075 
(.030) 
.050 
(.036) 
.013 
(.043) 
.238 
(.063) 
-.163 
(.046) 
.029 
(.010) 
Model 4 
.209 
(.057) 
-.159 
(.045) 
.030 
(.010) 
.013 
(.004) 
-1.943e-4 
(7.20e-5) 
.510 
.069 
(.020) 
.081 
(.030) 
.058 
(.036) 
.024 
(.043) 
.259 
(.064) 
-.173 
(.046) 
.031 
(.011) 
Model 5 
.212 
(.058) 
-.162 
(.045) 
.031 
(.010) 
.013 
(.004) 
-1.961e-4 
(7.20e-5) 
.514 
.069 
(.020) 
.081 
(.030) 
.058 
(.036) 
.022 
(.043) 
.260 
(.064) 
-.173 
(.046) 
.031 
(.011) 
-1. 78 7e-4 -1. 794e-4 -1.7 40e-4 -1. 762e-4 
(8.10e-5) (8.23e-5) (8.25e-5) (8.26e-5) 
.308 .306 .312 .313 
.094 .082 .090 .091 
(.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) 
.123 .104 .117 .118 
(.037) (.037) (.038) (.038) 
.111 .089 .105 .106 
(.048) (.048) (.049) (.049) 
.084 .057 .076 .078 
(.060) (.059) (.060) (.060) 
Notes: Model 2 is the Basic Model (age left education, a cubic in employer-
tenure, a quadratic in potential labour market experience, dummies for 
individual's skills and a time trend) plus regional dummies, I-digit industry 
dummies and establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus 
regional, occupational and qualification dummies. Model 4 is Basic Model 
plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size 
and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and 
union membership dummies. Standard errors presented in brackets. RZ is 
defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-
effects model. 
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Table 2.39 
Quantile (Median) Estimates on Tenure Effect 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Pooled 
Ten/IO .136 .111 .223 .182 .191 (.035) (.034) (.025) (.024) (.022) 
Ten2/102 -.093 -.066 -.130 -.108 -.121 (.026) (.026) (.019) (.018) (.016) 
TenS/lOS .018 .012 .023 .019 .022 (.005) (.005) (.004) (.003) (.003) 
Exp .038 .033 .030 .028 .028 (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001 ) 
EXp2 -6.847e-4 -6.10ge-4 -5.350e-4 -4.962e-4 -4.964e-4 (3.60e-5) (3.58e-5) (2.63e-5) (2.4ge-5) (2.33e-5) 
Pseudo R2 .232 .298 .306 .350 .352 
T5 .047 .040 .082 .066 .068 (.012) (.012) (.009) (.008) (.008) 
TIO .062 .056 .116 .093 .092 (.016) (.016) (.011) (.011) (.010) 
T15 .058 .057 .120 .094 .088 (.016) (.016) (.012) (.011) (.011) 
T20 .048 .051 .111 .083 
.072 
(.017) (.017) (.012) (.012) (.011) 
Male 
Ten/IO .120 .086 .137 .152 
.156 
(.042) (.040) (.035) (.034) (.032) 
Ten2/102 -.070 -.050 -.074 
-.088 -.095 
(.030) (.029) (.025) (.024) (.023) 
TenS /lOs .012 .009 .013 .015 .017 (.006) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.004) 
Exp .039 .036 
.037 .033 .032 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
EXp2 -6.667e-4 -6.218e-4 -6.148e-4 
-5.581e-4 -5.44ge-4 
(4.55e-5) (4.46e-5) (3.88e-5) (3.7ge-5) (3.56e-5) 
Pseudo R2 .269 .331 .317 .360 .362 
.044 .031 .052 .056 .056 T5 (.015) (.014 ) (.012) (.012) (.011) 
.062 .044 .076 .080 .078 TIO (.020) (.019) (.017) (.016) (.015) 
.061 .046 .083 .082 .078 T15 (.020) (.020) (.017) (.017) (.016) 
.052 .041 .082 .075 .069 T20 (.020) (.020) (.017) (.017) (.016) 
Female 
.174 .214 .248 .258 .279 Ten/IO (.052) (.049) (.042) (.041 ) (.038) 
-.127 -.149 -.184 -.187 -.203 Ten2/102 (.045) (.043) (.037) (.036) (.033) 
.025 .026 .036 .036 .038 TenS/lOS (.010) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.008) 
.032 .029 .023 .022 .022 Exp (.002) (.002) (002) (.002) (.002) 
-6.485e-4 -5.940e-4 -4.743e-4 -4.4 7ge-4 -4.44ge-4 EXp2 (4.6ge-5) (4.48e-5) (3.86e-5) (3.77e-5) (3.50e-S) 
Pseudo R2 .234 .316 .363 .393 .396 
.058 .073 .082 .087 .094 
T5 (.017) (.016) (.014) (.0 13) (.012) 
.071 .090 .099 . I 07 .1 IS 
TIO (.021) (.020) (.017) (.017) (.OIG) 
.058 .072 .078 .088 .O~) 1 
TI5 (.02 I) (.020) (.0 17) (.0 17) (.Olt;) 
(Table 2.39 continued) 
T20 .037 (.024) 
.037 
(.022) 
.045 
(.019) 
.056 
(.019) 
.053 
(.018) 
Notes: Model 1 includes: age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in potential 
labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend (Basic Model). Model 2 
is the Basic Model plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and establishment size 
dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus regional, occupational and qualification dummies. 
Model 4 is Basic Model plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment 
size and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union coverage and union 
membership dummies. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
Table 2.40 
Quantile (Median) Estimates on Tenure Effect: Wage Treatment Over Time 
T 5 T lOT 15 T 20 Pseudo R 2 
Pooled 
Male full-time employees 
Time Trend .044 .062 .061 .052 .269 (.015) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
Wave Dummies .044 .061 .059 
.049 
.269 (.015) (.020) (.021) (.021) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) .049 .067 .066 .055 .256 (.014 ) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .050 .069 .067 .055 .256 (.014) (.019) (.020) (.020) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) .037 .051 .049 .040 .253 (.014) (.019) (.019) (.020) 
Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time Trend .050 .069 .068 .056 .255 (.015) (.021) (.021) (.021) 
Female full-time employees 
.058 .071 .058 .037 
.234 Time Trend (.017) (.021) (.021) (.024) 
.059 .072 .058 .035 
.235 Wave Dummies (.015) (.019) (.019) (.021) 
.068 .085 .071 .046 
.213 Real Wage (R.P.I.) (.016) (.020) (.020) (.022) 
Real Wage (R.P.I.) plus Time Trend .056 .069 .056 .035 .215 (.016) (.020) (.021) (.023) 
.054 .064 .050 .028 
.211 Real Wage (A.E.I.) (.016) (.020) (.020) (.022) 
.053 .063 .049 .028 
.211 Real Wage (A.E.I.) plus Time Trend (.016) (.020) (.020) (.023) 
~otes: Basic model includes age left education, cubic i~ tenure, quadratic in potential labour market 
~xperience and skill dummies. Standard errors presented In brackets. 
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Table 2.41 
Quantile (Median) Estimates on Tenure Effect: Actual and Potential Experience 
T5 TI0 T15 T20 Pseudo RZ 
Male full-time emEloyees 
Pooled 
Potential labour market experience .044 .062 .061 .052 .269 (.015) (.020) (.020) (.020) 
Actual labour market experience .037 .051 .051 .044 .268 (.014) (.019) (.020) (.020) 
Unbalanced 
Potential labour market experience .047 .065 .064 .053 .269 (.014 ) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Actual labour market experience .042 .057 .057 .048 .268 (.014) (.019) (.019) (.020) 
Balanced 
Potential labour market experience .002 -.007 -.019 -.021 .276 (.020) (.027) (.028) (.027) 
Actual labour market experience -.002 -.013 -.023 -.023 .274 (.020) (.027) (.028) (.027) 
Female full-time employees 
Pooled 
Potential labour market experience .058 .071 .058 .037 .234 (.017) (.021) (.021) (.024) 
Actual labour market experience .033 .015 -.028 -.072 .241 (.017) (.021) (.021) (.024) 
Unbalanced 
Potential labour market experience .049 .059 .046 .026 .235 (.018) (.022) (.022) (.024) 
Actual labour market experience .027 .008 -.036 
-.078 
.241 (.016) (.020) (.021) (.023) 
Balanced 
Potential labour market experience .021 .010 
-.018 -.046 
.217 (.024) (.030) (.030) (.030) 
Actual labour market experience .049 .031 
-.023 -.086 
.230 (.026) (.033) (.032) (.033) 
Notes: Basic model includes age left education, cubic in tenure, quad.ratic in labour ma~ket 
experience, skill dummies and a time tren~. Actual labour market expenence refers to full-tIme 
employment only. Standard errors presented In brackets. 
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Table 2.42 
Robust Standard Error Estimates Tenure Effect 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Mode14 Model 5 
Male 
Ten/tO .145 .111 .173 .150 .147 (.032) (.029) (.030) (.028) (.028) 
Ten2/t02 -.082 -.064 -.094 -.087 -.089 (.023) (.021 ) (.021 ) (.020) (.020) 
Ten3/I03 .013 .011 .016 .015 .016 (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Exp .038 .035 .036 .032 .032 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Exp2 -.6.481 e-4 -6.016e-4 -5.997e-4 -5.350e-4 -5.261e-4 (3.45e-5) (3.21e-5) (3.27e-5) (3.10e-5) (3.0ge-5) 
F-stat. 479.64 195.09 166.89 158.82 154.64 
T5 .055 .041 .065 .055 .053 (.011) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
TIO .079 .059 .095 .078 .074 (.015) (.014) (.014 ) (.013) (.013) 
TI5 .083 .061 .103 .080 .074 (.015) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014 ) 
T20 .075 .056 .099 .073 .064 (.015) (.014) (.015) (.014) (.014) 
Female 
Ten/IO .193 .220 .261 .272 .280 (.046) (.042) (.038) (.037) (.037) 
Ten2/I02 -.160 -.164 -.188 -.188 -.197 (.040) (.036) (.033) (.032) (.032) 
Ten3/I03 .033 .031 .037 .036 .038 (.009) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.007) 
Exp .032 .030 .022 .022 
.021 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Exp2 -.6.525e-4 -5.93ge-4 -4.597e-4 -4.303e-4 -4.28ge-4 (4.11e-5) (3.78e-5) (3.4 7e-5) (3.35e-5) (3.34e-5) 
F-stat. 318.24 135.16 163.77 142.98 140.09 
T5 .061 .073 .088 .094 
.095 
(.015) (.013) (.012) (.012) (.012) 
TIO .066 .087 .110 .120 
.120 
(.018) (.017) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
TI5 .042 .066 .092 .106 
.103 
(.019) (.017) (.016) (.015) (.015) 
T20 .013 .032 .064 
.078 .071 
(.021 ) (.019) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
Notes: Model 1 includes: age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend (Basic 
Model). Model 2 is the Basic Model plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model 3 is the Basic Model plus regional, occupational and 
qualification dummies. Model 4 is Basic Model plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Model 5 is Model 4 plus union 
coverage and union membership dummies. Standard errors presented in brackets. 
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Table 2.43 
Quantile Regressions: Tenure Effect 
Quantile I II III IV 
Male 
.10 .183 .165 .195 .161 (.024) (.025) (.024) (.024) 
.20 .142 .093 .158 .102 (.020) (.022) (.022) (.021) 
.30 .107 .077 .113 .086 (.017) (.016) (.015) (.015) 
.40 .070 .052 .091 .086 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.016) 
.50 .062 .044 .076 .078 (.020) (.019) (.017) (.015) 
.60 .070 .040 .082 .063 (.016) (.016) (.017) (.014) 
.70 .048 .043 .072 .058 (.020) (.016) (.017) (.014 ) 
.80 .053 .044 .052 .038 (.021) (.016) (.017) (.016) 
.90 .040 .043 .058 .061 (.023) (.021) (.022) (.025) 
OLS .094 .076 .110 .091 (.016) (.015) (.015) (.014) 
Female 
.008 .103 .124 .126 
(.035) (.025) (.029) (.027) .10 
.061 .094 .125 .130 
(.029) (.029) (.020) (.017) .20 
.083 .090 .119 .114 
(.024) (.023) (.019) (.019) .30 
.080 .088 .101 .112 
(.021) (.018) (.017) (.016) .40 
.50 .071 .090 .099 .115 (.021) (.020) (.017) (.016) 
.068 .077 .109 .105 
(.023) (.018) (.016) (.015) .60 
.073 .080 .120 .119 
(.023) (.020) (.016) (.019) .70 
.062 .062 .094 .110 
(.020) (.020) (.021) (.019) .80 
.063 .070 .057 .126 
(.027) (.029) (.027) (.023) .90 
OLS 
.064 .090 .109 .128 
(.020) (.018) (.018) (.017) 
Notes: Model I includes: age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in potential 
labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend (Basic Model). 
Model II is the Basic Model plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and 
establishment size dummies. Model III is the Basic Model plus regional, occupational and 
qualification dummies. Model IV is Basic Model plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size, individual's qualifications, union coverage and union 
membership. Estimated ten-year tenure effect with standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 2.44 
Interquantile Regressions 
Testin8 Equality of Tenure Effect Between Quantiles 
Quantiles I II III IV 
Male 
0.10 0.25 .004 .000 .010 .008 
0.10 0.40 .000 .000 .000 .030 
0.10 0.50 .000 .000 .000 .001 
0.10 0.60 .000 .000 .000 .000 
0.10 0.75 .000 .000 .000 .000 
0.10 0.90 .000 .001 .001 .003 
0.25 0.40 .008 .057 .016 .510 
0.25 0.50 .010 .019 .000 .427 
0.25 0.60 .040 .010 .012 .125 
0.25 0.75 .033 .054 .000 .024 
0.25 0.90 .006 .217 .017 .190 
0.40 0.50 .504 .369 .227 .386 
0.40 0.60 .992 .345 .523 .167 
0.40 0.75 .201 .768 .057 .030 
0.40 0.90 .205 .766 .130 .256 
0.50 0.60 .534 .656 .691 .186 
0.50 0.75 .558 .972 .578 .139 
0.50 0.90 .4 71 .930 .430 .439 
0.60 0.75 .212 .709 .362 .366 
0.60 0.90 .181 .923 .318 .938 
0.75 0.90 .546 .891 .671 .623 
Female 
0.10 0.25 .000 .738 .832 .596 
0.10 0.40 .014 .689 .495 .649 
0.10 0.50 .054 .677 .435 .692 
0.10 0.60 .178 .460 .635 .576 
0.10 0.75 .032 .402 .691 .881 
0.10 0.90 .133 .432 .107 .985 
0.25 0.40 .896 .874 .358 .897 
0.25 0.50 .822 .966 .366 .999 
0.25 0.60 .999 .516 .718 .713 
0.25 0.75 .823 .405 .831 .694 
0.25 0.90 .735 .581 .040 .648 
0.40 0.50 .560 .889 .901 .840 
0.40 0.60 .673 .436 .616 .570 
0.40 0.75 .861 .574 .666 .617 
0.40 0.90 .573 .662 .142 .556 
0.50 0.60 .816 .334 .528 .186 
0.50 0.75 .556 .373 .519 .740 
0.50 0.90 .794 .503 .014 .640 
0.60 0.75 .516 .868 .918 .273 
0.60 0.90 .877 .858 .041 .303 
0.75 0.90 .449 .833 .052 .837 
Notes: Model I includes: age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend 
(Basic Model). Model II is the Basic Model plus regional dummies, I-digit industry 
dummies and establishment size dummies. Model III is the Basic Model plus regional, 
occupational and qualification dummies. Model IV is Basic Model plus dummy variables 
for region, industry and occupation, establishment size, individual's qualifications, union 
l'()\'l'r;I~C and union membership. P-values of performed tests of equality between tenure 
effect estimated at different quantiles. 
Table 2.45 
IV -Quantile Regressions: Tenure Effect 
Quantile I II III IV 
Male 
.10 .116 .147 .155 .138 (.063) (.051) (.059) (.047) 
.20 .100 .074 .073 .121 (.047) (.038) (.034) (.040) 
.30 .071 .078 .052 .113 (.043) (.029) (.038) (.034) 
.40 3.51e-4 .042 .059 .068 (.035) (.039) (.035) (.034) 
.50 .015 .009 .040 .063 (.036) (.041 ) (.036) (.036) 
.60 .037 .046 .033 .060 (.040) (.038) (.037) (.035) 
.70 -.003 .039 .050 .037 (.041 ) (.036) (.035) (.030) 
.80 .045 .059 .056 .057 (.044) (.039) (.038) (.035) 
.90 .079 .081 .026 .095 (.056) (.047) (.052) (.051) 
Female 
.10 -.034 -.025 .050 .078 (.070) (.050) (.064) (.064) 
.20 .003 .003 .021 .039 (.066) (.063) (.052) (.053) 
.30 -.012 .013 .010 .024 (.049) (.044) (.049) (.045) 
.40 -.018 -.008 .026 .009 (.045) (.037) (.036) (.044) 
.50 -.022 -.002 .040 .037 (.043) (.037) (.038) (.042) 
.60 -.043 -.011 .050 .026 (.051) (.034) (.041) (.037) 
.70 -.035 -.017 .043 .012 (.050) (.040) (.033) (.032) 
.80 .007 -.041 -.037 
.021 
(.046) (.038) (.039) (.045) 
.90 -.029 -.074 -.012 
-3.1ge-4 
(.059) (.055) (.045) (.035) 
Notes: Model I includes: age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in potential 
labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend (Basic Model). 
Model II is the Basic Model plus regional dummies, I-digit industry dummies and establishment 
size dummies. Model III is the Basic Model plus regional, occupational and qualification 
dummies. Model IV is Basic Model plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, 
establishment size, individual's qualifications, union coverage and union membership. Estimated 
ten-year tenure effect with standard errors in brackets, based on 2SQR estimator. 
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Table 2.46 
IV -Interquantile Regressions (ZSQR) 
Testing Equality of Tenure Effect Between Quantiles 
Quantiles I II III IV 
Male 
0.10 0.Z5 .094 .207 .044 .960 
0.10 0.40 .042 .041 .027 .122 
0.10 0.50 .066 .012 .032 .134 
0.10 0.60 .193 .026 .069 .121 
0.10 0.75 .082 .096 .128 .117 
0.10 0.90 .712 .297 .027 .592 
0.Z5 0.40 .004 .061 .804 .007 
0.Z5 0.50 1.00e-4 .019 .436 .086 
0.Z5 0.60 .094 .357 .382 .040 
0.Z5 0.75 9.00e-4 .165 .939 .100 
0.Z5 0.90 .060 .826 .464 .435 
0.40 0.50 .057 .607 .366 .859 
0.40 0.60 .033 .929 .495 .864 
0.40 0.75 .062 .. 885 .885 .611 
0.40 0.90 .195 .501 .283 .626 
0.50 0.60 .412 .172 .815 .913 
0.50 0.75 .896 .543 .613 .595 
0.50 0.90 .217 .154 .799 .510 
0.60 0.75 .614 .758 .447 .621 
0.60 0.90 .4 77 .317 .884 .512 
0.75 0.90 .166 .389 .242 .381 
Female 
0.10 0.Z5 .768 .170 .674 .231 
0.10 0.40 .817 .744 .748 .172 
0.10 0.50 .722 .744 .899 .521 
0.10 0.60 .912 .817 .999 .343 
0.10 0.75 .796 .862 .602 .427 
0.10 0.90 .963 .586 .380 .314 
0.Z5 0.40 .990 .450 .900 .515 
0.Z5 0.50 .939 .636 .687 .939 
0.Z5 0.60 .583 .492 .553 .893 
0.Z5 0.75 .953 .352 851 .730 
0.Z5 0.90 .908 .267 .647 .494 
0.40 0.50 .908 .850 .683 .257 
0.40 0.60 .597 .933 .500 .597 
0.40 0.75 .968 .594 .793 .993 
0.40 0.90 .899 .329 .302 .869 
0.50 0.60 .500 .752 .707 .564 
0.50 0.75 .889 .518 .402 .494 
0.50 0.90 .913 .378 .385 .604 
0.60 0.75 .521 .647 .326 .720 
0.60 0.90 .840 .446 .166 .641 
0.75 0.90 .861 .489 .580 .855 
Notes: Model I includes: age left education, a cubic in employer-tenure, a quadratic in 
potential labour market experience, dummies for individual's skills and a time trend 
(Basic Model). Model II is the Basic Model plus regional dummies, I -digit industry 
dummies and establishment size dummies. Model III is the Basic Model plus regional, 
occupational and qualification dummies. Model IV is Basic Model plus dummy variables 
for region, industry and occupation, establishment size, individual's qualifications, union 
covera~c and union membership. P-values of performed tests of equality between tenure 
effect ~stimated at different quantiles. 
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Chapter 2: Appendix 
Age 
Wave 1 
Wave 2 
Wave 3 
Wave 4 
Wave 5 
Wave 6 
Wave 7 
Wave 8 
Employer Tenure 
Actual Labour 
Market Experience 
(Full-time) 
Actual Labour 
Market Experience 
(Part-time) 
Potential Labour 
Market Experience 
Hourly Wage Rate 
(Nominal Values) 
Table A.2.1 
BHPS Coverage Period 
3 rd September 1991 to 30th January 1992 
5th September 1992 to 30th April 1993 
5th September 1993 to 30th April 1994 
3 rd September 1994 to 9th May 1995 
4th September 1995 to 30th April 1996 
29th August 1996 to 17th April 1997 
29th August 1997 to 8 th May 1998 
1 st September 1998 to 8th May 1999 
Table A.2.2 
BHPS Sam~le Characteristics (Waves 1-8) 
Pooled Sample Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel SamE Ie Sample 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
38.63 38.06 38.68 38.17 39.69 40.15 
00.29) 00.59) (10.25) (10.56) (9.38) (9.77) 
7.53 6.14 7.57 6.20 9.30 7.57 
(7.05) (5.62) (7.04) (5.62) (6.96) (5.97) 
20.57 14.19 20.63 14.27 22.14 15.70 
(10.99) (8.34) (10.96) (8.33) (9.96) (8.07) 
0.51 3.07 0.50 3.09 0.33 3.54 
(2.20) (4.94) (2.18) (4.96) (1.60) (5.1 1) 
21.29 20.66 21.33 20.77 22.45 22.90 
00.88) 01.34) 00.84) (11.29) (9.93) 00.61) 
8.49 6.70 8.52 6.72 8.66 7.00 
(6.09) (3.65) (6.10 (3.65) (5.66) (3.94) 
7638 5398 7518 5628 3168 2232 Sam~le 
Notes: Reported means with standard deviation into brackets. 
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Table A.2.3 
BHPS Sam,Ele Characteristics: Male Em,Eloyees 
Employer Actual Labour Actual Labour Potential Labour Hourly Wage Rate Sample Age Market Experience Market Experience Tenure Market Experience (Nominal Values) (Full-time) (Part-time) 
Wave 1 1237 37.35 6.73 19.44 0.48 20.05 7.28 (10.65) (7.19) (11.31) (2.35) (11.48) (3.88) 
WaveZ 1329 37.47 6.83 19.59 0.43 20.17 7.72 (10.68) (6.78) (11.29) (2.07) (I 1.43) (4.36) 
Wave 3 1012 37.88 7.09 19.90 0.43 20.46 8.03 (10.46) (6.84) (11.13) (1.91) (11.09) (4.57) 
Wave 4 956 38.42 7.52 20.33 0.51 21.11 8.53 (10.36) (7.21) (11.12) (2.21 ) (10.86) (5.46) 
Wave 5 928 38.97 7.69 20.83 0.54 21.66 8.84 (9.97) (7.17) (10.79) (2.35) (10.43) (5.25) 
Wave 6 853 39.51 7.82 21.23 0.59 22.14 9.48 (9.69) (6.93) (10.51) (2.38) (10.13) (7.82) 
Wave 7 729 40.66 8.78 22.36 0.60 23.24 9.52 (9.59) (7.03) (10.43) (2.18) (10.08) (5.37) 
WaveS 594 41.27 9.36 23.07 0.59 23.95 10.27 (9.35) (6.91) (10.18) (2.07) (9.79) (11.96) 
Notes: Reported means with standard deviation into brackets. 
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Table A.2.4 
BHPS Sample Characteristics: Female Employees 
Employer Actual Labour Actual Labour Potential Labour Hourly Wage Rate Sample Age Market Experience Market Experience Tenure (Full-time) (Part-time) Market Experience (Nominal Values) 
Wave 1 868 36.00 4.99 12.79 2.62 18.50 5.73 00.85) (5.60) (8.50) (4.71) 01. 70) (2.86) 
WaveZ 935 35.94 5.21 12.70 2.73 18.52 5.98 (10.97) (5.39) (8.30) (4.80) (11. 79) (3.02) 
WaveS 737 37.17 5.65 13.42 3.04 19.75 6.33 (10.60) (5.33) (8.30) (5.00) 01.35) (3.31) 
Wave 4 683 38.02 6.12 14.18 3.05 20.58 6.65 00.44) (5.43) (8.32) (5.00) 01.13) (3.31) 
Wave 5 636 38.82 6.51 14.61 3.20 21.45 7.12 (10.02) (5.49) (8.04) (5.03) (10.69) (3.69) 
Wave 6 593 39.58 6.72 15.24 3.31 22.19 7.44 (9.91) (5.74) (7.96) (5.01) (10.60) (3.80) 
Wave 7 516 40.61 7.41 16.18 3.44 23.32 7.78 (9.93) (5.60) (8.05) (4.97) 00.63) (5.29) 
Wave 8 430 42.14 8.53 17.12 3.81 24.90 7.97 (9.68) (5.82) (8.02) (5.10) (10.4 1) (3.73) 
Notes: Reported means with standard deviation into brackets. 
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Table A.2.S 
Nominal and Real Average Hourly Wage Rates 
Nominal Hourly Wage Deflated De-trended Hourly Wage (RPI) Hourly Wage (AEI) AEI RPI 
Year Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1991 7.28 5.73 (3.88) (2.86) 
5.45 4.29 8.49 6.68 
(2.91) (2.14) (4.52) (3.33) 133.5 85.8 
1992 7.73 5.98 (4.39) (3.02) 
5.58 4.32 8.50 6.57 
(3.17) (2.18) (4.83) (3.33) 138.5 90.9 
1993 8.02 6.34 (4.56) (3.31) 
5.70 4.50 8.57 6.77 
(3.24) (2.35) (4.87) (3.54) 140.7 93.6 
1994 8.54 6.63 (5.46) (3.29) 
5.93 4.60 8.81 6.83 
(3.79) (2.28) (5.63) (3.39) 144.1 97.0 
1995 8.84 7.08 (5.23) (3.62) 
5.93 4.75 8.84 7.08 
(3.51) (2.43) (5.23) (3.62) 149.1 100.0 
1996 9.41 7.42 (7.79) (3.83) 
6.16 4.86 9.08 7.17 
(5.10) (2.51) (7.52) (3.69) 152.7 103.6 
1997 9.48 7.81 (5.33) (5.30) 
6.02 4.96 8.78 7.23 
(3.38) (3.36) (4.93) (4.91) 157.5 108 
1998 9.87 7.98 (5.14) (3.75) 
6.06 4.90 8.69 7.03 
(3.16) (2.30) (4.53) (3.30) 162.9 113.5 
1999 11.50 7.48 (6.38) (3.07) 
6.95 4.52 9.67 6.29 
(3.86) (1.86) (5.36) (2.58) 165.4 119 
Notes: Average hourly wage rates in nominal and real values. Standard deviation reported into brackets. RPI, retail price index. AEI, 
avcra~<c earnings index. RPI, base year 19~7. AEI, base year 1995. 
159 
Construction of Employer-Tenure variable 
The tenure variable I want to construct refers to the employer tenure~ i.e. the 
amount of time individuals had spent with their current employer until the date 
they were interviewed. The variable is measured in monthsZO and is constructed 
only for the individuals who were employed during the time of interview. 
The construction of the employment variable is based on three main records, the 
wave-on-wave job history record WjOBHISpl, the Wave 3 lifetime employer 
history record CLIFlJOB and the Wave 2 lifetime employment status history record 
BLlFEMST. The WjOBHIST record contains information on the employment history 
over the period between the 1 st September of the year before the individual was 
interviewed and the date of interview of each wave, e.g. for Wave 3, CjOBHIST 
covers the period from pt September 1992 to the date of Wave 3 interview. These 
records exist only for individuals whose current labour force began sometime 
during the period that these records cover, e.g. CjOBHISTcontains information on 
individuals whose current labour force status in Wave 3 began at or after 1 st 
September 1992. 
The CLIFlJOB contains information on employer spells with start and end dates for 
the individual's employment prior to 1st September 1990, i.e. employer tenure start 
dates prior to when AjOBHISTrecord begins. The record is restricted to respondents 
that were interviewed at Wave 2 and had another (full-time or part-time) paid job 
20 Throughout the empirical analysis of the thesis though, employer tenure variable is transformed 
and measured in decades. 
2 I The first letter (W) in the name of the job history record refers to the particular wave. Therefore, 
for the Wave 2 the name of the record would be BjOBH/STand similarly for the other waves. 
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(with different employer than the one in their previous employment spell) at Wave 
3, that lasted more than one month. 
The BLlFEMSTrecord contains information about employment status spells, rather 
than changes in employers, covering the period since the respondent first left full-
time education. The data collection was unrestricted, so all respondents at Wave 2 
were asked questions concerning their lifetime employment activities. This record 
can provide useful information about the employer start date spell but only when 
the previous employment status was "not-employed' and the recorded start dates 
(month and year) from the BLlFEMST record match exactly with the beginning of 
the current position at each wave. 
The methodology followed for the construction of the employer-tenure variable is 
quite similar for all the waves. However, there is an additional step included to the 
succeeding Wave 1 remaining BHPS waves. For illustration reasons, I will focus on 
the description of the tenure variable in Waves 1 and 2, for the rest of the BHPS 
waves the process is exactly the same with the one followed for the second wave. 
One thing should be underlined before continuing on the description of the 
methodology employed. A main issue of concern in the construction of the 
employer-tenure is the identification of the beginning of the employment spell with 
a particular employer. The beginning of an employment spell does not necessarily 
coincide with the beginning of an employment spell with a particular employer. The 
respondent may have changed jobs but she may be still working for the same 
employer. Therefore, in order to identify the beginning of an employment spell with 
a particular enlployer, the respondent should either not be working previously 
(Ullt'l11ph)),cd, (.Jut of the labour 111arket or student) or specifically state that she 
works with a different employer than her previous one. 
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Starting now with Wave 1, the construction of employer-tenure is based on five 
steps, in every step the sample contains only individuals whose tenure variable has 
not been constructed in one of the previous steps. The first step is based on the 
AjOBHISTrecord. The individuals of concern are: 
(a) Those who were either self-employed or employed with a different employer 
(AjHSTAT=2) in the most recent spell (AjSPNO= 1) (spell closest to the date of 
Wave 1 interview) and were not working with the same employer (AjHSTAT=I=l) 
in the previous spell (AjSPNO= 2). Or, 
(b) Those who were employed with the same employer (AjHSTAT=-l) at the most 
recent spell (AjSPNO= 1) but were employed with a different employer or self-
employed (AjHSTAT=2) in the exact previous spell (AjSPN0=2), so that we can 
identify the beginning of the employment spell with the current employer. In the 
case the individual was working for the same employer at the last two most 
recent spells (AjSPNO= 1 or 2) then I check whether she was working at a 
different employer or was self-employed during the spell before these two. 
Employer-tenure is defined as the period between the beginning of the employment 
spell (AjHENDM, AjHENDY> at the most recent spell (AjSPNO= 1) or the exact 
previous one (AjSPN0=2) and the date Wave 1 interview took place (ADO.lA.f), for 
the two groups of individuals described above, respectively. 
The second step is based on the WINDRESP records of the rest of the BHPS waves 
(Waves 2-8>. Starting with the BINDRESP record, the analysis is focused on the 
individuals whose current employment status in Wave 2 (BjBBGM, BjBBG}') started 
before or exactly when current economic activity reported in Wave 1 (wave under 
examination) started (AjBBGM, AjBBG}'). For those individuals employer-tenure is 
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calculated as the period between the beginning of the current economic activity in 
Wave 2 (BJBBGM, BJBBGY) and the date of the Wave 1 interview. The process 
described above is repeated using alternatively the rest of the WINDRESPrecords. 
For the next step, the BLlFEMST record is used. The individuals of interest here are 
those, whose start of employment spell (BLESHM, BLESHY) matches exactly with the 
date current employment began in Wave 1. In addition the respondents should be 
either full-time or part-time employed (BLESHST=2 or 3) at the spell of interest and 
not full-time or part-time employed in the exactly previous spell (BLESHNO), so that 
I can identify the beginning of the employment spell with the current employer. The 
employer-tenure is estimated as the period between the beginning of current 
employment in Wave 1 and the date of Wave 1 interview. 
In the forth step, there are three alternative methods used respectively. The relevant 
information used, in all methods described below, for the calculation of the 
employer-tenure is taken from the CLIFIJOB record. Starting with the first method, 
the analysis focuses on the individuals whose employment spell, as reported in 
CLlFiJOB (CIJBGM, CIJBGY) record, started exactly when current employment in 
Wave 1 started. In the case where seasons instead of months are stated in the date 
employment began, the individuals are excluded from this method. Employer-
tenure here is simply the period over the beginning of the employment spell of 
interest from the CLIFIJOB record and the date of Wave 1 interview. 
In the second method employed, I relax the criteria. Here I anl looking for 
individuals whose current employment spell in Wave 1 started sometime between 
two consecutive enlployment spells as reported in the CLIFIJOB record (CLJBBM, 
CIJBBY, CIJLFrM, CIJLFFY). In addition when seasons are stated, they are replaced 
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with months22 • For those individuals, employer-tenure is constructed by calculating 
the months between the beginning of their current employment status and the date 
of Wave 1 interview. 
Finally in the third method used, the criteria are relaxed even more. Here the 
criterion for the selection of the individuals of interest is that the date of Wave 1 
interview must fall between the beginning and the end of an employment spell in 
the CLIFlJOB record (CIJBBM, CIJBBY, CIJLFI'M, CIJLFI'Y). As before, seasons are 
proxied with months. The acquired tenure then is considered to be the period over 
the beginning of the employment spell of interest from the CLIFlJOB record and the 
date the individual was interviewed in Wave 1. 
In the last step, followed for the construction of the obtained employer-tenure I look 
whether the current employment status reported in the succeeding waves began 
before the date Wave 1 interview took place. More particularly, starting with Wave 
2 I look for individuals whose employment status in Wave 2 (BjBBGM, BjBBGY) 
started before the Wave 1 date of interview and who were either full-time or part-
time employed in both Waves 1 and 2 (AjBSTATand BjBSTAT=Z). Employer-tenure 
is defined as the period between the beginning of the Wave 2 current employment 
status and the date of Wave 1 interview (ADOlM). The same process is repeated for 
the other remaining waves. 
The methodology described above is used in order to construct the employer-tenure 
variable for Wave 1. For the remaining waves the process is quite similar, with the 
addition of one step at the beginning. More specifically~ initially I examine whether 
22 'Winlc'r' is replaced with January, 'Spring with April, 'Sumlllc/ with July :Llld ',llIllImn' with 
('ldobl.'r. 
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the current employment status of the wave of interest began before or during the 
date the interview of the previous wave took place. For example, when constructing 
the tenure variable for Wave 2, I check whether the current employment status 
began before or during the Wave 1 interview took place. If this is the case, in other 
words if the individual continues to work for the same employer as in the previous 
wave (Wave 1), then tenure is simply constructed by estimating the period between 
the Wave 1 and Wave 2 date of interview and adding that to the employer tenure of 
the previous wave (Wave 1). After this step, the methodology followed is exactly the 
same as the one described above for Wave 1. 
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Construction of Actual Labour Market Experience 
A distinction has to be made between the potential and the actual labour market 
experience. Usually, in the absence of the appropriate variables, researchers used to 
proxy labour market experience with the potential labour market experience, which 
is defined as the length of time in the labour market, constructed as the difference 
between the current age of the individual and the age when left full-time education 
(first or last time). This variable can sometimes be quite a satisfactory proxy of the 
actual labour market experience. However, BHPS includes detailed data that makes 
the construction of actual labour market experience feasible. Therefore, for the 
purpose of my analysis, I construct a variable that corresponds to the actual labour 
market experience an individual had obtained up to the time she was interviewed, 
for each of the first eight BHPS waves. 
Employment periods are separated into full-time and part-time, according to the 
hours an individual normally works per week, while non -employment spells are 
categorised into spells of full-time education, unemployment or out of the labour 
market. More specifically, an individual is considered to work as a full-time 
employee, if she normally works at least 30 hours per week, otherwise she is 
characterised as a part-time employee (less than 30 hours per week). In addition, a 
respondent of the BHPS questionnaire is considered to be out of the labour market if 
she is retired, on maternity leave, long-time sick/disable, under family care, in a 
government training scheme or in a national/war service. 
For the construction of the actual experience I start with Wave 2, because in that 
year a lifetime labour market experience survey was conducted (BLlFEMST record). 
This record contains information about the labour market experience since first 
leaving full-tinle education, on all the individuals who had left full-time education 
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at the time of the Wave 2 interview. Therefore the second wave of the BHPS is the 
basis for generating the actual labour market experience for the rest of the waves. 
Consequently actual experience variable is available only for individuals that had 
left full-time education at the time Wave 2 survey was conducted. Below there is a 
description of the three main steps followed in order to construct the actual labour 
market experience. In all the steps described below, when seasons are reported 
instead of months they are proxied with months in the same way as I do for the 
construction of the employer-tenure variable. 
The first step is focused on the construction of the experience variable in Wave 2, 
based on the BLIFEMST record. The main variables used from that record were the 
BLESLEN (length of employment history spell) in order to identify the employment 
spells and the BLESHST (lifetime employment history status) to characterise them. 
First, individuals with missing information on these two variables are dropped from 
the sample. Then I simply summed up the spells by category (e.g. full-time 
employed) for each individual separately. This way I constructed a variable in Wave 
2 that corresponds to the actual experience an individual has obtained up to the 
date she was interviewed for Wave 2. 
In the second step, I return to the first wave of the BHPS and construct the 
experience variable for that wave. The basic idea behind the process followed here 
is first to identify the employment spells during the period between Wave 1 and 2 
interviews. Then, by subtracting these spells from the Wave 2 actual experience 
variable I can estimate the actual labour market experience of the individuals in 
Wave 1. Records BLIFEMST, AINDRESP and BINDRESP were used for the 
construction of the experience variable in the first wave. In particular, information 
l1n thc lifetime employment history spells (BLESHEM, BLESHEY, BLESHSM, BLESHSY, 
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BLESHST, BLESHNO, BLESLElV) and the dates of the Wave 1 and 2 interviews 
(ADOIM, BDOIM, BDOly) are acquired for that purpose. 
The first stage in the construction of the actual experience variable is to identify the 
employment spells. The analysis is focused only on spells of changes in employment 
status that occurred during or after the Wave 1 interview. Then I characterise the 
spells according to the employment status and add the spells duration by category 
for each individual separately, in order to get the difference between the Wave 1 
and 2 labour market experience. Finally, I subtract the estimated experience spells 
from the actual experience of Wave 2 to get the Wave 1 experience variable. For 
example, if an individual has started working before or during the Wave 1 
interview and has not stopped till the date of Wave 2 interview, then we can easily 
calculate the employment spell by estimating the period between the two interviews. 
Then by subtracting the duration of this employment spell from the labour market 
expenence of the individual at Wave 2, we obtain an estimate of her actual 
expenence in Wave 1. Lets assume now a more complicated case where an 
individual starts working before Wave 1 interview, stops after a few months, and 
starts working again before the Wave 2 interview, having spent some months in 
unemployment. Here, there are three spells observed, the one covering the period 
between the Wave 1 interview and the date when she stopped working, the second 
between the end of the first employment spell and the beginning of the second one 
where she was unemployed and the last one between the beginning of the second 
employment spell and the date of the Wave 2 interview. In that case, we should sum 
up the first and the third employment spell and subtract them from the Wave 2 
actual experience variable in order to get an estimate of the Wave 1 experience 
variable. 
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The actual labour market experience of the remaining six waves is constructed in 
the third step. The methodology followed is the same for each wave, therefore for 
illustration reasons I will focus on the process of construction the experience 
variable for Wave 3. The sample is divided into three sub-samples: 
(a) The individuals from record CjOBHISTwhose last change in labour status began 
before the Wave 2 interview. More specifically the first sub-sample includes 
those individuals whose most recent change in labour status started on 
September 1992 or before (CjHA9LY~ 1), or whose last employment spell 
started after September 1992 (CjHA9LY= 2) but before the date of Wave 2 
interview. 
(b) The individuals from record CjOBHISTwhose last change in labour status began 
at the time of the Wave 2 interview or afterwards. In particular individuals 
whose most recent employment spell started after September 1992 
(CjHA9LY= 2) and after the year of Wave 2 interview, or whose last change in 
labour status occurred after September 1992 (CjHA9LY=2) and after or during 
the date of Wave 2 interview. 
(c) The remaining of the individuals from CINDRESPrecord. 
For all the groups of individuals the main steps in the construction of the experience 
variables can be summarised in the following. First, keep individuals of interest. 
Then identify the employment spells and characterise them. Sum up the spells by 
category for each individual. Finally, add them to the experience variables of the 
previous wave, in our case Wave 2, to get the experience at the date of interview of 
the current wave. 
For the first group of individuals the construction of employment spells is based on 
the dates labour force spells ended (CjHENDY, CjHENDiU) and the dates of Wave 2 
and 3 interview. Spells can be either the period between the Wave 2 interview and 
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the end of labour status (spell n, or the period between the end of labour status and 
Wave 3 interview, or Wave 2 interview and Wave 3 interview (spelJ 2). The 
characterisation of spell 1 is based on information from CjIBHISTrecord (CjHSTAT, 
CjHSEMf'). If the individuals have responded that they were in different job but with 
the same employer (CjHSTAT=-l) characterisation is based on the BINDRESPrecord 
(BjBSTAT, BjBHRS). Similarly, for spell 2 the identification is based on information 
from CINDRESPrecord (CjBSTA T, CjBHRS). 
Continuing with the second sub-sample of individuals, the construction of 
employment spells is based on the dates employment spell began and ended and on 
the dates of Wave 2 and 3 interview. The constructed spells are divided into three 
types: 
(a) Those covering the period between Wave 2 interview and the end of a labour 
force spell, for the least recent spell (spell n. 
(b) Those for the period between the end of a labour force spell and Wave 3 
interview, for the most recent spell (spell 2). And finally, 
(c) Those covering the period between the beginning and end of a labour force 
spell, for all the spells between the least and the most recent one (speJJ 3). 
The characterisation of spell 1 is based on information from the BINDRESP record 
(BjBSTAT, BjBHRSJ, while labour force spells belonging in spell 2 are characterised 
based on CINDRESP record. Spell 3 similarly is categorised using information from 
the CjIBHIST record (CjHSTAT, CjHSEMf'). If individuals had responded that they 
are in a different job but with the same employer (CjHSTAT= 1) then the 
identification is made using the information from the exactly previous spell from the 
one referred. Individuals whose labour status cannot be identified are excluded 
from the sample. 
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Finally, the third group contains the remaInIng of the individuals. The spells 
constructed are simply the period between the Wave 2 and 3 interviews, and their 
characterisation is made using information from the CINDRESPrecord. 
The process described above is repeated for the rest of the BHPS waves in order to 
construct the actual labour market experience variable. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Profitable Career Paths: The Importance of Occupational and 
Industry Expertise 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I provide a thorough examination on the importance of 
employer tenure on individuals' earnings profiles. The findings from the analysis 
presented suggest a modest but positive tenure effect on wage growth for both male 
and female employees. The most popular and probably widely accepted theory that 
explains this observed relationship is the human capital theory that goes back to the 
pioneering work of Becker and Mincer in the 60's and 70's. The cornerstone of 
human capital theory is that individuals over the years acquire a variety of skills in 
work that are quite valuable to their employers due to their firm/job-specificity. 
Almost universally, all studies on the tenure-wage effect distinguish a worker's 
working experience into two components, general labour market experience and 
employer tenure. Within the human capital framework, the effect of the former 
refers to return to general labour market skills, while the effect of the latter is 
interpreted as the reward for employer-specific skills. In this chapter, I challenge 
this assumption and explore whether the typical worker's human capital stock 
should be further disaggregated. Particularly, I examine the existence of industry 
and occupation -specific skills. 
Studies on displaced workers have revealed that industry may be an important 
dimension across which skills are transferable. Although most displaced workers 
suffer wage losses, workers who switch industries following displacement usually 
suffer greater losses than observationally similar workers who find jl~bs in their pre-
dispiacelllt'nt industry (Pod.sul'sky and Swaim I 98 7~ Addison and Portugal I 9~9 a, 
1- ') { -
b; Kletzer 1991; Ong and Mar 1992; Carrington 1993; Ong and Lawrence 1993; 
Neal 1995). If the accumulated skills in work are mainly industry-specific rather 
than firm-specific, then it is expected that employer-tenure will have only a modest 
effect on wages. Furthermore, the observed wage losses of the displaced workers 
will be more severe for those who find employment in another industry, since they 
will forego their previously accumulated industry-specific skills. According to Neal, 
"the difference between switchers and stayers is that switchers forfeit compensation 
for their industry-specific skills' (pp. 657). The author acknowledges the fact that a 
portion of industry-specific compensation reflects labour market rents. 
Nevertheless, there are still important wage profile differences between stayers and 
switchers due to the fact that the latter forfeit, in the post-displacement job, 
compensation for their already obtained industry-specific skills. Furthermore, the 
author argues that, after all, firm-specific factors may contribute little to the 
observed slope of the wage tenure profile. 
Parent in a recent study (2000), based on a standard wage equation model, 
establishes that the returns to seniority are very small or they do not exist at all. 
From the author's point of view, what is important for the wage profile in terms of 
human capital is industry specificity rather than employer specificity. According to 
his findings, it appears that past studies have overlooked an important factor in 
analysing the effect of tenure on wages. Industry-specific skills are found to playa 
far more significant role in the wage growth process than employer-specificity. 
The question addressed here is whether the accumulated in-work human capital 
should be further decomposed, apart from the employer-specific and the general 
labour market conlponents. A possible candidate, as already outlined above, is 
industry-specific skills. A worker through the years may acquire some skills that are 
appreciated and rewarded not solely by the current employer, but by ('1ther 
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employers as well in the same industry. If that proves to be true, then that implies 
that industry-specificity does exist and furthermore it has a significant role in the 
wage determination process. In this framework, an individual working in the 
manufacturing sector, for example, could obtain some skills that will be equally 
appreciated by other employers in that industry. Therefore, it would be expected 
that her experience in the manufacturing industry should have a positive effect on 
her wages in any future employment in the same industry. On the other hand, if she 
moves to another industry, then she would forfeit these industry-specific human 
capital wage premia. 
One may argue though that it is occupational experience that matters instead of 
industry experience. Let's consider again the example of the worker that is 
employed in the manufacturing sector, as a secretary. In the case of industry-
specificity of human capital, these accumulated skills, specific to the manufacturing 
industry, should not have any effect on her wages if she switches industries, for 
instance if she is employed in the banking sector, as a secretary again. However, one 
might wonder what sort of skills a secretary could obtain in the manufacturing 
industry, that are specific to this particular industry. Probably, it would be more 
reasonable to assume that it is occupational-specificity of human capital that should 
be examined. A secretary would most likely acquire skills that are specific to her 
current occupation, therefore transferable among different employers and 
industries, as long as she is working as a secretary. In the case that an individual 
changes occupations, then it should be expected that she would forfeit these wage 
premia associated to her expertise in her previous occupation. 
Individuals are not equally well equipped to enter each occupation, and they self-
select on the basis of their comparative advantaze for the occupation. The 
occupational choice pr()cess can be described as a utility maximisation problem. If 
174 
we assume that occupational choice determines, on average, subsequent earnings 
growth, then each individual acts as a far-sighted optimiser. This economic agent 
early in her adult life chooses her career path23 , in other words, chooses the 
occupation which best achieves her lifetime objectives that are represented both by 
her lifetime income stream and tastes for specific occupations. The parameters that 
determine the self-selection of workers into occupations can be distinguished into 
two main groups. On the one hand, there are the personal tastes and motivation, 
allied to family background, of the individual. In general, socio-economic variables 
play an important role in occupational choice (Robertson and Symons, 1990), since, 
in a way, they form the future expectations of the individual and her taste and 
preferences towards life-style, priorities and quality in life. One the other hand, 
ability and the attributes of the individual are important determinants of the choice 
of occupation. Each worker is endowed with a level of ability for each sector, so they 
will sort themselves into occupations according to their comparative advantage 
(Roy, 1951). Since individuals aim to maximise their utility, they tend to choose 
occupations that cater their personal strengths. 
A worker consists of a bundle of characteristics that are embodied within the person 
and sold on the market as a package deal. The way these characteristics are utilised 
and valued will differ across occupations, since technology, among other 
parameters, varies across occupations. Technology plays a central role in 
determining the weights that are placed on various personal characteristics and 
consequently different technologies might require the use of different characteristics 
or at least emphasise them differently. Thus each individual, knowing her ability, 
forms an estimate of her expected earnings in each occupation and, taking into 
23 Despite the fact that therr is both upward and downward movement, the position of individuals in 
the occupational hierarchy is highly stable over time (Nickell, 1982). 
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account her particular taste for each occupation, chooses the one which offers the 
greatest utility. One would probably expect then that the expertise the individual 
acquires over the years in this, best chosen to match her ability, occupation would 
playa significant role in her earnings profile. 
The first paper, to my knowledge, that directly examInes the significance of 
occupational investment, as part of the post-school human capital, in wage 
determination is a study by Shaw (1984). Shaw in her paper argues that 
occupational investment, which is the accumulation of skills an individual acquires 
to perform work within a particular occupation, is a strong determinant of earnings 
and far superior to general labour market experience. Total occupational investment 
in a particular occupation is calculated as the weighted sum of the individual's 
accumulated quantities of occupation-specific investment, based on the hypotheses 
that some portion of the occupational skills are transferable across the various 
occupations and that occupations are characterised by different degrees of general 
investment. According to the author, although total labour market experience and 
occupational investment are both proxies of the individual's stock of general human 
capital, the latter is a far better measure. The reason is that occupational investment 
can be considered as a heterogeneous measure of general labour market skills. 
Therefore, the introduction of occupational investment, which replaces the 
homogeneous measure of years of experience in the labour market (total labour 
market experience), reduces the otherwise unobservable heterogeneity in the 
individual's general post-school investment. The main empirical framework of this 
study is based on a standard Mincer wage equation model, where the author 
introduces occupational investment in place of total labour market experience. The 
findings from these wage equations strongly suggest that occupational investment 
has a very important contribution on individual's earnings profiles, ""elllpiric:Jlly 
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dominating the standard experience variable as a proxy for the stock of general 
human capital investment embodied in the individual' (pp. 338). 
In the analysis that follows, I examine whether individuals' accumulated human 
capital in work has an industry and/or occupational-specific dimension and the 
significance of these kind of skills in the wage determination process. The findings 
of this study can be of significant importance to the better understanding of wage 
growth and may be rather enlightening on issues related to career choices. In 
addition, identifying the type of specilisation and expertise that is central to a 
worker's future prospects can also be informative and helpful to policy makers. 
Particularly to those who target unemployment, through training programs, and 
aim for flexibility in the labour market based on skilled and employable individuals. 
In Section 3.2, I explain the methodology employed for the purpose of the analysis, 
followed by a description of the data set used here, Section 3.3. The main findings 
are summarised in Section 3.4, with a discussion on their implications with respect 
to the evolution of an individual's earnings profile. The estimates on the wage 
equation models suggest the existence of occupational specific skills and the 
significance of individuals' expertise in their wage determination process. The 
evidence on the industry-specific human capital, on the other hand, is not so strong. 
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainty concerning the industry experience, even in 
the case where industry specificity matters, the estimated effect does not appear to 
be of great magnitUde. In Section 3.5 a more detailed examination is pursued. Here I 
explore whether these derived effects are uniform across the various occupations or 
industry sectors or not. Indeed, the findings suggest that there is heterogeneity in the 
returns to industry and occupational experience, suggesting that the previous 
estimates in Section 3.4 are driven by particular occupational and industry choices. 
finally in Section 3.6, I conclude the discussion highlighting the major findings and 
implications of this study. 
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3.2 Methodology 
The framework adopted here, similar to the one Parent (2000) employs in his study, 
is based on a standard wage equation model. My working assumption is that 
employer-tenure, total industry and occupational experience are competing effects 
in the wage determination process. Initially, consider the following wage equation 
model 
(3.1) 
for the individual i, with the j employer, the period t, where T,J/ represents the 
employer tenure, Eij/ is the total labour market experience and X Ij/ is a 1 x n 
control vector that does not include industry or occupational experience. If industry 
experience plays a significant role in the wage setting, then I would expect that the 
inclusion of this variable in the control vector, alongside employer tenure, would 
decrease the magnitude of tenure effect on wages. The reason is that the returns to 
tenure are most likely overestimated when industry experience is not controlled for 
in a wage equation model. A portion of this estimated tenure effect should be 
attributed to the industry-specific skills that an individual has obtained in work 
rather than to those skills that are only appreciated by the current employer. In like 
manner, if it is occupational experience that matters, then its inclusion in the 
covariates should have a similar negative impact on the magnitude of the estimated 
returns to employer-specific skills. 
The main framework of my analysis has already been outlined in the paragraph 
above. In order to address the issue of industry-specific and occupational-specific 
human capital, I investigate whether employer tenure effect decreases when they 
are alternatively controlled fl'lf in the estimated model. Initially, I consider a wage 
equation model without including a variable for either industry experience or, 
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occupational experIence. The wage equation model is then re-estimated adding 
alternatively industry and occupational experience and both. Any observed 
significant decrease in the magnitude of tenure effect in these models may provide 
us with the insight on how total working experience should be decomposed and 
have important implications on the evolution of life cycle earnings and on job 
mobility issues. 
Consider now a wage equation model 
~jkhl = a + fJ1I;JI + fJ2EI/ + fJ3I nd;kl + fJ4 0cc;hl + fJnXUkhl + clJkhl (3.2) 
where ~jkhl represents the log hourly wage of individual 1~ with the j employer, 
having the h occupation in the k industry, the t period, and industry experience 
Indljkhl and occupational experience OCCijkhl are included in the regressors alongside 
employer tenure I;jI and total labour market experience E
I
/ 1 • One issue of concern 
related to the estimation process is the fact that the obtained coefficients of interest 
(/31' /32' fJ3 and fJ4)' based on OLS, are likely to be biased due to potential correlation 
between these variables and unobserved individual and job/ sector match effects. In 
particular, the error term cUkhl can be decomposed into five components, 
(3.3) 
where unobserved heterogeneity is analysed into an individual effect (a l ), a job-
match effect (3
1
) ,an industry-match effect (r;k) and an occupation-match effect 
«(VI;'). The individual effect (a;) represents the individual's unobserved ability, 
while the job-match effect (31J) captures the quality of the employment relationship 
stemming from search activity. The inclusion of industry experience variable in the 
wage equation adds an extra source of unobserved heterogeneity. That is the 
unobserved industry-match effect (rlk) , that represents the unobserved quality of 
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the match between the individual and the industry where she works in (Parent, 
2000). Furthermore the self-selection of workers into occupations means that there 
is an additional source of endogeneity bias driven by unobserved quality match 
between the individual and her current occupation ((Vih). Therefore, in total there 
are four sources of potential endogeneity bias in the wage equation model, given by 
equation (3.2). Individuals with high unobserved ability (high a,) most likely 
experience lengthy and less interrupted employment spells, while better matches, 
choices of job and industry (high 9ij and rik) are more likely to occur to individuals 
with more experience, as the result of human capital and lengthy search. In 
addition, individuals with high unobserved ability are likely to choose well paid and 
prestigious occupations (high (Vih). 
The analysis is carried out based on OLS, generalised least squares (GLS) and 
within-group fixed-effect (FE) estimators. For the panel estimators, two alternative 
observation units are considered in the estimation process. Initially, I use the 
individual as an observation unit and then the individual working for a particular 
employer. In the latter case, when a respondent in my sample is observed working 
for different employers, she is treated as a different individual. The idea behind this 
is that potential endogeneity bias in employer tenure estimates, driven by 
unobserved job-match effects, may be more effectively controlled when I consider in 
the estimation process that the employer-employee match has some 'unique 
features. 
180 
3.3 Data Description 
The empirical analysis is carried out using the unbalanced panel sample of male and 
female full-time employees (BHPS, waves 1-8) from Chapter 1. The sample sizes 
though are reduced, since in some cases there is missing information on industry 
and occupational experience, the two new variables I use in this chapter. Some 
summary statistics of this sample are provided in Table A.S.l. 
The panel sample consists of 985 male and 734 female workers that give a total of 
5027 and 3587 observations, respectively. Male respondents appear to spend on 
average seven years and a half with a particular employer, while their female peers 
report staying one year less on average. Furthermore, male employees overall 
accumulate more industry experience than female workers do, however both of 
them report on average similar years of occupational experience. These observed 
patterns in the accumulation rate of various kinds of working experiences between 
male and female employees should probably be attributed though to the fact that 
female individuals tend to take more time off the labour market than their male 
colleagues do. As we can see from the table, although potential labour market 
experience is at similar levels for both of them, actual labour market experience 
based on true employment spells suggests that it is the male respondents that have 
the longest job-market history. In addition, despite what industry and occupational 
experience imply, male workers change occupations and industry sectors where 
employed slightly more frequently than female employees. One thing that may raise 
some concern is that both male and female respondents sometime report that they 
are changing industry or occupation, while they remain with the same employer. 
From Table A.S.l we can see that the number of industry and occupation chanzes 
exceeds the total number of employer changes, the sample was employed by. 
Whether these reported movements are true mobility patterns or just 
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misclassification errors is an issue of concern. However the answer is not an obvious 
one. 
For the purpose of the analysis the construction of two new variables, the industry 
and the occupational experience, is required The former refers to the years an 
individual has been working in a particular industry and can be thought as a proxy 
of the industry-specific human capital accumulated in work. Similarly, the latter, 
measures the years a worker has spent in a certain occupation, which corresponds 
to the individual's occupation-specific skills acquired over these years. The variables 
are constructed, alternatively, both on the I-digit and Z-digit level of industry and 
occupation classification and only employment spells where the respondent 
reported working for an employer (not self-employed), either part-time or full time, 
are taken into consideration. A question that may arise is which of these 
measurements is the more appropriate one. Is it sufficient to measure occupational 
experience, for example, at the broader I-digit level of classification or should we 
focus on a more detailed level? The answer to this question partly has to do with the 
homogeneity of occupational skills. If acquired skills within the broader I-digit level 
of occupational classification are quite homogeneous then it is probably adequate to 
measure experience at that level. In the alternative case, where skills are 
significantly heterogeneous, probably one should focus on a more detailed level of 
classification. Leaving though aside the question regarding the homogeneity of 
skills, there is another argument as well. Sometimes the changes in occupation, for 
example, that we observe at the Z-digit level of occupational classification may be 
just movements within the broader I-digit level that represent a career progression. 
In that case probably it would make more sense to ignore movements that occur at 
the Z-digit level and focus on a broader level. Although I am more inclined in using 
industry and occupational experience measured at the I-digit le\'d of classification, 
for completeness reasons in the analysis that follows I employ both measures/levels. 
A further distinction has to be made between two alternative ways of measuring 
these variables. They can be measured based on either continuous spells, or not 
necessarily continuous spells. In the first case, industry experience, for example, is 
measured by the consecutive years an individual has been working in the same 
industry. While, in the latter case, industry experience is measured by the years a 
worker has been in the same industry in total, not necessarily consecutive. In order 
to make this distinction clear, consider the case of a worker who has spent a few 
years with an employer and then has been employed in a different job in an 
industry, different than the previous one, that she has been working sometime in the 
past. Now, if I measure industry experience based on the continuous spells then 
when the worker changes jobs, her industry experience should reset to zero. 
However, when I measure it based on the second method, industry experience 
should not reset to zero but to the number of years she has spent in that industry in 
the past. The difference between these two ways of measuring industry experience 
can be thought of as reflecting different rates of depreciation of the industry-specific 
human capital. If one thinks that industry-specific skills depreciate rapidly, then it 
might be better to use continuous spells. Yet, another point that I should mention is 
that the industry experience variable based on not necessarily continuous spells 
most likely does not eliminate much of the variance in employer tenure that is 
important in the identification of the tenure effect. Since I do not have any 
information on the rate at which industry-specific human capital depreciates, I am 
in favour of the latter method for their desirable feature in the estimation process of 
tenure effect. A similar argument can be raised for occupational experience~ 
therefore all the estimates presented below are based on spells of industry and 
occupational experience that do not have to be necessarily continuous. In the 
Appendix at the end of this chapter, I provide a quite detailed description on the 
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construction of these two new variables that should enable the reader to re-produce 
them. 
3.4 The Role of Industry and Occupational Specificity 
The aim of my analysis is to examine whether part of the estimated employer-tenure 
effect on wages should actually be attributed to industry-specific or occupation-
specific human capital or both. In order to explore that I estimate a wage equation 
model where initial only employer-tenure, alongside potential total labour market 
experience and other regressors, is included. Then, this earnings equation is re-
examined, this time with the inclusion of industry experience orland occupational 
experience. The attention is focused on the estimated coefficients of the variables of 
interest. Any significant change in the derived effects across these models, could be 
quite informative on how transferable are skills acquired in work and on their wage 
premIa. 
The estimates are based on a standard Mincer (1974) wage equation model, where 
the dependent variable is the log of hourly wage rate. The control vector on the 
right-hand side of the equation includes a quadratic in potential labour market 
experience, a cubic in employer-tenure, industry and occupational experience and 
controls for the characteristics of the individual and of the workplace where 
employed24 • The analysis is carried out separately for male and female employees 
and the findings are summarised in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. In each table, the 
estimated effect of ten years of enlployer-tenure (Tl 0), industry experience (Ind](1) , 
occupational experience (OcclO) and total labour market experience (PotExplO) 
are presented, a fairly standard way in the literature to present the estimates. The 
~.j Thc Appendix gives a list of the regressors included in the wage equation model. 
first column in each table refers to the wage equation model where employer-
tenure and total labour market experience are included (from the four candidate 
variables/proxies of the labour market skills). In the second and fourth column 1-
digit industry and occupational experience are included, respectively and also in the 
third and fifth, but at a 2-digit level this time. Finally, the last two columns show 
estimates when both industry and occupational experience, alongside employer-
tenure and total labour market experience, are considered. 
Starting the analysis with the sample of male-employees, OLS estimates are 
summarised in the first part of Table 3.1. As we can see from the first column, the 
returns to ten years of employer-tenure, when industry and occupational 
experience are not controlled for, are around 8.5 per cent. General labour market 
skills in this case are estimated to have a contribution of 24.4 per cent. When 
industry experience is included in the wage equation (second column), the tenure 
effect is slightly reduced while industry-specific skills appear to explain only a small 
part of the variation in wages (3.5 per cent ten-year effect). The impact is stronger 
when 2-digit level industry experience is used; tenure effect is further reduced 
while industry-experience has a 5 per cent effect. The inclusion of occupational 
experience in the regressors restricts the contribution of employer-tenure around 6 
per cent. Conversely, occupation-specific human capital appears to matter more in 
the wage determination process, with the effect varying between 8 and 10 per cent 
depending the level of occupational classification. The picture remains the same in 
the last two columns, where both industry and occupational experience are 
included in the covariates. Occupation -specific skills have a similar effect on wages, 
while employer tenure appears to contribute even less than before. Interestingly 
enough, industry experience does not seem to have a significant role anymore. The 
fact that the effect of industry-experience is increased, while in the case of 
occupation is reduct'd, when 2-digit level of classification is used can probably be 
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explained by the different rates of industry and occupational mobility in the male 
sample. As we can see from Table A.3.1, male workers tend to change more 
frequently occupations than industries25 . Finally, the returns to total labour market 
experience are slightly reduced when either industry or occupational experience or 
both are included in the estimated model, nevertheless the ten-year effect in all 
cases is around 20 per cent. The first impression one gets from these estimates is 
that occupation-specific human capital may have a significant contribution on an 
individual's earnings profile. On the contrary, the evidence is not so supportive to 
industry experience. 
One should acknowledge that the estimates based on OLS may suffer from potential 
endogeneity bias, driven by unobserved individual characteristics and job and/or 
sector match effects. Therefore, the wage equation model is re-estimated usmg 
panel estimators26, and the findings are summarised in the rest of the table. 
Although the Hausman test performed (not included here) is profoundly in favour 
of the fixed effect estimator, for completeness reasons I present here estimates based 
on both fixed effect and random effect model. The picture remains fairly similar to 
the one discussed above, however there are some slight differences depending on 
the choice of estimator. The addition of industry experience in the regressors vector 
has an effect similar to the one suggested by OLS (columns 2 and 3). Although 
employer-tenure effect reduces it still remains larger than the industry experience 
25 Whether this observed difference in the patterns of mobility is actually true or not, is unknown to 
the author. 
26 Parent (2000) argues that residuals are likely to be serially correlated due to the presence of a 
fixed individual effect, driven by the fact that individuals are observed over a number of years. The 
author for that reason employed feasible random-effects, allowing for AR(1). HO\Vl'\'l'r the findings 
appear to be quill' similar to those based on random-effects. Therefore estimates are not presented 
here. 
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effect, with the only exception the case where fixed-effect estimators are employed 
and the observation unit is an individual working for a particular employer. 
Furthermore, the contribution of industry-specific human capital increases in 
magnitude when a more detailed industry classification is used. Moving in the next 
two columns, we see that, in general, when panel estimators are employed the 
impact of occupational experience on wages is reduced, especially in the case of 
fixed-effects. Although the picture is not completely uniform, overall we can say 
that the effect of occupational experience appears to be more significant than, or in 
the worst case equal to, the effect of tenure. As before, the use of 2-digit 
classification in occupation reduces its estimated magnitude. Finally, when both 
industry and occupational experience are included, we observe no significant 
difference between OLS and random-effects in the 'ranking of the contribution of 
the human capital variables, although their size is altered to some extent. The only 
case where employer-tenure effect is more significant, in terms of magnitude, 
compared with occupational experience is when the fixed-effect estimator is 
employed and the observation unit is the individual. Considering that both potential 
labour market experience and the time trend included in the wage equation model 
increase by one unit (one year) from wave to wave, the identification of the linear 
term of potential experience and of the time trend is not feasible, when fixed -effect 
estimators are employed. Therefore, I exclude the linear term of potential 
experience from the estimated model and the obtained coefficient of the time trend 
now reflects their joint effect. Consequently, I do not report the ten-year effect of 
labour market experience, as I do with the other estimators (OLS and random-
effects), since I cannot distinguish these two effects. Overall, the analysis presented 
above clearly suggests that occupation-specific human capital is wrongly 
overlooked in the literature so far. The estimated tenure-effect should probably be 
attributed to those skills that are specific to the worker's current occupation rather 
than to his employer. The evidence on industry specificity, although not so clear, is 
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generally not very supportive to its existence. Even if industry-specific accumulated 
skills do exist, it is occupational experience and expertise that dominates the wage 
determination process. 
Turning now my attention to the female sample of employees, Table 3.2 presents the 
estimated effects of accumulated skills in work. Based on the OLS estimator , 
employer tenure appears to have an effect of 9 per cent (ten-year effect) that is 
reduced when either industry or occupational experience is included and becomes 
insignificant when both are considered in the estimated model. On the other hand, 
industry experience has an 8 per cent effect that reduces with the inclusion of 
occupational experience. The latter is estimated to have an effect of around 15 per 
cent (I-digit level) and 10 per cent (Z-digit level) irrespective to whether industry 
experience is included or not in the wage equation model. Total labour market 
experience appears to have an effect of 15 per cent that falls notably when either 
industry or occupational experience or both are included in the wage equation. 
When the random-effect estimator is employed, with the individual used as an 
observation unit, we observe that, first of all, the magnitude of the estimated effects 
is reduced in all cases. Furthermore, at the I-digit level, industry experience and 
employer-tenure appear to have a similar modest contribution on earnings. 
However, at the more detail level of classification, the former has an effect of 
around 5 per cent (ten-year effect) while the latter becomes insignificant. 
Occupational experience throughout the estimates, although reduced, seems to play 
a far more important role than the previous two with an effect of 6 to 7 per cent. 
When the individual-employer match is used as an observation unit, the estimates 
slightly change. Employer-tenure effect is noticeably increased and now it exceeds 
the industry-experience effect at the I-digit level, and is sinlilar to it at the Z-digit 
level. The picture does not change a lot for occupational experience, which still 
appears to have a significant role in the wage determination process. Finally, the 
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estimates based on the fixed-effect estimator27 appear to alter only when the 
observation unit considered is the individual-employer match. In this case, 
employer-tenure effect increases significantly28 (above 10 per cent the returns to 
ten-year of tenure) and is estimated to have a more important role on wages, 
compared to industry and occupational experience. Overall, the estimates in Table 
3.2 highlight the existence of occupational-specific human capital and its 
significance in the wage determination process. On the other hand, the evidence on 
industry-experience is not conclusive, although there are some indications that it 
may have a modest effect on an individual's earnings. 
A final comment concerning the returns to total labour market experIence. The 
estimated effect appears throughout the estimates to be rather limited, however that 
is something that probably we should expect since the variable used is the potential 
labour market experience. As we can see in Table A.3.l, there is a notable difference 
between potential and actual labour market experience. The former is 7 years 
lengthier than the latter, which is something quite common in the female 
population in general, because female workers take more time out of the labour 
market, mainly due to family reasons. I replicate the analysis this time using actual 
27 Similar to the case of male employees, the fixed effect model appears to be more appropriate 
based on the performed Hausman test (not presented here), compare to a random effect model. 
28 One thing that probably worthies mention here is that there is a considerable difference between 
male and female workers in what happens in the returns to tenure when the observation unit in the 
panel estimators changes. If the individual working for a particular employer is defined as a unit in 
the panel estimators, then we observed a reduction in the estimated employer-tenure effect in the 
case of male employees and an increase in the case of female workers. The fact that these two effects 
go to opposite direction probably suggests that there may be some sort of positive selection of male 
workers in high paid jobs and a negative one for the female workers. To put that in a more formal 
way, endogcneity bias in the returns to tenure driven by unobserved job-match effects appears to 
overestimate the effect of tenure for the male sample and underestimate it for the female employees. 
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(full-time) labour market experience29 (not included here) and find that the 
estimated returns to total labour market experience seem to be more 'realis{jc than 
before. The effect appears to be below 20 per cent based on OLS estimators1 around 
20 per cent when the random-effect estimator is employed. The inclusion of actual 
instead of potential labour market experience does not have a dramatic impact on 
the magnitude of the other human capital variables of concern, despite the slight 
variation in the estimates. In the case of fixed-effect estimator, there is an 
identification issue related to actual labour market experience. Since both employer-
tenure and actual labour market experience increase by the same amount between 
waves, the estimation process based on fixed -effects makes the distinction of the 
effect of the linear terms of these two variables impossible. Therefore, one of these 
terms is dropped out of the estimated wage equation model. This basically results in 
obtaining an estimate that represents the joint and indistinguishable effect of the 
linear terms of tenure and actual working experience. Hence, I cannot derive the 
ten-year effect of either employer-tenure or actual labour market experience. 
Summarising the discussion in this section, we see that the analysis suggests that 
individuals accumulate in work skills that are specific to their occupations. This 
kind of transferable and competitive skills prove to be quite valuable in workers' 
earnings profiles, since employers appreciate and reward them accordingly. The 
evidence on industry specificity is not conclusive, but even if it exists, its effect is 
dominated by occupational expertise in a wage equation model. 
29 The estimates remain fairly similar when I include full-time and part-time employment spells in 
the calculation of actual labour market experience. 
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3.5 A Closer Examination on Occupational and Industry Experience Effects 
The discussion in the previous section clearly indicates that occupational experience 
is an important determinant of an individual's earnings profile. The more 
experienced an individual is in a particular occupation, the higher her wages are 
going to be. In other words, the workers who, in a way, stay loyal to their 'career 
plan' and seek and acquire specific knowledge and experience in their chosen 
occupation are likely to be more rewarded by their employers, ceteris paribus. One 
question though that the analysis above does not answer is whether this finding is 
uniform across the different occupations or not. We know that individuals choose 
their occupation based on their comparative advantage, i.e. choose a career that best 
suits and emphasises their strengths. Therefore, it is quite useful to know whether 
there is homogeneity in the accumulation rate and the returns to occupation-
specific human capital across various occupations, or there are different patterns 
dictated by the nature of each occupation. One will probably expect the effect of 
occupational-experience to be rather high in those occupations that require and 
attract high-ability workers, and quite limited or insignificant in the not so 
demanding occupations. This is probably due to the 'anybody-can-do-jf effect of 
the latter occupations (Roy, 1951), which says that if anyone is as good as anybody 
else to perform a particular task, then that occupation is more likely to be chosen by 
individuals of average or below average ability. In this section therefore, I explore 
whether there are significant differences in the way occupational-experience is 
rewarded across the various occupations. There are two obvious ways to pursuit this 
idea, either run separate regressions according for each occupation or include 
interaction terms between occupational-experience and occupational dummies in 
the wage equation model. I am in favour of the second approach since dividing the 
sample according to occupational choice would result to sub-samples of rather 
limited size that would probably make the estimation process difficult and more 
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susceptible to sample selection biases. Therefore in the analysis that follows I re-
estimate the wage-equation model where alongside the other regressors used above 
(summarised in Table A.3.2) I include interaction terms between occupational 
dummies30 (1-digit SOC classification) and employer-tenure, potential labour 
market experience and occupational experience polynomials. 
The findings on the male and female sample are summarised in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, 
respectively. Each column in these tables refers to a choice of different estimator 
(OLS, random-effects or fixed-effects) and each row represents the returns to ten 
years of experience of the human capital variables of interest. In addition a test is 
performed where I formally examine whether the observed variation in the 
estimated effect of a particular human capital variable across different occupations 
is statistically significant or not. Starting my discussion with the male sample (Table 
3.3> we see that there is some fluctuation in the returns to ten-year of employer 
tenure depending on the occupation reported by the individual. Although tenure 
appears to have an insignificant effect in many occupations, there are a few cases 
where it actually has a noticeable effect on earnings. In particular, the findings 
suggest that seniority and employer-specific skills have a strong positive effect 
mainly in clerical and secretarial occupations and in craft and related occupations, 
with an estimated ten-year impact of above 10 per cent on average. However, the 
performed test implies that this variation in the returns to tenure is only significant 
when random-effect estimators are employed. Similarly, according to the test on the 
effect of ten-year of potential working experience, general labour market skills are 
equally rewarded across the various occupations, despite the derived t1uctuation in 
the estimates. Industry experience, which is assumed not to vary over the different 
30 Tables A.3.S and A.3.B in the Appendix provide a detailed 'Imlp' on how male and female 
employees ;Irc distributed across the various occupations and industry sectors (I-digit level of 
classification) in my sample. 
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occupations (hence no interaction terms are used) is estimated to have only a 
modest positive effect on earnings that does not exceed the 4 per cent (ten-year 
effect). Finally, the findings on occupational experience are quite interesting and 
insightful. In the previous section I demonstrate that occupational specificity plays a 
rather important role in the wage determination process. Here the estimates suggest 
that the previous findings are actually driven by some particular occupations and 
are not uniform over the whole 'landscape of occupational choices. We see that 
there is a quite strong impact for those individuals who have managerial, 
professional or associate professional or technical occupations (SOC. 1,2,3). This is 
particularly true though for the managers and administrators. Acquiring a ten-year 
experience in this occupation (SOC. 1) appears to have an effect between 15 and 30 
per cent (depending on the estimator used) and that on average is even higher than 
the effect of general labour market skills, traditionally considered as the human 
capital variable with the highest returns. Managers and administrators are far better 
off when they focus on developing their 'expertise rather than investing in any 
other kind of human capital. Furthermore, estimates on OLS and random-effects (II) 
imply that there are significant returns to sales associated occupational experience. 
It seems that the more experience an individual acquires as a salesman, the more 
persuasive that he is, hence the higher his earnings are going to be (assuming sales 
are directly related to his wage). Apart though from these occupations outlined 
above, there is no evidence to support something similar for the rest of the 
occupations, where their returns appear to be negligible. One final comment, the 
performed test verifies that these observed patterns between the various occupations 
are indeed significant, providing a further support to my discussion above. 
The results in Table 3.4 tell us a slightly different story for the female workers. 
Employer-tenure is unifornlly estimated to have an insignificant effect on earnings 
over the various occupational choices. On the contrary, there appears to be a 
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noticeable variation in the returns to potential labour market experience depending 
on the individuals' occupations, which is verified to be significant in the case of OLS 
and random -effects (II). According to these findings, general labour market skills 
are highly rewarded only in the prestigious managerial and professional 
occupations and in the, popular to female employees, secretarial occupations. In the 
rest of the occupations, potential working experience does not seem to have any 
significant impact on individuals' earnings growth31 . Industry specificity as well 
appears to be unimportant, apart from the case of random-effects (II), in the wage 
determination process. Finally, the picture on occupational experience is not very 
clear. Although the findings suggest that there is some variation in the returns to 
occupational expertise, the performed tests imply that this is true only in the case of 
OLS and random-effects (I). Similar to the estimates on the male employees, 
occupational experience seems to be significant mainly in the case of the highly-
esteemed managerial, professional and technical occupations (Sac. 1,2,3), where 
their ten-year effect is calculated to be around 15 per cent on average. Overall, the 
main conclusion that we can draw from Tables 3.3 and 3.4 is that there is 
heterogeneity in the returns to occupational experience across the various 
occupational choices. The estimated impact of occupational expertise appears to be 
driven by the more prestigious and highly paid occupations, while in the other 
occupations it is estimated to have a negligible and insignificant contribution on 
earnmgs. 
31 The wage equation models are re-estimated this time using actual labour market experience 
instead of potential working experience. The findings (not presented here) suggest that general 
labour market skills have a significant and positive effect of around 20 per cent (ten -year effect), 
which however does not vary across the different occupations. The estimates on the other variables of 
interest remain similar to those presented in Table 3.4. 
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Although the analysis in Section 3.4 provides only weak evidence on the importance 
of industry specificity in the earnings profiles, I believe it is interesting to explore 
whether the significance of its role varies across the industry sectors. Therefore, in 
what follows I address this question by re-estimating a wage equation model with 
industry sector interaction terms. In particular, similar to what I do above, I 
consider an earnings equation where I include alongside the other regressors, 
interaction terms between the industry sectors (I-digit SIC classification) and the 
tenure, potential experience and industry experience polynomials. The findings are 
summarised in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, where the estimated ten-year effects of the 
human capital variables of interest are presented. In addition, the p-value of a test 
that examines the significance of the variation (across the different industry sectors) 
in the estimates for each variable of interest is included as well. The results on the 
male workers in Table 3.5 suggest some rather interesting patterns. The significance 
of seniority and employer-specific skills appears to vary across the industry sectors. 
The results almost uniformly suggest that tenure has a strong positive effect on 
earnings in the agricultural, the energy and the mineral extraction and 
manufacture of metal and mineral products industries. In addition there is weak 
evidence for the construction and transport and communication industries as well 
as for other services. Tenure in the other industry sectors does not appear to have 
any significant contribution on the earnings determination. The test also verifies 
that indeed the observed variation of tenure effect across the industries is 
significant. Overall, we see that the role of employer tenure crucially depends on the 
industry sector the individual is employed in. Particularly, employer-specific skills 
are highly rewarded mainly in 'blue-collar industries. About the returns to 
potential working experience, the findings suggest that despite the slight fluctuation 
in the estinlated effects of the general labour market skills, their contribution in an 
earnings equation appears to be rather homogeneous across the various industry 
sectors. Industry experience in the majority of industries seems to play an 
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insignificant role on workers' wages. There are two distinct cases though where 
industry specificity truly matters, but with opposite effects. Accumulated industry 
experience in the metal goods, engineering and vehicles industries is estimated to 
have a strong, negative though effect. I believe that the interpretation of this finding 
does not lie on the human capital theory but on some story associated with industry 
rents or business cycle. Although in my wage equation model I include industry 
dummy variables in order to capture any industry effect that may intluence 
earnings, it is possible that the returns to industry experience, in this particular 
case, are in a way 'contaminated by what is happening that period in this specific 
industry sector. The negative returns to industry experience, for instance, may 
actually be reflecting the fact that a particular industry is going through a recession. 
One possible interpretation may be that this is a declining industry, where junior 
workers either are laid off or quit and senior workers (generally considered less 
mobile) are in a way 'trapped in their current sector. In this case, the negative 
industry experience contribution probably captures the effect of those senior 
workers who are unable to find a new job in a more prosperous industry32. On the 
other hand, the findings suggest that the accumulated industry-specific human 
capital in the banking sector has a significant positive effect on an individual's 
earnings profile. Finally, occupational experience is estimated to have a significant 
and positive impact in all cases examined. 
32 In order to further explore this issue, I re-estimate this wage equation model (the results are not 
presented here) including alternatively industry interaction terms with the time trend and the 
employment growth rate (over the last five years) of the individual's current industry sector. 
Although one would probably anticipate that the inclusion of these variables would 'correct the 
Ile:sative industry experience effect, the results are practically identical to the previous estimates. 
Ovcrall, the findings from both the earnings equations remained Lllrly similar to those presented in 
Table 3.5 (Table 3.6 for the female employees). 
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Moving to the results on the female employees in Table 3.6 we see that despite the 
variation in the estimates, employer tenure and potential labour market experience 
have a rather homogeneous impact on wages across the various industry sectors, as 
the performed tests suggest33 . The role of industry experience, on the contrary, 
appears to vary across the different sectors. In particular, acquired industry-specific 
skills in the banking sector and in other services have a strong and positive effect on 
earnings, while in the majority of the other sectors it seems that industry specificity 
does not matter at all. Similar to the case of male employees, occupational 
experience is estimated to have a positive effect on earnings. Based on the analysis 
above, one conclusion that we may draw, concerning industry experience, is that on 
both male and female employees the banking sector seems to represent the main 
sector where industry specificity truly matters in the wage determination process. 
Concluding the discussion, the findings suggest a particular pattern concerning the 
returns to accumulated occupation and industry specific skills. Although the 
analysis may not be exhaustive, the evidence presented in this section implies that 
occupational and industry specificity are mainly significant and noticeable in the 
more prestigious and high-paid occupations and industry sectors. Apparently, 
workers' expertise and consequently true productivity is what governs employees' 
earnings profiles in the more competitive and demanding sectors and occupations. 
33 The picture remains fairly identical when actual experience is included, instead of potential 
experience, in the wa~e equation model. Its estimated effect thou~h is higher in this case. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I depart from the assumption on the transferability of accumulated 
human capital that divides human capital dichotomously into employer-specific and 
general labour market skills, and pursue the idea of possible industry or 
occupational specificity. For the purpose of my analysis, I introduce two new 
variables, the industry and occupational experience that represent the accumulation 
of relevant skills and expertise over the years of employment. Their inclusion in a 
Mincer wage equation proves to be insightful on the workers' human capital-
earnings paths. Occupation specific skills are estimated to have a rather important 
contribution in determining wages, highlighting the significance of 'specialisation' 
in earnings profiles. The evidence, on the other hand, on industry specificity is not 
so strong and in some cases inconclusive. In addition, a further examination on 
occupational and industry specificity indicates that the observed patterns are 
actually driven by some particular occupations and industries, rejecting the 
hypothesis of homogeneity across them. Specifically, the findings outline that 
industry and occupational expertise is truly important for individuals' earnings in 
industry sectors and occupations that are characterised by high-paying, prestigious 
but, also competitive and demanding jobs, like professional and managerial jobs or 
jobs in the banking and finance sector. This analysis clearly provides evidence that 
supports the importance of occupational experience especially, which has been 
overlooked in the literature, and suggests some rather interesting patterns in the 
workers' earnings profiles. 
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Chapter 3: Tables 
Table 3.1 
Wage Eguation Estimates on Male Em£loyees 
I-digit 2-digit I-digit 2-digit I-digit 2-digit 
018 TIO .085 .075 .066 .062 .059 .055 .046 (.031 ) (.031 ) (.031) (.031) (.032) (.031 ) (.032) 
PotExplO .244 .232 .233 .212 .222 .204 .218 (.031 ) (.033) (.032) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) 
IndIO .035 .050 .016 .033 (.029) (.025) (.029) (.025) 
OcclO .097 .078 .099 .077 (.026) (.024) (.026) (.024) 
Adj. RZ .536 .539 .539 .540 .539 .543 .542 
GLS TIO .083 .075 .067 .065 .064 .059 .052 (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) 
(I) PotExplO .276 .271 .268 .248 .261 .246 .256 (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.024) 
IndIO .034 .051 .025 .043 (.016) (.013) (.016) (.014) 
OcclO .077 .060 .073 .053 (.014) (.013) (.015) (.014) 
Adj. RZ .467 .470 .4 71 .4 75 .4 72 .4 77 .4 75 
GLS TIO .065 .057 .050 .050 .051 .044 .040 (.020) (.021 ) (.021) (.021) (.021) (.021 ) (.021) 
(II) PotExplO .249 .244 .243 .227 .236 .224 .232 (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.025) 
IndIO .033 .045 .024 .038 (.016) (.014 ) (.016) (.014) 
OcclO .067 .053 .064 .047 (.015) (.017) (.015) (.014) 
Adj. RZ .469 .4 73 .4 73 .476 .4 74 .4 79 .4 77 
FE TIO .081 .074 .068 .067 .066 .062 .057 (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.019) 
(I) PotExplO 
IndIO .034 .049 .027 .043 (.017) (.014) (.017) (.014 ) 
OcclO .061 .046 .057 
.038 
(.015) (.013) (.015) (.014) 
Adj. RZ .244 .245 .247 .248 .246 .248 .248 
FE TIO .033 .025 .023 .022 .025 
.017 .018 
(.032) (.032) (.032) (.032) (.032) (.032) (.032) 
(II) PotExplO 
IndIO .022 .035 
.017 .032 
(.017) (.014 ) (.018) (.014) 
OcclO .041 
.030 .038 .024 
(.015) (.014 ) (.017) (.014 ) 
Adj. RZ .216 .217 .218 .218 .217 .219 .218 
Sample 5027 
Notes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd 
order polynomial in potential labour market experience are considered. The estimated wage 
equation model also includes: age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, 
industry and occupation, establishment size, individual's qualifications, union coverage and 
union membership. Standard errors reported in brackets. In panel estimators (I), the observation 
unit is the individual. In panel estimators (In, the observation unit is the individual working for a 
particular employer. R~ is defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the 
random-effects model. 
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Table 3.2 
Wage Eguation Estimates on Female EmEloyees 
I-digit 2-digit I-digit 2-digit I-digit 2-digit 
OLS TIO .091 .050 .046 .039 .053 .017 .025 (.037) (.037) (.036) (.036) (.037) (.037) (.037) 
PotExplO .154 .113 .120 .098 .132 .082 .116 (.037) (.038) (.036) (.039) (.038) (.040) (.036) 
IndIO .082 .078 .057 .050 (.037) (.030) (.036) (.030) 
OcclO .158 .091 .150 .100 (.034) (.029) (.033) (.027) 
Adj. R2 .559 .575 .576 .575 .566 .583 .579 
GLS TIO .045 .033 .024 .030 .028 .022 .012 (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.020) (.021) 
(I) PotExplO .135 .121 .121 .107 .117 .098 .109 (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.024) 
IndIO .033 .054 .024 .044 (.020) (.016) (.020) (.017) 
OcclO .075 .064 .073 .062 (.017) (.015) (.017) (.015) 
Adj. R2 .495 .512 .514 .512 .504 .523 .519 
GLS TIO .081 .065 .056 .062 .062 .050 .043 (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
(II) PotExplO .123 .106 .109 .098 .109 .085 .100 (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.024) (.025) (.024) 
IndIO .043 .052 .036 .044 (.020) (.017) (.020) (.017) 
OcclO .074 .051 .071 .049 (.017) (.015) (.018) (.015) 
Adj. R2 .498 .516 .518 .517 .507 .527 .523 
FE TIO .015 .011 -.000 .008 .005 .005 -.006 (.022) (.023) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.023) (.023) 
(I) PotExplO 
IndIO .023 .044 .016 .037 (.021) (.017) (.021) (.017) 
OcclO .048 .048 .045 .043 (.018) (.015) (.018) (.015) 
Adj. R2 .309 .310 .311 .312 .312 .312 .313 
FE TIO .137 .130 .124 .128 .127 .123 .118 (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) 
(II) PotExpIO 
IndIO .029 .034 .023 .029 (.022) (.017) (.022) (.018) 
OccIO .036 .031 .033 
.027 
(.018) (.015) (.019) (.015) 
Adj. R2 .275 .276 .276 .276 .276 .277 .277 
Sample 3587 
Notes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd 
order polynomial in potential labour market experience are considered. The estimated wage 
equation model also includes: age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, 
industry and occupation, establishment size, individual's qualifications, union coverage and 
union membership. Standard errors reported in brackets. In panel estimators (I), the observation 
unit is the individual. In panel estimators (II), the observation unit is the individual working for a 
particular employer. RZ is defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the 
random -effects model. 
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Table 3.3 
Wage Equations with Occupational Interaction Terms (Male Employees) 
OLS GLS (I) GLS (II) FE (I) FE (II) 
TIO (soel) -.003 -.041 -.074 .005 -.028 ('092) ('034) ('038) ('035) ('048) 
TIO (soe2) .080 .077 .038 .112 .055 (,079) (.043) ('047) ('043) (.053) 
TIO (soe3) .014 .017 .007 .021 6.92e-04 ('072) (.044) (.049) ('044) (.054) 
TIO (soe4) .128 .130 .106 .146 .069 (.087) (.049) (.052) (,049) (.057) 
TIO (soe5) .151 .104 .141 .072 .059 (.057) (,036) (,039) (,037) (.047) 
TIO (soe6) .170 .112 .106 .049 -.011 (,134) ('067) (,068) (,070) (,074) 
TIO (soe7) .040 .018 .017 .056 -.023 (,124) (,071) (.076) (.072) (.087) 
TIO (soe8) .035 .079 .058 .076 -.016 (.061 ) (.037) ('040) (,037) (.047) 
TIO (soe9) .197 .036 .008 -.055 -.155 (,085) (,071) (,073) (,072) (.079) 
Test (p-value) 0.671 0.072 0.073 0.116 0.261 
PotExp I 0 (soc I) .287 .220 .200 ('081 ) ('050) (,051) 
PotExplO (soe2) .198 .261 .196 ('088) ('056) ('059) 
PotExpIO (soe3) .148 .186 .153 (.089) ('053) ('054) 
PotExp I 0 (soe4) .324 .312 .298 ('069) ('055) ('056) 
PotExplO (soe5) .209 .267 .244 ('060) ('044) ('044) 
PotExplO (soe6) .394 .336 .292 ('137) ('084) ('083) 
PotExp I 0 (soc 7) .299 .368 .367 (,118) (,081 ) ('081 ) 
PotExpIO (soe8) .053 .180 .183 (.075) ('049) (.050) 
PotExpIO (soe9) .134 .201 .196 (.074) ('085) ('086) 
Test (p-value) 0.099 0.205 0.224 
.028 .039 .034 .036 .026 IndIO ('028) ('016) ('017) (.017) ('018) 
.303 .257 .268 .184 .168 Oee I 0 (soc 1) (.071) (,034) ('035) (,036) (,039) 
.143 .088 .060 .045 .007 Oee I 0 (soe2) (.078) ('044) ('045) (,046) (,049) 
.149 .073 .060 .035 .012 OeeIO (soe3) (.070) (.042) (.042) (.044) ('045) 
-.082 .017 .013 .042 .053 Oee I 0 (soe4) ('081 ) ('047) (.048) (.048) ('050) 
.015 .010 -.013 .037 .007 OeeIO (soe5) (.062) (.040) (.040) (,042) (.043) 
-.100 -.043 -.026 -.032 -.019 Oee 1 0 (soe6) (.116) (,066) ('065) (.070) ('070) 
.291 .1 13 .150 .0 1~) .064 Oee 1 0 (soc 7) (,127) (,074) (.073) ('073) ('077) 
-.014 .025 -.005 .030 -.026 OeelO (soe8) ('054) ('037) ('038) (.039) ('040) 
-.012 -.064 -.071 .021 .035 Oee 1 0 (soe9) (.076) ('068) (.067) ('075) ('075) 
Test (p-value) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.021 
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(TabJe 3.3 continued) 
Adj. R2 .565 .502 .506 .263 .233 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-
tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour 
market experience, interaction terms between I-digit occupational dummies and the tenure, 
potential labour market experience and occupational experience polynomials, age left 
education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, 
establishment size, individual's qualifications, union coverage and union membership. 
Standard errors reported in brackets. In panel estimators (1), the observation unit is the 
individual. In panel estimators (II), the observation unit is the individual working for a 
particular employer. R2 is defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the 
random-effects model. Classification of occupations in Appendix. Performed test on equality 
of estimated effect across occupations. 
Table 3.4 
Wage Equations with Occupational Interaction Terms (Female Employees) 
OLS GLS (I) GLS (II) FE (I) FE (II) 
TIO (soet) -.107 -.041 -.054 -.039 -.004 
(.087) (.042) (.046) (.043) (.063) 
TIO (soe2) -.123 .020 .028 .071 .164 
(.102) (.048) (.050) (.050) (.059) 
TIO (soe3) .098 .089 .109 .057 .137 
(.088) (.042) (.044) (.043) (.059) 
TIO (soe4) .006 .019 .035 -.020 .055 
(.051) (.031 ) (.035) (.033) (.055) 
TIO (soe5) -.067 -.121 .025 -.114 .054 
(.145) (.104) (.114) (.097) (.116) 
TIO (soe6) .176 .002 .044 -.035 .029 
(.123) (.055) (.061) (.058) (.078) 
TIO (soe7) .191 .071 .122 -.043 .056 
(.105) (.088) (.089) (.084) (.097) 
TIO (soe8) .112 .136 .148 -.003 -.044 
(.162) (.100) (.108) (.103) (.124 ) 
TIO (soe9) -.057 .004 .065 -.027 .052 
(.163) (.122) (.123) (.1 19) (.127) 
Test (p-value) 0.177 0.240 0.180 0.419 0.189 
PotExp I 0 (soc I) .224 .136 .124 
(.096) (.048) (.049) 
PotExpIO (soe2) .209 .181 .197 
(.118) (.058) (.060) 
PotExpIO (soe3) -.021 .024 .030 
(.067) (.042) (.044) 
PotExp I 0 (soe4) .215 .083 .088 
(.073) (.040) (.040) 
PotExp 1 0 (soe5) -.014 .173 .104 
(.094) (.113) (.113) 
PotExp I 0 (soe6) -.142 .062 .021 
(.113) (.062) (.062) 
PotExp I 0 (soc 7) -.114 .037 -.023 
(.102) (.089) (.097) 
PotExpIO (soe8) -.150 .003 .084 
(.121) (.105) (.108) 
PotExpIO (soe9) -.043 -.016 -.032 
(.098) (.090) (.092) 
Test (p-value) 0.045 0.139 0.073 
IndIO .049 .032 .043 .008 .016 
(.038) (.021) (.02l) (.022) (.023) 
OeeIO (soeI) .269 .086 .111 -.028 .013 
(.077) (.041 ) (.043) (.045) (.048) 
OeeIO (soe2) .175 .115 .129 -.008 -.0 :~~) 
(.094) (.054) (.055) (.057) (.0(12) 
OeeIO (soe3) .14S .172 .153 .138 . O~) 7 
(.l"'S 7) (.042) (.042) (.045) (.047) 
202 
(TabJe 3.4 continued) 
Occ t 0 (soc4) .105 .067 .047 .073 .030 
(.059) (.045) (.047) (.043) (.047) 
OcctO (soc5) .029 -.021 -.016 -.110 -.094 
(.143) (.102) (.105) (.111) (.125) 
OccIO (soc6) .213 .077 .056 .078 .050 
(.141) (.060) (.060) (.059) (.060) 
Occ 1 0 (soc 7) -.045 -.040 -.078 -.028 -.057 
(.116) (.083) (.083) (.085) (.085) 
OccIO (soc8) -.309 -.143 -.039 .024 .181 
(.113) (.096) (.104) (.099) (.115) 
OccIO (soc9) .341 .034 .032 -.080 -.075 
(.165) (.129) (.127) (.136) (.134) 
Test (p-value) 0.002 0.041 0.169 0.118 0.361 
Adj. R2 .6 16 .546 .549 .335 .298 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-
tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour 
market experience, interaction terms between I -digit occupational dummies and the tenure, 
potential labour market experience and occupational experience polynomials, age left 
education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, 
establishment size, individual's qualifications, union coverage and union membership. 
Standard errors reported in brackets. In panel estimators (I), the observation unit is the 
individual. In panel estimators (11), the observation unit is the individual working for a 
particular employer. R2 is defined as the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the 
random-effects model. Classification of occupations in Appendix. Performed test on equality 
of estimated effect across occupations. 
Table 3.5 
Wage Equations with Industry Interaction Terms (Male Employees) 
OLS GLS (0 GLS (11) FE (0 FE (II) 
TIO (sicI) . I 16 . I 68 .221 .1 56 .127 (. I 07) (.070) (.073) (.072) (.082) 
TIO (sic2) .020 .099 .153 .133 .227 (. I 10) (.064) (.073) (.063) (.083) 
TIO (sic3) -.063 -.001 .015 .037 .027 (.060) (.037) (.041) (.039) (.050) 
TIO (sic4) -.058 -.020 -5.66e-04 -.005 -.033 (.076) (.043) (.047) (.043) (.056) 
TIO (sic5) .245 .112 .066 .101 .007 (.093) (.067) (.069) (.067) (.074) 
TIO (sic6) .198 .045 .042 .016 -.061 (.091) (.045) (.048) (.047) (.057) 
TIO (sic7) .034 .172 .085 .203 .034 (.083) (.053) (.058) (.055) (.067) 
TIO (sic8) .114 .019 -.049 .031 -.041 (. I 29) (.046) (.050) (.047) (.058) 
TIO (sic9) .087 .082 .087 .054 .021 (.058) (.034) (.037) (.036) (.047) 
Test (p-value) 0.054 0.037 0.046 0.043 0.039 
PotExp 1 0 (sic 1 ) .135 .189 .094 (.130) (.091) (.093) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic2) .179 .274 .234 (.115) (.077) (.078) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic 3) .251 .310 .284 (.058) (.047) (.049) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic4) .144 .235 .234 (.086) (.050) (.051) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic 5) .249 .190 .195 (.107) (.074) (.075) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic6) .346 .367 .390 (.078) (.051) (.052) 
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(Table 3.5 continued) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic 7) .166 (.116) 
.228 .190 
(.068) (.072) 
PotExplO (sicS) .214 (.096) 
.263 .199 
(.059) (.062) 
PotExplO (sic9) .207 (.073) 
.198 .178 
(.047) (.048) 
Test (p-value) 0.690 0.282 0.046 
Ind 10 (sic 1) .240 (.108) 
.062 .001 .090 .027 
(.079) (.080) (.083) (.085) 
IndIO (sic2) .296 (.113) 
.049 .059 -.052 -.114 
(.070) (.069) (.070) (.072) 
IndIO (sic3) -.155 (.055) 
-.130 -.140 -.082 -.094 
(.043) (.043) (,046) (.048) 
Ind 10 (sic4) .021 (.065) 
.040 .028 .029 .021 
(.044) (.045) (.047) (.049) 
IndIO (sic5) -.121 (.079) 
.042 .029 .053 .058 
(.065) (.066) (.067) (.069) 
IndIO (sic6) -.097 (.086) 
.003 .003 .083 .119 
(.049) (.050) (.052) (.054) 
Ind 1 0 (sic 7) -.029 (.082) 
-.072 -.033 -.105 -.077 
(.057) (.060) (.063) (.072) 
Ind 1 0 (sicS) .086 (.126) 
.178 .230 .103 .080 
(.050) (.051) (.054) (.060) 
Ind 10 (sic9) -.016 (.070) 
.043 .019 .078 .042 
(.040) (.040) (.045) (.047) 
Test (p-value) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.052 0.042 
OcclO .107 .076 .068 .059 .038 
(.025) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.016) 
Adj. R2 .571 .501 .503 .271 .242 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-
tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour 
market experience, interaction terms between I-digit industry dummies and the tenure, 
potential labour market experience and industry experience polynomials, age left education, a 
time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size, 
individual's qualifications, union coverage and union membership. Standard errors reported 
in brackets. In panel estimators (I), the observation unit is the individual. In panel estimators 
(II), the observation unit is the individual working for a particular employer. RZ is defined as 
the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. Classification 
of occupations in Appendix. Performed test on equality of estimated effect across occupations. 
Table 3.6 
Wage Equations with Industry Interaction Terms (Female Employees) 
OLS GLS (I) GLS (II) FE (I) FE (II) 
( . ) .310 .285 .229 .156 .148 TIO sicl (.148) (.127) (.138) (.133) (.160) 
-.071 .095 .048 .054 -.035 
(.203) (.153) (.163) (.170) (.208) TIO (sic2) 
-.053 -.016 .073 .014 .173 
(.106) (.069) (.079) (.071) (.098) TIO (sic3) 
-.214 -.009 .057 -.041 .079 
(.123) (.074) (.077) (.076) ('092) TIO (sic4) 
-.140 .4 73 .558 .691 .836 
(.256) (.376) (.373) (.327) (.326) TIO (sic5) 
.064 .117 .138 .048 .080 
(.071) (.044) (.048) (.047) (.068) TIO (sic6) 
.340 .076 .076 .352 .557 
(.221) (,124) (.139) (.149) (.21 ~) TIO (sic7) 
.003 .036 .050 -.005 .051 
(.091) (.046) (.050) (.051) Cl")75) TIO (sicS) 
(Table 3.6 continued) 
TIO (sic9) -.012 -.040 -.005 -.041 .079 (.050) (.027) (.031 ) (.031) (,047) 
Test (E-value) 0.119 0.259 0.676 0.127 0.128 
PotExp I 0 (sic I) -.078 -.128 .243 (.266) (.164) (.202) 
PotExpIO (sic2) .091 .088 -.024 (.170) (.145) (.152) 
PotExp 1 0 (sicS) .348 .167 .056 (.108) (.080) (.084) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic4) .135 .078 .081 (.109) (.068) (.075) 
PotExp 1 0 (sic 5) .449 .176 .053 (.241 ) (.322) (.318) 
PotExpIO (sic6) -.055 .044 .013 (.094) (.047) (.049) 
PotExp 10 (sic 7) -.351 -2.53e-04 -.026 (.277) (.143) (.159) 
PotExpIO (sicS) .201 .154 .166 (.076) (.049) (.052) 
PotExpIO (sic9) .074 .066 .060 (.056) (.033) (.033) 
Test (E-value) 0.030 0.505 0.467 
Ind I 0 (sic 1) -.028 .016 .081 .025 .092 (.158) (.117) (.131) (.127) (.165) 
IndIO (sic2) -.153 .070 .159 .163 .335 (.166) (.122) (.137) (.132) (.178) 
Ind 10 (sicS) -.113 -.111 .002 -.164 -.153 (.112) (.080) (.085) (.084) (.1 04) 
Ind 10 (sic4) .063 -.018 -.010 -.037 .003 (.087) (.073) (.075) (.078) (.081 ) 
IndIO (sic5) -2.45 .940 .769 1.68 1.47 (2.89) (2.84) (2.77) (2.61 ) (2.54) 
IndIO (sic6) -.048 -.092 -.102 -.058 -8.24e-04 (.128) (.051) (.052) (.052) (.056) 
Ind 1 0 (sic 7) .062 .102 .075 -.257 -.336 (.201) (.139) (.145) (.180) (.234) 
IndIO (sicS) .188 .173 .188 .138 .130 (.084) (.052) (.054) (.055) (.063) 
Ind 1 0 (sic9) .116 .106 .106 .032 -.004 (.055) (.037) (.038) (.042) (.046) 
Test (E-value) 0.339 0.012 0.018 0.027 0.127 
OccIO .152 .071 .072 .040 .034 (.032) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.019) 
Adj. RZ .610 .543 .547 .339 .301 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-
tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour 
market experience, interaction terms between I-digit industry dummies and the tenure, 
potential labour market experience and industry experience polynomials, age left education, a 
time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment size, 
individual's qualifications, union coverage and union membership. Standard errors reported 
in brackets. In panel estimators (I), the observation unit is the individual. In panel estimators 
(II), the observation unit is the individual working for a particular employer. K~ is defined as 
the within for the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. Classification 
of oCl~upations in Appendix. Performed test on equality of estimated effect across occupations. 
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Chapter 3: Appendix 
Table A.3.l 
Sample Characteristics (BHPS): Waves 1-8 
No. of Individuals 
No. of Observations 
No. of Employer Changes 
No. of Industry Changes (I-digit) 
No. of Industry Changes (Z-digit) 
No. of Occupational Changes (I-digit) 
No. of Occupational Changes (Z-digit) 
No. of Industry Changes (I-digit) per indo t 
No. of Industry Changes (Z-digit) per ind.t 
No. of Occupational Changes (I-digit) per indo t 
No. of Occupational Changes (Z-digit) per ind.t 
Individuals who Changed Industry (I-digit) 
Individuals who Changed Industry (Z-digit) 
Individuals who Changed Occupation (I-digit) 
Individuals who Changed Occupation (Z-digit) 
Employer Tenure 
Industry Experience (I-digit) 
Industry Experience (Z-digit) 
Occupational Experience (I-digit) 
Occupational Experience (Z-digit) 
Potential Labour Market Experience 
Actual Labour Market Experience (full-time) 
Table A.3.Z 
Regressors 
Employer tenure (cubic) 
Total labour market experience (quadratic) 
Industry experience (cubic) 
Occupational experience (cubic) 
Age left education 
Individual's skills (dummies) 
Time trend 
Region (dummies) 
Industry (1 -digit dummies) 
Establishment size (dummies) 
Occupation (dummies) 
Qualification (dummies) 
Union Coverage (dummy) 
Union Membership (dummy) 
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Male 
985 
5027 
1155 
1347 
1584 
1502 
1770 
2.24 
2.41 
2.27 
2.86 
% 
29.6 
43.0 
41.2 
50.3 
Mean (S.D.) 
7.64 (6.53) 
13.26 (9.83) 
10.66 (9.33) 
11.37 (9.78) 
8.95 (9.09) 
22.45 (10.43) 
21.83 (10.39) 
Female 
734 
3587 
850 
909 
1068 
1005 
1256 
2.19 
2.31 
2.24 
2.55 
% 
20.0 
34.6 
29.7 
45.8 
Mean (S.D) 
6.40 (5.09) 
11.96 (8.26) 
9.40 (7.70) 
11.21 (8.70) 
8.38 (7.86) 
21.76 (l0.81) 
14.98 (7.95) 
SICt 
SIC2 
SIC3 
SIC4 
SIC5 
SIC6 
SIC7 
SICS 
SIC9 
SOCt 
SOC2 
SOC3 
SOC4 
SOC5 
SOC6 
SOC7 
SOCS 
SOC9 
Table A.3.3 
Industry Classification (I-digit) 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing; Energy & Water Supplies 
Extraction of Minerals & Ores (other than fuels); Manufachlre of 
Metals, Mineral Products & Chemicals 
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries 
Other Manufacturing Industries 
Construction 
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) 
Transport & Communication 
Banking, Finance, Insurance, Business Services & Leasing 
Other Services 
Table A.3A 
Occupational Classification (I-digit) 
Managers & Administrators 
Professional Occupations 
Associate Professional & Technical Occupations 
Clerical & Secretarial Occupations 
Craft & Related Occupations 
Personal & Protective Service Occupations 
Sales Occupations 
Plant & Machine Operatives 
Other Occupations 
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Table A.3.5 
Indu~ and Occupational Distribution (Male Employees) 
SICl SIC2 SIC3 SIC4 SIC5 SIC6 SIC7 SICS SIC9 Total % 
SOCl 25 37 113 82 54 148 86 137 192 874 17.4 
SOC2 18 9 124 8 18 5 8 101 301 592 11.8 
SOC3 15 16 58 35 14 6 40 128 220 532 10.6 
SOC4 35 24 27 24 10 79 30 76 79 384 7.6 
SOC5 98 63 265 214 89 130 47 7 64 977 19.4 
SOC6 3 0 1 22 0 35 15 26 283 385 7.7 
SOC7 0 9 39 19 6 90 3 30 0 196 3.9 
socs 37 90 158 247 15 62 123 12 45 789 15.7 
SOC9 73 3 6 5 20 12 144 3 32 298 5.9 
Total 304 251 791 656 226 567 496 520 1216 5027 
% 6.1 5.0 15.7 13.0 4.5 11.3 9.9 10.3 24.2 100 
----~ 
--------
---~ 
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Table A.3.6 
dustrv and Occ~ational Distribution (Female Employees) 
SICI SIC2 SIC3 SIC4 SICS SIC6 SIC7 SIC8 SIC9 Total % 
SaC} 5 6 18 36 3 125 8 82 200 483 13.4 
SaC2 1 2 4 3 2 4 3 37 406 462 12.9 
SaC3 2 5 25 17 4 15 3 58 389 518 14.4 
SaC4 45 21 100 83 9 152 79 311 441 1241 34.6 
sacs 1 16 5 83 0 3 0 0 9 117 3.3 
SaC6 0 0 0 0 I 44 7 7 296 355 9.9 
SaC7 3 1 1 4 0 120 0 6 4 139 3.9 
SaC8 1 25 54 40 0 10 1 0 2 133 3.7 
SaC9 5 8 3 7 0 32 14 4 66 139 3.9 
Total 63 84 210 273 19 505 115 505 1813 3587 
% 1.8 2.3 5.9 7.6 0.5 14.1 3.2 14.1 50.5 100 
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Construction of Industry and Occupational Experience Variable 
The construction of both industry and occupational experIence is quite similar. 
Therefore here I focus my attention on the steps followed in order to construct the 
industry experience. One should be able to derive occupational experience as well 
by simply repeating this process. 
The starting point (1st step) on the construction of the industry experience is Wave 
3, where retrospective information on respondents' employment history is collected 
(CLIFlJOlJ). This is a record that contains information about jobs held in 
employment spells, covering the period from the time individuals first left full-time 
education since the 1st September 1990, where the collection of data in the main 
panel began (AJOBHIST record). CLIFqOB record is restricted to respondents that 
were interviewed at Wave 2 and had another (full-time or part-time) paid job (with 
different employer than the one in their previous employment spell) at Wave 3 that 
lasted more than one month. The construction of industry experience is based on 
this record since it is the only lifetime employment status history record in BHPS 
that provides information on the industry respondents were employed34 . Therefore, 
industry experience can be constructed only for those individuals included in the 
CLIFlJOB record. 
First, I restrict my attention to those who reported being either part-time or full-
time employees, excluding the self-employed respondents. Then I calculate the 
employment spells based on the recorded length of job history spells, or based on the 
:14 The BLIFEMST record which contains information about employment status spells, coverin~ the 
~1criod since the respondent first left full-time education, does not provide any information on the 
industry the individual was employed. 
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information about the beginning and the end of these spells. When seasons are 
reported, they are replaced with months35 . Information on the industry is collected 
when reported. In the case of missing information, I check the CINDRESP record, 
only though when the starting date of employment matches between these two 
records, or when the current job in CINDRESPbegan before the employment spell of 
interest in the CLIFQOB. Alternatively, I gather this information from the following 
waves (4-8). The criterion is that the starting date of the reported current 
employment spell should either coincide or be before the date the spell in CLIFlJOB 
began. Finally, I check whether the starting date current job in Waves 1 & 2 
matches exactly with the date the employment spell in CLIFlJOB has began, since I 
can get information on industry from these waves. After constructing the 
employment spells and collecting the related information on industry, I add up the 
spells by industry for each respondent separately in order to construct the industry 
experience and keep the most recent one, since individuals may be repeated in the 
sample. In the next step, I use the already calculated industry experience as the basis 
for the construction of industry experience in Wave 1. 
The industry experience variable constructed up to this point refers to employment 
spells of the respondents' labour market history, where the last reported 
employment spell began before the 1 st September 1990 and may have terminated 
either before or after the date of Wave 1 interview. Therefore I need to identify 
which is the case, for each individual, and based on this information and the already 
constructed variable above to measure the industry experience up to the Wave 1 
interview (2nd step). Based on the AjOBHIST record, which contains information 
from the employment history over the period from 1 st September of the year before 
3S 'il'infc'/ is replaced with January, 'S'rm'l1c'l! with April, 'SurmnC'I: with July and 'Autumn' with 
October. 
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to the date of interview, the sample is divided into four groups, according to the 
individuals' status type of the last job history record. This is quite informative on 
what to expect in the following waves. 
Not Last Spell. 
• If the most recent employment spell (in a different job but with the same 
employer, or with a different employer) in AjOBHIST ended when the last 
employment spell in CLIFlJOB terminated, or afterwards but before the 
Wave 1 interview, then the industry-experience variable in Wave 1 is the 
one calculated in the fSi step. 
• If it ended after the Wave 1 interview, then the period between the end of 
the last employment spell (in CLIFlJOB record) and the date of interview is 
subtracted from the measured above variable. 
• If the last employment spell in CLIFlJOB ended before the most recent one in 
AjOBHIST, then the duration of any addition~l employment spells from the 
latter record is included in the variable of the fsi step and that gives the 
Wave 1 industry-experience. 
Last job Ever: 
• If the most recent job spell in AjOBHIST did not end after the date the last 
employment status in CLIFlJOB ended or the Wave 1 interview, the 
industry-experience in that wave coincides with the one already measured 
above. 
• Otherwise the duration between the date of interview and the termination of , 
the CLIFlJOB last job spell should be subtracted from the variable of the P! 
step. 
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Began After 1.9.90 
• If at the most recent employment spell in AjOBHISTthe end date is before or 
at the same time that the last spell in CLIFlJOB began, then Wave 1 industry 
experience is equal to the one already calculated after subtracting the 
duration of this last spell. 
• If the beginning though of the most recent spell in AjOBHISTmatches with 
the beginning of the last spell in CLIFlJOB, then industry experience in Wave 
1 should be equal to the already calculated industry experience minus the 
period between the Wave 1 and 3 interviews. 
Present job (Started) Before 1.9.90 
• Similar to the previous case. 
For the remained individuals, the construction of industry-experience is based on 
AINDRESP record, the main Wave 1 record. The sample is divided into three main 
groups according to their employment status: 
1. If individuals not currently employed, then industry-experience is equal to the 
one calculated in the 1st step. 
2. If the beginning of the current employment in Wave 1 matches with the 
beginning of the last spell in CLIFlJOB, then industry experience in this wave is 
equal to the one already estimated, minus the duration of this last spell, plus the 
period between the beginning of the current job and the Wave 1 interview. 
3. The last group of interest contains those individuals whose current job began 
after the date the last spell in CLIFlJOB started. There are six sub-cases 
considered here. If the last spell in CLIFlJOB. 
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• Finished after the Wave 1 interview, then industry experience is equal to 
the industry experience from the 1st step, minus the last spell, plus the 
period between the end of this last spell and the Wave 1 interview. 
• Finished before or during the beginning of the current employment in 
Wave 1, then industry experience is equal to the calculated one, plus the 
period between the start of current job and the Wave 1 interview. 
• Started after the beginning of the current employment, but before the 
date of interview, then Wave 1 industry experience is equal to the 
variable from the 1st step, minus this last spell, plus the period between 
the beginning of this last spell and the Wave 1 interview. 
• Ended before or during the Wave 1 interview, then industry experience 
is equal to the one measured in the 1st step, plus the period between the 
end of this last spell and the date of interview. 
• Ended after the Wave 1 interview, then industry experience is equal to 
the industry experience based on the 1st step, minus the period between 
the date of interview and the end of this last spell. 
For the remained individuals, industry experience is equal to the one estimated 
before, minus the last spell in that record, plus the period between the start of 
current job in Wave 1 and the date of interview. The construction of the Wave 1 
industry experience is completed here. The calculation of industry experience for 
the following waves is based on this one. 
The methodology employed for the construction of the industry experience for the 
remaining waves (Jrd step) is the same for all of them. Therefore, I only discuss how 
to proceed on Wave 2 and the analysis should be exactly the same for the rest of the 
waves (3-8>. 
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Focusing first on the BjOBHISTrecord, the individuals of interest here are those in a 
different job but with the same employer or those working full-time or part-time for 
a different employer. The first group of respondents includes those, whose least 
recent employment spell in BjOBHISTbegan before and ended after or during the 
Wave 1 date of interview. Industry experience is equal to the one in Wave 1 plus 
the period between the Wave 1 interview and the end of this employment spell, the 
duration of the following spells of employment and the period between the 
beginning of the current employment spell, reported in BINDRESp, and the date of 
Wave 2 interview. The second group contains the respondents who did not report 
any employment spell in BjOBHIST. For those individuals, industry experience is 
equal to the one in Wave 1 if they reported not employed as well in BINDRESP. 
Otherwise in the case of employment, it should be equal to the Wave 1 industry 
experience plus the period between the beginning of their current employment and 
the Wave 2 interview. For the remained individuals in record BINDRESp, industry 
experience is equal to the Wave 1 industry experience plus the period between 
Waves 1 and 2 interviews if they reported employed and equal to the Wave 1 
industry experience if they were not currently working. The construction of 
industry experience for the remained waves is exactly the same as the one described 
above. 
Occupational experience is constructed exactly as industry experience. The spells 
are identified in a similar pattern and the only difference is that instead of using 
information on the industry individuals are working in, here I use the occupation of 
the individual reported in each employment spell, in order to estimate the period of 
time spent in each occupation. 
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Chapter 4 
----------- ----
4 Seniority Profiles in Unionised Workplaces: Do Unions Still Have the 
Edge? 
4.1 Introduction 
Numerous studies in the literature have examined the significance of seniority on 
the wage determination process. Job tenure, either due to unobserved individual and 
job-match characteristics reflected in the duration of the job match (Abraham and 
Farber 1987a; Altonji and Shakotko 1987) or due to the acquisition of firm-specific 
human capital (Topel 1991), appears to have a positive impact on earnings. My 
empirical study on tenure-wage growth in Chapter 2 also suggests a modest but 
positive tenure effect. In addition, the analysis based on quantile regressions 
indicates that, at least for the male employees, seniority is rewarded more at the 
lower parts of the wage distribution, rejecting the homogeneity hypothesis on the 
tenure effect. The purpose of this chapter is to extend this knowledge and explore 
whether there is any interaction between institutional arrangements and workplace 
policies on individuals' earnings profiles, giving a particular attention to seniority. 
More specifically, I wish to examine whether there are different seniority-earnings 
paths when a trade union is present or when formal wage incremental policies exist 
in the workplace. The innovation of this chapter is that it is based on a more detailed 
description of the different, accumulated in-work kinds of skills that basically 
decompose acquired human capital beyond the conventional practice of dividing 
skills between firm-specific and general labour market skills. Already the analysis in 
Chapter 3 highlights the significance of occupational expertise on individuals' 
earnings profiles, whilst there is limited evidence that industry specific skills may 
have a modest role as well. Furthermore, here I use British panel data covering the 
last decade of the twentieth century, a period of time well after the hostile legislation 
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towards unionism (end of 1970s) and just before the introduction of a national 
minimum wage (April 1999). I believe it is of great interest to examine the role of 
unions and their effect on earnings in the modern British labour market and to 
explore how trade unions adjusted to this new era. 
The British labour market since the late 1970s has experienced many significant 
changes concerning employees' representation in the workplace. Restrictive 
legislation and less friendly managerial attitudes towards trade unions among other 
developments led to the weakening of unionism through the derecognition of such 
workers' associations in existing establishments, the creation of new workplaces 
where trade unions were not particularly popular, or supported and the decline in 
union membership. Consequently, the proportion of the workforce covered by 
collective bargaining shrunk and, in line with the decline in membership strength, 
union influence over pay setting has waned even where the institution continues to 
exist. Union membership declined by over 5 million in the two decades after the 
1979 zenith of 13 million. In addition the proportion of workers covered by a 
collective agreement fell from 71 per cent in 1984 to 51 percent in 1990 and to 35 
per cent in 1997. The wage premium that individuals covered by collective 
contracts traditionally used to enjoy over the workers who were not covered has 
effectively evaporated by the end of the 1990s. For men the wage premium fell from 
9 per cent in 1991 to zero in 1999, while for women, it fell from 16 per cent to 10 
per cent over the eight years (Machin, 2002). Although, trade unions in nowadays 
appear to be less able to extract concessions from employers and the union wage 
premium may be nearly extinct, still workers' unions and collective contracts 
continue to be strongly associated with lower levels of earnings inequality than the 
non -union sector (Metcalf et a1., 2001). 
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Despite the fact that the impact of trade unions on economic performance has been 
restricted in recent years, unions still wield 'the sword of justice' in the workplace. It 
is a stylised fact that pay dispersion among unionised workers is lower than the 
spread among their non-union counterparts. Trade unions even now sustain their 
traditional role as defenders of egalitarian pay structures in the organised sector 
(Machin, 1997). This is achieved through three avenues identified in the literature: 
(a) within establishments (b) across workplaces and firms and (c) across the whole 
pay distribution. Unions reduce wage dispersion within establishments via two 
operational rules. First, they prefer a single wage rate for each occupational group 
whereas in workplaces with no representation and collective contracts supervisors 
decide pay levels within a range. Second, unionised workplaces make more use of 
objective criteria, like seniority, in setting pay rather than subjective factors, like 
individual merit, preferred in non-union establishments. Union representatives 
prefer reduced pay differentials within an establishment for three main reasons: 
1. They are concerned about favouritism and discrimination in the workplace, 
therefore they opt for impartial objective standards where pay goes with the job. 
Z. In a median voter framework of union representation, since median pay is less 
than mean pay in nearly all firms, we should expect that over half of the 
employees will favour redistribution towards the lower paid. 
3. Workers' solidarity is likely to strengthen when they receive similar wage rates. 
The pursuit of wage standardisation by trade unions narrows pay dispersion within 
the organised sector as well. Two arguments that provide reasoning for this 
phenomenon (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) are that, first of all, employers and 
workers of firms competing in the same market can be expected to favour a 
standard rate. On the one hand, an employer does not want a labour contract that is 
more expensive than its competitors. And on the other hand, it secures workers' pay 
from allY undercutting, since essentially it takes wages out of competition. 
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Furthermore, union solidarity may be at stake if some workers are paid notably 
more than others for the same job. The decentralisation of bargaining from national 
multi-employer agreements to firm or workplace agreements, especially in the 
private sector, and the privitisation during the last two decades (British Petroleum, 
British Aerospace, British Telecom, gas water, electricity and the railways) may have 
increased the dispersion of pay in the organised sector. Nevertheless, continuing 
union recognition should prevent pay dispersion widening to the extent that we 
observe in the non-unionised sector. Finally, trade unions reduce inequality across 
the whole pay distribution by the enforcement of a de facto wage floor for covered 
jobs, i.e. by truncating the bottom tail of their pay distribution. The introduction 
though of a national minimum wage (NMW) legislation (April 1999) may 
undermine collective bargaining where it exists and effectively reduce the role of 
trade unions in the future 36 . 
Trade unIons are traditionally associated with the standardisation of pay setting 
mechanisms, often in the form of seniority pay scales. Seniority can be considered a 
mechanism that unions adopt in order to enforce non-arbitrary procedures for pay 
and promotion and so any pay differentials arising out of seniority based systems are 
compatible with union goals. Freeman and Medoff (1984) underline the importance 
of seniority in the operation of a unionised workplace. According to the authors, 
"union seniority clauses protect older union workers from the danger of layoffs and 
give them greater chances of promotion compared with otherwise similar older 
nonunion workers' (pp. 135). A theory that provides an insight into how seniority 
is directly linked to wages in a union firm is the 'discrinzintlting nlOnopof~? 
approach that describes a non-uniform pricing model of union wages (Frank 198B; 
36 The data set used here covers the period between 1991 and 1998, where there was no statutory 
minimum wage protection, SCI the NM\V does not invalidate any of my arguments. 
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Kuhn 1988; Kuhn and Robert 1989; Frank and Malcomson 1994). This model is 
similar to the multi-part tariff in product markets, where a product market 
monopolist is able to discriminate among consumers by applying a non-uniform 
price schedule that yields higher profits than otherwise. The discriminating 
monopoly theory implies that a seniority wage scale, usually accompanied by a 'las/-
in) [irst-ouf (LIFO) layoff rule, is adopted in the workplace. 
Under this framework, workers are positioned according to their job tenure in a 
queue, a seniority rank, based on which they are hired and laid off. Therefore, the 
firm is bound to first employ the senior workers offering them a higher wage rate, 
before it can employ junior workers at their reservation wage. From the unions' 
point of view, irrespectively to what their preferences might be, concerning the 
distribution of rents among its members, a seniority wage scale can achieve greater 
employment efficiency and consequently more rents extracted from the firm (Kuhn 
1988, Kuhn and Robert 1989). Firms, on the other hand, are likely to adopt such a 
policy for a variety of reasons. Based on a seniority wage scale policy, as outlined 
above, the marginal employment decision from the employers' perspective involves 
the low-wage junior workers who are employed only if their lifetime marginal 
product exceeds their lifetime income stream, both discounted at present value. 
Hence, as Booth and Frank (1996) claim, it is more profitable for the firm to hire at 
the bottom of a steep scale than the average wage on the scale would suggest. 
Furthermore, hiring costs are likely to exist and workers already employed may also 
have acquired firm-specific skills, i.e. outsiders are not perfect substitutes for 
insiders. Firms will attempt to discourage labour turnover among their most highly 
valued workers by implementing a seniority wage rule that under these 
circumstances appears to be an optimal policy. The adoption by firms of policies 
linking wages and tenure, of course, goes back to the 1970's, as it is a central 
clement of the descriptive theory of internal labour markets (ILMs). 
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The concept of the ILM began with the seminal work of Doeringer and Piore 
(1971), who define the institution as "an administrative unit within which the: 
pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of rules and procedures' (pp. 
1). The reasons for the existence of such institutions lie in the characteristics of joint 
production and the problems of monitoring and consistent incentives. ILMs develop 
to deal with these problems in the face of specificity in human capital investments, 
and opportunistic behaviour in the context of information asymmetries. 
The prImary rationale for ILMs is usually supposed to be specific investment 
(Wachter and Wright, 1990). Skill specificity is measured by the skill's uniqueness 
to the job classification and the enterprise and is accumulated through on-the-job 
training. This kind of training occurs by 'osmosis in the production process 
(Doeringer and Piore, 1971), where the participants assume dual duties of learning 
and carrying out the tasks and "is confined to those Skll1s required for the job and 
no excess training" (pp. 27). However, for the worker, increasing skill specificity 
"reduces the incentive for him to invest in such training, while simultaneously 
increasing the incentive for the employer to make the investmenf' (pp. 14), since 
the skills cannot be readily utilised elsewhere. 
The four distinguishing features of ILMs, as summarised by Doeringer and Piore, 
are: 
1. Entry to internal labour markets is via certain jobs and ports of entry. 
2. Rules regarding job security, career arrangements and so on differentiate the 
insiders from the outsiders to the firms. 
3. Employees are paid according to administrative rules and customs, so in a 
way wages are tied to jobs rather than to individuals. And, 
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4. Wages are influenced only weakly by conditions in the labor market external 
to the firm. 
A cornerstone of the Doeringer and Fiore characterisation of ILMs is the notion that 
wages are attached to jobs and to a lesser extent to individuals and their human 
capital. Thereby the firm commits itself to a reward structure, which relies on 
promotions. Access to higher level positions on internal promotion ladders is not 
open to all comers on an unrestricted basis. As part of the internal incentive system, 
higher level positions are filled by promotion from within whenever this is feasible. 
This practice, especially if it is adopted by other enterprises to which the worker 
might otherwise turn for upgrading opportunities, ties the interests of the worker to 
the firm in a continuing way. Given these ties the worker looks to internal 
promotion as the principal means of improving his position. Reliance on internal 
promotion has affirmative incentive properties in that workers can anticipate that 
differential talent and degree of cooperativeness will be rewarded. Consequently, 
although the attachment of wages to jobs rather than to individuals may result in an 
imperfect correspondence between wages and marginal productivity at parts of 
entry, productivity differentials will be recognised over time and a more perfect 
correspondence can be expected for higher level assignments in the internal labour 
market job hierarchy. Thus internal promotion ladders encourage a positive worker 
attitude towards on-the-job training and enable the firm to reward cooperative 
behaviour. 
ILMs therefore consist of sets of careers and relatively detailed defined career paths , , 
that in turn lead to long-term attachments. Adopting an ILM strategy may raise 
firm's performance because career opportunities provide incentives to put forth 
more effort via promotion tournaments (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), delayed 
compensation (Lazear, 1981) or efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) and 
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to acquire firm-specific skills (Gibbons, 1997). Also, employers learn about their 
employees, which is useful in assigning workers to jobs and reduces firms' hiring 
and screening costs. An additional reason for the existence of ILMs is that they can 
provide valuable insurance and stability to employees (Bertrand, 1999). ILM 
agreements are commonly reached through collective bargaining. Unionisation 
commonly facilitates grievance procedures and contract revision and renewal that 
enable the adjustment of these agreements to the changing conditions and to 
unforeseeable contingencies in a relatively nonlitigious manner. 
The discussion so far has clearly outlined unions' opposition to sUbjective pay 
mechanisms like the Performance-Related Pay (PRP) scheme and their preference 
over objective pay setting, the standardisation of wages and seniority policies. Trade 
unions, by enforcing such pay setting processes in the establishment, create a less 
competitive and quite secure environment for the covered workers. Individuals, 
especially those more' vulnerable like seniors and minorities or female workers, feel 
more protected behind the egalitarian union representatives against layoffs and 
unfair or discriminating treatment. The standardisation of pay and the wage 
compression in the organised sector suggest that workers' true productivity and 
qualifications may not be appropriately acknowledged. In a Mincer wage equation 
model that would be interpreted into flatter returns to human capital compared to 
the non-union sector. The worker-friendly pay setting processes that unions 
advocate mean that workers are not rewarded according to their actual contribution 
and individual merit, but based on some objective rules. While this is beneficial for 
part of the workforce, individuals with high qualifications and competitive skills 
may feel restricted and unsatisfied in an environment like this. High-skilled workers 
who are willing to voice their concerns to management personally, or are able to 
find alternative employtnent relatively easily may not feel the need of 
representation. Therefore, while for some workers unionism may be re~arded as a 
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'protective shield, for some others it is more of a constraint, a burden in their career 
development. Effectively this may lead to a kind of sorting between the unionised 
and non-unionised sector based on individuals' need for protection and job security. 
Murphy et al. (1991), in their examination of the union effect on earnings 
distribution, conclude that "one principal effect of the pursuit of standard rate 
policies by trade unions is the attraction of a more homogeneous workforce in to 
union employment' (pp. 536). 
The aim of my study here is to explore how trade unions influence individuals' 
earnings profiles. In particular, I want to examine how unionism interacts with the 
human capital wage premia, when considered in a Mincer earnings equation 
framework. From the discussion above, I form two hypotheses that I wish to 
investigate. First, in workplaces with union representation, the returns to employer-
tenure should be higher than in the non-union sector. The main rationales behind 
this argument are two. Employer-tenure measures the years an individual spent 
working for a particular employer, i.e. it is the seniority of an individual in a 
particular job. Since organised sectors are more likely to adopt seniority rules as 
their pay setting process, instead of PRP schemes, I expect that seniority earnings 
profiles will be steeper than in workplaces with no workers' associations. 
Furthermore, as Booth at al. (2001) suggest, relative to non-union workers, union-
covered workers are more likely to receive training and they also receive more days 
of training than their non-unionised counterparts37 • In addition, they experience 
higher wage growth and a greater return to training. We can anticipate then that 
workers in the unionised sector are more likely to accumulate firm-specific skills, 
37 A number of other studies on British data have found a positive correlation between work-related 
training incident and measures of union presence (Booth 1991; Greenhalgh and l\1avrotas 1994; 
Arulampalam ;ll1d Booth 1998; Green, Machin and Wilkinson 1999). 
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through training. Therefore, the returns to employer-tenure, as a proxy for job-
specific skills, will be higher for the covered workers. 
The second proposition IS that the returns to more transferable type of skills, 
acquired in work and appreciated by a number of employers, are steeper in the less 
restrictive and more competitive non-union sector. Contrary to the traditional 
opposition of unions to any pay setting mechanism based on individual merit, 
managers at workplaces with no union representation are more friendly and 
supportive to PRP schemes. Concequently, in non-unionised establishments, workers 
are more likely to be rewarded based on their actual skills and productivity. Hence, 
true qualifications and competitive skills should be more important in these jobs 
than in unionised workplaces. 
Booth and Frank (1996) in a recent study on British data propose that union wage 
differential increase with seniority but only when formal seniority scales exist38 . In 
the same spirit, Theodossiou (1996) argues that tenure has a significant positive 
effect on earnings in jobs with promotion policies, although he does not make any 
distinction between unionised and non -unionised firms. Nevertheless, this finding is 
in support of our first proportion since, as the analysis outlined before, the 
standardisation of pay setting procedures and promotion policies are strongly 
guarded by unions' 'sword of justice. In this chapter, there are many similarities 
with the study of Booth and Frank (1996), however the innovation of this work is 
that it provides a more detailed and complete map of the acquired human capital 
that has some rather interesting implications concerning the individuals' earnings 
38 In the US literature, Topel (1991) argues that the returns to tenure for union members are larger 
in magnitude and rising compared to their non-union peers, while Kuhn and Sweetman (1999) 
looking from a different perspective find that the loss to displaced workers from unionised 
workplaces is increasill~ in seniority. 
225 
profiles. While the previous studies divide accumulated human capital into firm-
specific and general labour market, based on the analysis in Chapter 3, I argue that 
acquired skills in work should be further decomposed. The existing literature 
overlooks the importance of occupation-specific skills in the wage determination 
process. 
Here I adopt this approach and alongside job-tenure and labour market experience I 
include occupational and industry experience in my analysis. Job-tenure is usually 
considered in the literature as a measure of seniority and, under the assumption that 
workers accumulate firm-specific human capital, as a proxy of non-transferable 
(between jobs) skills. On the other hand, we can think of occupational experience as 
a measure of the individual's expertise in a particular occupation, i.e. of the 
individual's occupation -specific skills that are transferable between different 
firms/ employers within the same job description (occupation). It is of great interest 
to explore how trade unions and/or formal wage policies in a workplace affect the 
individuals' earnings profiles when examined at the different levels of 
transferability of the accumulated skills. According to Booth and Frank (1996) 
seniority wage scale policies are more likely to be adopted in workplaces where 
strong trade unions are present and individual productivity is hard to measure. If 
we imagine such a workplace we would probably expect job tenure, rather than 
true productivity, to play an important role on earnings. On the contrary, in a more 
competitive environment, not so restricted by formal wage policies, one might 
expect that the individual's expertise on the job she performs and consequently her 
productivity would be more appreciated and rewarded. In this chapter I address 
these questions and explore how workplace features, like unionism and seniority 
scales, influence the importance of job-tenure and accumulated skills in the wage 
determination process. 
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In the next section, I examine the interaction between union representation in the 
workplace and individuals' earnings profiles. I begin my analysis with the 
estimation of standard union and non-union wage equations, Section 4.2.1~ and in 
the second part, Section 4.2.2, I address the selectivity issue in the estimates, driven 
by the endogeneity of union status. In Section 4.3, I explore whether we can explain 
the observed distinct earnings paths in union and non-union jobs with the existence 
of formal seniority wage policies in these workplaces. Finally in Section 4.4, I 
conclude my discussion with a summary of the most important findings. 
4.2 Seniority Earnings Profile Under Unionism 
The purpose of this section is to examine the different wage growth paths in the 
union and non-union sector. Before faddress though this question, I need to decide 
on the definition of union status. I can define union status either at the individual 
level as union membership, or at the workplace level as union coverage. The choice 
between the two is actually the answer to whether there is a free-rider problem 
associated with union membership or not. One of the main roles of trade unions is 
the improvement of wages and working conditions above the perfectly competitive 
level (the union's monopoly role). Economists, Olson (1965) among the first, have 
argued that there is indeed a free-rider problem associated with union wage 
premium. The reason behind that is that in an establishment, where a union is 
recognised for pay bargaining, all workers regardless of their membership status 
can enjoy the improved wages and working conditions. Therefore, the above the 
perfectly competitive level wages and the better working conditions are normally a 
collective good since it is difficult to exclude workers who are not union members. 
Individuals acting as rational economic agents faced with a public good are 
expected to take a free ride on union membership and enjoy this collective 30(',d 
without incurring the monetary or physic costs of membership. Two recent studies 
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(Booth and Bryan, 2001; Bryson, 2002) using the linked employer-employee data 
from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS) provide empirical 
evidence to the free-rider argument. The authors examine the membership 
premIum among covered workers and conclude that there was no union 
membership wage premium in the late 1990s for Britain's private sector workers39 . 
The question that naturally comes to mind is why then individuals still want to join 
a union or, why union members do not leave the union. Trade unions are also 
traditionally associated with the provision of friendly society benefits, grievance 
procedures and the like. These are normally excludable, private goods or services 
available only to union members that may act as an incentive to workers to unionise 
(Booth and Chaterji, 1995). In addition, workers may feel the need or pressure to 
comply with the group norm of union membership (Booth, 1985; Naylor, 1989) or 
they may join and remain members because they are ideologically committed to 
doing so. The theoretical rationale and empirical evidence, in conclusion, suggests 
that the union wage premium is a public good available to all covered workers 
regardless of membership status. Therefore, in my analysis here I define union status 
solely based on the existence of a recognised trade union in the workplace. This way 
I may optimally avoid the 'free-nder effect in a union job, which applies to a 
considerable proportion of workers in United Kingdom. 
The empirical examination is based on the same unbalanced panel sample used in 
Chapter 3. Some of the main characteristics of this sample are provided in Table 
A.4.1, where averages on employer-tenure, general total labour market experience, 
industry and occupational experience are presented separately for the union and 
39 Similarly, Barth et [1f. (2000) using a matched emloyer-employee data set for Norway find that 
individual membership status ceases to have any significant effect on the wage when establishmcnt-
level union density is included and conclude that the union wage effect is a pure public good. 
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non-unIon sector. Although an analysis on simple descriptive statistics would 
probably be inadequate and certainly not exhaustive, the figures in the table are 
quite indicative of some distinct patterns that govern these two sectors. In 
particular, what is interesting here is the fact that in general the average duration of 
employment history, measured either as tenure or experience, is longer in the 
organized sector than in the non-union sector. A finding that probably reflects the 
higher job stability and security that former workplaces actually offer. The most 
characteristic example from the table is male employees' recorded tenure, where on 
average men in unionised jobs appear to stay with their current employer about two 
years more, compared with their peers in the non-union sector. 
The discussion in this section focuses on the workers' earnings profiles in the union 
and non-union sector. In the first part (Section 4.2./), I present conventional wage 
equation estimates separately for a workplace with union representation and 
without. Then in the second part (Section 4.2.2>, I concentrate on the issue of the 
endogeneity of union status, and re-estimate these earnings models, controlling for 
potential selectivity bias in the results. 
4.2.1 Unionism and Wage Equations 
I begin the analysis here by estimating standard Mincer earnIngs equations 
separately for the union and the non-union sectors: 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
where W is the 100 union waoe and W is the log nonunion wage for individual j ~ 0 0 ~ 
at period t. .X is the vector of variables determining earnings and {J'S are the 
coefficients to be estimated. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the hourly 
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wage rate, including overtime paid hours. The human capital variables on the right-
hand side of the equation include job-tenure (measured in decades), actual labour 
market experience, industry and occupational experience (measured in years)w. 
Alongside these variables, the remaining regressors consist of controls for individual 
characteristics such as education, skills, qualification and current occupation, 
workplace characteristics like establishment size and industry sector and regional 
dummies and a time trend. The results are summarised in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, for the 
male and female employees, where the derived ten-year effect41 of tenure, labour 
market experience and industry and occupation experience is calculated and 
presented, in order to help the comparison between these two sectors. I 
acknowledge that the estimates of the effect of these four variables may be 
inconsistent due to unobserved heterogeneity across individuals and across matches. 
Although this potential endogeneity bias is not of major concern, I utilise the panel 
element of our data set and employ panel estimators42 , generalised least square 
(GLS) and within-group fixed effects (FE)43, alongside OLS estimator. Finally, on 
40 Quadratic polynomial for labour market experience and cubic polynomials for the other three 
human capital variables. 
41 Through out the chapter, I present the findings from the estimated earnings model, based on the 
calculated ten-year effect of the four human-capital variables of interest. 
42 A technical note concerning the estimation process, for observation unit in the panel estimates I 
use alternatively (I) the individual, and (II) the individual working for a specific employer, i.e. if an 
individual is observed working for different employers in the sample she is treated as a different 
unit/individual. The latter method may capture some unobserved job-match effects that the former 
might not, especially for the estimates on the returns to job-tenure. 
43 When fixed effect estimators are employed, an identification problem arises driven by the presence 
of both employer-tenure and actual labour market experience in the wage equation model. For those 
individuals who do not have any part-time employment spell, the increase between two consecutive 
waves in both tellure and labour market experience is the same. This implies that I cannot 
simultaneously estimate their effect \vhell using fixed effects (difference from mean). The only CdSC 
what it concerns the level of identification of the industry and occupation sector for 
the measurement of the individual's accumulated experience in them, I use 
alternatively both the I-digit and Z-digit level of classification. 
The results presented in Table 4.1 provide a rather interesting insight on the 
differences in the earnings profiles between the union and non-union sector. If we 
compare the first half of the table (union) with the second half (non-union) we can 
derive some distinct paths between the two sectors. Job tenure, while it appears to 
have a modest but positive and significant contribution in those establishments 
where workers are organised into trade unions, the same is not true for their peers 
in the non-union sector. Furthermore, in the union sector labour market experience 
and occupational experience are estimated to have a significant positive effect on 
individuals' earnings. However the impact is stronger in the less restricted non-
unionised workplaces. This is especially true for occupational experience, where the 
calculated contribution (ten-year effect) is at least double the size compared to the 
union sector. Finally, wages, in the second half of the table, appear to increase with 
industry experience, particularly when the latter is measured at the Z-digit level of 
classification. According to these findings, seniority and/or firm -specific skills are 
important only in workplaces with trade unions present. In work environments 
where they can be both estimated is for those individuals who had some part-time working 
experience between, for example, two consecutive waves. In that case the increase in labour market 
experience will be higher than the one in employer-tenure. Effectively though that means that the 
obtained coefficients of labour market experience do not measure its effect on wages, but rather 
capture this event in their employment history. Therefore, when fixed effect estimators are employed, 
in order to avoid this kind of identification problem I exclude the linear term of labour market 
experience from the estimated model. Consequently, in the case of fixed effects the rdurns to labour 
market cxpericnce are not presented in the tables. 
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though less protective and restricted, it is the more competitive and transferable 
kind of human capital that really matters in the wage determination. 
The estimates on Table 4.2 do not provide a clear picture of the effect of union 
representation on the earnings profiles of female employees. First of all, in both 
sectors employer-tenure and industry experience do not appear to play any 
significant role in the wage determination. Total labour market experience and 
occupational expertise, on the other hand, are estimated to have a significant 
positive effect on wages, however there is no distinct pattern on their returns in the 
two sectors. Therefore, despite the variation in their magnitude, the evidence is not 
conclusive and I cannot make any comment, as I do for the male employees, on the 
interaction between unionism and these estimated wage premia. 
Overall though, this first attempt to explore the earnings profiles in the covered and 
non -covered sector sheds some light. From the wage equation models on the male 
employees I can conclude that seniority is closely related to wages in workplaces 
where trade unions exist. In these protected working environments where formal 
policies probably exist concerning the employment and the level of wages, senior 
workers are more valued compared with their junior colleagues. However, 
individuals with competitive and transferable skills, such as occupation-specific 
skills, are far better of in jobs less restricted where their true productivity is more 
likely to be acknowledged. On the contrary, the findings on the female workers are 
open to interpretation and are not so insightful at the current stage. 
One main source of concern with the above findings is the endogeneity of union 
status. Individuals are not randomly assigned in the union or non-union sector. l~n 
the contrary, the distribution of workers among these two sectors is governed by 
rational decisions and behaviours of both the employees and the cmployers. 
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Workers select themselves into their most preferred sector, while employers choose 
from the pool of available workers those individuals that they desire. An obvious 
issue that arise from this discussion is the potential sample selection bias in the 
previous estimates. The two samples, in the union and non-union sector, may be 
characterised by different features concerning both the individuals and the 
workplace. In other words, the estimated differences in the wage equation models 
between the two sectors may after all be the result of the likely heterogeneity of the 
two samples, rather than genuine distinct patterns in the earnings profiles. I explore 
this route in the following section and address the selectivity issue in the wage 
equation framework. 
4.2.2 Endogeneity of Union Status 
It is generally agreed that union status should be treated as an endogenous variable 
(Dungan and Leigh 1985). The fact that, for example, we observe an individual in 
the union sector is the result of distinct systematically made decisions from the two 
parties involved (employees and employers), where they both aim to maximise their 
utility. A theoretical model, mainly developed in the US literature, that describes this 
whole process is the 'queuing mode! based on the influential and pioneer work of 
Abowd and Farber (1982) that basically involves a dual selection process. Workers, 
based on the utilities that each sector yields to them, make explicit decisions 
regarding their desire for union representation in their workplace. However, the 
preference towards the union sector does not necessarily result into employment on 
a union job, since it is the employer who decides whom to employ from the 
available queue of workers, in order to produce at minimum cost. Hence, "[1 
worker's union status is determined by both a desJ1'e for a union job :ind the 
clnp!oyer's se/cction criteria" (pp. 355). In other words, the observable event of 
Z33 
union status requires the queuing process from the employee's side and her being 
selected by the employer. 
Although such a theoretical model may be quite insightful on the behaviours that 
govern the observable event of union status, it is still questionable whether it is 
applicable to the British labour market or not. Furthermore, since the only event the 
researcher observes is the union status is quite difficult to distinguish these two steps 
(queuing and selection) and discern whether non-union workers did not actually 
desire to work in a union job, or were just not chosen from the queue, although they 
wanted union representation. In practice that means that unless we can find at least 
one variable that is contained in one model (e.g. queuing) but not in the other (e.g. 
selection) we are unable to distinguish these two processes and identify the possible 
different behaviour patterns that characterise them. Therefore, due to the 
ambiguous validity of the model for the case of Britain and to limitations in my data 
set, I do not pursuit this route. Instead I estimate a probit model on the event of 
union status that although it does not provide us with any insight on both employees 
and the employers' decisions, it still serves well its purpose concerning the control 
of selectivity bias. 
Specifically, I estimate the structural form of the union status model, specified as: 
(4.3) 
and 
Union = 1 if Union" > ° and =0 otherwise 
,1 /I 
where Union,: is the latent variable indicating union representation In the 
workplace, Union" is the observed union status, ZI/ is a vector of personal and job 
characteristics and C'1 - ( 0, CJ!' ) • 
234 
The regressors ZII included in the union probit model are those used in the earnings 
equation model presented above. However, for identification purposes we require at 
least one more variable that affects the event of working in a job with union 
representation that has no obvious impact on wages. The author suggests that 
individuals' political beliefs may influence ones decision of whether or not to work 
in an unionised environment but they do not have any effect on their earnings 
profile. We can think of ideology as a proxy of what the views and perceptions of an 
individual are concerning various aspects of everyday life, including trade unions 
and collective bargaining in the workplace. Under this assumption, we would 
expect people located in the center and left at the 'political map to be friendlier 
towards the idea of unionism and collective action44 . Figures 4.1 and 4.2 give us a 
vague idea on how individuals, according to the party they support, are distributed 
between the union and non-union sector. Although one might argue that this is a 
rather traditional view, questioning its validity in nowadays, the empirical findings 
presented below support our initial assumption. Hence, alongside the regressors 
from the wage equation model I include three dummy variables corresponding to 
whether the individual feels closer to the Conservative party, Labour party or the 
Liberal Democrats45 . BHPS contains a series of questions on respondents' political 
44 Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) use similar identifying variables for the construction of a 
structural union-membership equation in a selectivity-corrected union wage gap model for UK. 
Commenting on the validity of their choice, the authors argue that "in the ['.K trade unions hlivc 
always been closely associated with the Labour Party in particular, and with more left wins policies 
ill general' (pp. 2). 
45 The methodology employed here relies on the conventional assumption that individuals' political 
views and party attachment are rather stable in the long term (Green and ralmquist, 1990). 
Therefore, while short-term factors (e.g. economic conditions) may influence voters, such shifts are 
transitory, as individuals are expected rather soon to return to their preferred party. Within this 
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views. In particular, individuals are asked if they support a particular political 
party, and if so which party they regard themselves as being closer to than the 
others. The replies to these two questions form the basis for the construction of the 
political beliefs dummy variables that I use below. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the derived marginal effects from the estimated union 
status probit model. The model is estimated both at I-digit and 2-digit of industry 
and occupational classification, however the results remain fairly similar 
irrespectively to the chosen level of identification. Before we move on to the 
findings, it should be stretched out that the interpretation of the results is not a 
straightforward one. The difficulty arises from the fact that the actual process of 
joining a union job is unobserved to the researcher. Therefore, I reckon that it 
would probably be more appropriate to interpret the findings as the effect that 
individual and job characteristics have on the probability that one is observed in a 
unionised workplace, rather than attempt to suggest behavioural strategies from the 
employers and employees. Starting with the findings on the male sample, in general 
the signs on the significant variables in the union status equation are what would be 
expected a priori. 
The polynomial terms of job tenure appear to be significant, suggesting a positive 
relationship between seniority and union status. One possible interpretation of this 
finding is that the individuals who plan to stay for many years in a job and 
accumulate tenure are more likely to be observed in a workplace with union 
representation. Apparently, the security that trade unions offer provides an 
incentive to those individuals who seek stability in their careers. On what it 
framework, political beliefs are formed at an early life stage based on parents' given preferences, 
socia-economic status, race, religion and region and remain fairly stable over the years. 
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concerns the political beliefs, the individual used as the base for the estimates is he 
who supports a party different from the three most popular mentioned above or, no 
party at a1146 . According to the findings, the workers who support the Labour party 
are those most likely to be observed in an unionised environment, followed by the 
Liberal Democrat supporters. Those located to the right in the political spectrum are 
less likely to work in the unionised sector, compared to the supporters of the other 
two major parties. Furthermore, the results suggest some strong regional effects 
especially for the North and the Wales, where the probability that an individual is 
employed in a union job are higher compared to the reference region of the South. 
In addition, the model captures some industry and occupation effects on the 
probability of union status suggesting that some sectors are more likely to have 
union representation than others, or simply that workers in particular sectors prefer 
more to work in a unionised place. More specifically, individuals in Agriculture, 
Energy and Manufacture of Metals, Mineral Products and Chemicals sector as well 
as Other Services are more likely to work in an unionised environment. While those 
in Metal Goods and Engineering industries and in Hotels and Catering sector are the 
least likely to be represented by a trade union. Moreover, those with Managerial and 
Professional occupations have lower probability of being observed in an unionised 
workplace compared with employees in other occupations. According to the 
estimates, the occurrence of union status is more likely in larger workplaces, which 
is something that we should expect since union representation in general is more 
likely to be observed in workplaces with a large number of employees. Two last 
remarks on the findings, semi and high skilled workers, as well as non-manual 
workers are those that are most likely to be working in a union job. And finally, the 
probability of union status reduces as the years pass. Whether though this occurs 
46 ThL' base group, those who support a party other than the three main ones or does not support any, 
is approximately onL' quarter of the whole sample, in the case of male employees. While, for the 
female respondents it rises up to one third. 
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because unionism overall declines through the years or simply because of some 
unobserved time trend captured in the data is not clear. 
Before we move on to the findings on the female employees, there is an issue that 
worthies addressing here. The estimates on the union-status probit model in Table 
4.3 suggest a positive relationship between union-status and job seniority. One 
interpretation that I suggest above is that individuals who prefer stability to possibly 
frequent job changes are more likely to find employment in an unionised 
environment. However, there may be an alternative explanation to this estimated 
effect. Employer-tenure may be endogenously determined by some unobserved 
individual and workplace characteristics that may also influence whether an 
individual is employed in a unionised sector or not. Similarly to a wage equation 
model, the estimated positive effect of tenure may actually be driven by the 
correlation with individual and workplace characteristics not observed to the 
researcher. Here I attempt to clarify this issue and take a closer look on the potential 
endogeneity of the obtained job-tenure effect. 
A test of endogeneity always requires the specification of a list of instruments for the 
variables under suspicion. For that purpose of my analysis I employ the instrumental 
variables suggested by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) (AS thereafter), where 
employer-tenure is instrumented by the deviation from its job-match mean for 
every individual. On the basis of this instrument I compute a test of exogeneity for 
the union-status probit model as proposed by Smith and Blundel (1986). This test is 
related to the Davidson-MacKinnon auxiliary regression test for exogeneity in a 
regression context (an alternative to the commonly used Hausman test). This test 
involves a two-step estinlatiol1 process. In the first stage, the variables suspected for 
endogeneity are expressed ~lS a linear projection of a set of instruments, those 
specified by the researcher plus all other explanatory variables of the probit I11l")del. 
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The residuals from each first stage instrument regression are then included in the 
probit model. A test on the joint significance of the coefficients on the residual series 
is performed. Under the null hypothesis, the probit model is appropriately specified 
with all suspected variables as exogenous, i.e. the residuals from the auxiliary 
regressions should have no explanatory power. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicates that the standard probit estimator should not be employed. The performed 
Smith-Blundel test of exogeneity, based on the AS instrumented variables for tenure, 
rejects the null hypothesis with a Chi-square (X2(3») of 10.936 (Chi-square: 11.809, 
when industry and occupational experience are measured at a 2-digit level). 
Employer-tenure appears to be endogenously determined in the union-status probit 
model. After all, the unobserved individual and workplace characteristics that affect 
the presence of an individual in an unionised workplace appear to influence also 
the duration of his employment spell in that job. 
As an alternative model to the union-status probit model in Table 4.3, I can employ 
the instrumental variable probit model using Amemiya Generalised Least Squares 
(AGLS)47 that is used for estimating probit models where some of the independent 
variables are endogenous (in our case the employer-tenure polynomial). The 
estimates from this IV-Probit model on union-status (not included here) reduce the 
estimated effect of tenure both in magnitUde and in statistical significance. Seniority 
does not appear to have an explanatory role anymore in the event of been employed 
in a union-sector. The findings from the IV-Probit on the rest of the regressors 
remain fairly similar to those provided in Table 4.3. Apparently, what this analysis 
implies is that the previously estimated positive relationship between union-status 
and job-tenure may actually have to do with the fact that tenure is endogenously 
17 Maddala (1983) provides a good summary of how AGLS works and Newey (l ~)R7, eq. 5.\;) the 
specific formulas used for the estimation. 
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determined in this probit model48 • Nevertheless, for the estimation purposes of 
Heckman's selection model on the earnings equations I employ the probit model 
presented in Table 4.3. 
The estimates on the female employees in Table 4.4 are fairly similar to those 
already discussed with only a few differences observed. First of all, only the linear 
terms of the polynomials of job tenure and labour market experience are positive 
and significant, while all the terms of the industry experience are significant at the 
I-digit of classification and only the first term at the 2-digit level. Nevertheless, job 
tenure still has a positive effect on the probability of being observed in a union job, 
like in the case of male workers49 • Furthermore, employees' qualifications appear 
now to affect the probability of union status, where previously in the case of male 
workers they are (apart from a few exceptions) insignificant. Employees with 
teaching qualifications are those most likely to be working in union jobs compared 
to all other individuals with different qualifications. Probably this is something one 
might expect if we assume that these individuals are working in relevant sector 
(education) where union representation in the workplace is quite common. 
Moving now in my analysis, if union status IS endogenous In a wage equation 
framework, then: 
E(cUil I Unionl~ > 0) -:f. 0 and E(cnil I Unioni~ ~ 0) -:f. 0 
This means that OLS estimated coefficients of the wage Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are 
inconsistent. In Tables 4.5 and 4.61 present the estimated earnings equations, where 
48 I should acknowledge though that my discussion here relies on the specific instruments used and 
consequently on how appropriate and valid they are for the sample. 
49Thc Smith-Blundel test is performed here as well in order to test the exogeneity of employer-tenure. 
The estimated Chi-square suggests that the probit model is the one that should be employed, since the 
null hypothesis (exogeneity) is not rejected. 
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I control for selectivity, based on the union status probit models discussed above. 
The Heckman maximum -likelihood estimates overall deliver rather similar estimates 
to those summarised in Ta.bles 4.1 and 4.2, where I do not control for potential 
sample selection bias. According to the results on the male employees, job tenure 
has a positive and significant effect only in the union sector. Apparently, seniority is 
an important determinant of individuals' earnings profiles in a workplace with 
union representation 50. A finding that verifies my discussion above on the role of 
trade unions on the remuneration policies adopted by the management and their 
positive attitude towards the standardization of wages and seniority policies. On the 
other hand, total labour market experience appears to have a contribution of similar 
magnitude on both sectors. Occupational experience, although, is appreciated and 
rewarded in both sectors, the magnitude of its effect on wages differs between them, 
with the non-union sector being more appreciative to it. The derived returns to ten 
years of occupational expertise in the, more competitive and less structured, non-
union sector are more than triple in size compared to the well protected working 
environment of a union job. Finally, the results suggest that selectivity is significant 
only in the non-union sector. The positive sign of rho at the bottom of the table for 
the non-union sector simply indicates that the factors, which have a positive effect 
50 The selectivity-corrected model presented here does not consider the fact that employer-tenure 
may be endogenously determined in the union -status probit model. This may cast some doubt on the 
reliability of the estimated tenure effect in the former model. However, a performed Hausman test on 
the exogeneity of tenure in a wage equation model (as the one presented in Table 4.!) on the whole 
sample of male employees and separately on the union and non-union sub-samples, based on the AS 
instruments, is in favour of the OLS estimator (estimates not included here). Therefore, although the 
duration of the current employment appears to be simultaneously determined with the union-status, 
it behaves as an exogenous explanatory variable in the wage determination process, both in the 
Llnion and non-union sector. This finding may reinforce our confidence on the derived estimall's on 
seniority. 
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on the individual's earnings in the non-union sector also, raise the probability of 
being observed in this sector. 
The findings in Table 4.6 on the female employees are rather similar to those 
presented in the previous section, when using OLS. From the four variables of 
interest, representing seniority and accumulated skills in work, only total labour 
market experience and occupational experience are estimated to have a positive and 
significant effect. Their contribution appears to be higher in the non -union sector ~ 
however the difference is not as notable as it is for the male employees. Hence, based 
on the present results I cannot support any argument similar to the one discussed 
above for the male workers. Finally, there appears to be negative selectivity in the 
union sector, which implies that the individual and workplace characteristics that 
raise wages have an inverse effect on the probability of observing this individual in 
a union job. 
The discussion presented here sheds some light to the different earmngs paths 
followed in the union and non-union sector. At least for the male workers, the 
results strongly suggest that seniority plays an important role in the earnings 
profiles of those working in a workplace with union representation. On the 
contrary, in the more competitive and meritocratic environment of a non-union job, 
individuals appear to be rewarded for their true productivity and expertise. In the 
next session, I explore whether this phenomenon has to do merely with the presence 
of a trade union or with the existence of formal wage scale policies in that sector 
and what happens if no such policies are adopted in the union sector. 
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4.3 Pay-Rise Policies and Human Capital Wage Premia 
My findings in Section 4.2 imply the presence of distinct seniority-wages profiles 
between the union and non-union sector. Here, I attempt to provide a better 
understanding of the underlining mechanism in the unionised workplaces that 
drives these strong seniority-earnings ties. Trade unions are traditionally associated 
with the standardisation of pay-setting procedures and the adaptation of seniority 
rules in the workplace. In the previous section I examine whether union wage 
differentials increase with seniority without though making any distinction about 
the presence of pay-rise rules. The observed, at least for the male employees, steeper 
seniority profiles may universally be true for the whole covered sector, as the 
findings above suggest or, they may actually be driven by formal objective rules 
related to pay-setting that unions through bargaining enforce in the workplace. If 
the latter is true, then what happens in those establishments with union 
representation but no formal seniority policies? Are senior workers less protected in 
this case? These are the issues that I address in this section and attempt to shed some 
light on. 
There are two candidate questions from BHPS that can help us identify workplaces 
where formal wage policies are adopted. Individuals are asked whether seniority 
wage scales exist in the current job5!. In addition, there is another question, more 
general though, on the promotion opportunities in their current job52 . The author is 
in favour of the former because it appears to be more directly linked to wages than 
the latter which is broader in the sense that it may refer to aspects of work not , 
51 The question addressed is: "Some people can normll11y expect their Fly to rL\'e evelJ' ye!1r by 
movins to the next point on the SCdJe, as weJJ as recdvJ!lg ne,gotiated 17:1)' n'ses, Are you p:lld on this 
(vpe o{incn'ment,,1 scale!'. 
52" In your current job do )'llll 11./1'(' opportunities for promotion?', 
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related to earnings such as the job description, responsibilities and work conditions. 
From the 2834 male workers who reported that they have opportunities for 
promotion, only 1485 were expecting a pay-rise next year. Similarly, no more than 
1221 from the 1772 female employees with promotion prospects in their current 
job responded that every year they were anticipating a wage increase. Therefore, I 
base my analysis on the information that individuals provide in BHPS concerning 
the existence of formal wage scale policies. 
At the first part of this section, I present estimates on wage equations, similar to the 
ones in the previous section53, where I divide and examine separately the workers 
depending on the existence of incremental wage scale policies in their current job. 
Table 4.7 summarises the estimated effects in jobs with pay-rise and no pay-rise for 
the male workers. Employer-tenure does not appear to have an important role here 
in these estimates. The only case where I derive a significant and positive effect is 
when pay-rise policies are adopted, based on the OLS estimator. Total labour market 
experience has a strong positive effect on both cases, workplaces with or without 
seniority policies, but its effect is marginally stronger in the latter case. Furthermore, 
industry experience appears to have a significant and positive contribution only 
when measured at the more detailed 2-digit level of industry classification and in 
workplaces with pay-rise rules. The evidence also suggests that the more 
competitive and transferable occupation-specific skills are highly rewarded in the 
less restricted and more flexible workplaces where no formal seniority-wage scales 
exist. Analogously, the estimates on the female employees in Table 4.8 suggest that 
industry experience has a more significant positive impact on wages in jobs with 
pay-rise policies. Occupational experience, antithetically, plays a far more 
53 The sample size marginally reduces for both male and female employees, due to missing 
information on the existence of wage scales in their current job. 
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important role in the more competitive environment of a workplace where wages 
are not governed by formal seniority policies. The findings overall imply that there 
are obvious similarities between the earnings profiles in a union job and in a job 
with seniority-wage scales. I continue my analysis towards that direction and I first 
explore which are the individual and job characteristics that determine the 
existence of scale coverage in a workplace. 
The probit estimates of the determinants of scales coverage are given in Tables 4.9 
and 4.10 for the male and female workers, respectively. The two main findings that 
stand out from Table 4.9 are the strong union effect and the role of firm size in the 
adoption of wage scale policies. Workplaces with trade unions present are more 
likely to have seniority wage scale rules. According to the estimated marginal effect 
of union job, union representation increases the probability of adopting a seniority-
wage rule by 20 per cent, a rather significant effect. The 'discriminating monopoly 
view, discussed above, provides the theoretical reasoning why trade unions may 
relate wages to seniority through formal scales. It worthies noting that in these 
estimated models I consider only the presence of a trade union in the workplace and 
not the individual membership. In an alternative specification (results not presented 
here) I include union membership in the regressors vector. The interesting result 
that comes out of this model is that whether an individual is a member of a trade 
union or not does not appear to have any notable effect on the probability of getting 
a pay-rise next year. What this finding really implies is that adopted seniority-
earnings policies, probably as the outcome of a bargaining process between the 
management and union representatives, apply to all covered workers in the 
establishment, regardless of their membership status. More explicitly, wage 
incremental policies are public goods, not excludable to workers who did not join 
the trade union. Antithetically, when I estimate a similar probit model on the 
probability of getting a prl1motion the following year (the other candidate variable, 
available in BHPS) I find that union membership increases significantly the chances 
of being promoted (estimates excluded from the analysis). The estimated positive 
and significant effect of union membership in the latter model clearly suggests that 
promotions when negotiated by a trade union are more of a private good, available 
mainly to union members. This is a quite interesting finding which in a way 
provides further support and reasoning to my initial choice of pay-rise policies 
instead of promotions as proxies of pecuniary future prospects of individuals; 
current employment. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, recent studies provide 
evidence of the 'free-rider' phenomenon in unionised workplaces. Therefore since 
the improvement of wages is normally a collective good available to all workers in 
the union sector, we would expect that individuals could benefit from policies 
related to their wages without necessarily having to join a trade union. And, that is 
exactly what I find from these estimated probit models. 
Continuing now to the remaining of Table 4.9, we observe that as the size of the 
workplace increases, so does the probability of implementing a formal wage policy. 
This is something that one should expect, since seniority wage scale is likely to 
emerge as an alternative to individual performance related or merit pay in work-
environments where productivity and output are difficult to monitor. This is 
especially true for firms with many employees, where due to the large scales of 
production it is inherently hard to measure productivity. Individuals who are 
already employed in a job, which requires substantial total labour market 
experience or industry experience, have a higher probability of operating under a 
pay-rise policy, conlpared with other colleagues. Occupational expertise, on the 
other hand, has a positive effect on wage scale rules, especially at the early stages of 
skills-accnnlulation (this is true only at the 1-digit level of occupation classification 
though). Finally, workers in Agriculture, Energy and J\·1:111Uf:lL'tlire of J\fct:ils, 
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Mineral Products and Chemicals and Other Services industries are significantly 
more likely to be covered by wage scales. 
The estimates from Table 4.10 on the female employees are on average quite similar 
to those on their male peers. Once again there is a strong positive union impact with 
a marginal effect of 28 per cent, and a positive relationship between firm size and 
the probability of wage scales, although the estimated marginal effects do not 
increase monotonically with the number of employees. Compared with the male 
estimates, we observe that there are some interesting occupational effects. 
Individuals in Professional or Associate Professional and Technical occupations are 
more likely to be covered by seniority-wages rules, compared with the Managers 
and Administrators, whereas those in Personal and Protective Services and Sales 
occupations are less likely to be covered by similar pay mechanisms. 
Following Booth and Frank's (1996) analysis I re-estimate the pay-rise probit model, 
this time making a distinction between the union and non-union sector (estimates 
not included in the chapter). While Booth and Frank suggest that, in non-union 
jobs, scales do not affect earnings and the variables in their data set do not explain 
the existence of wage scales, my findings between the two sectors have some 
similarities. Many of the individual and job characteristics that playa significant 
role in union jobs appear to do so also in workplaces with no trade unions present. 
Therefore I cannot really distinguish any different pattern towards the 
implementation of wage policies in these two sectors. 
Two main conclusions are drawn from the analysis so far. Seniority earmngs 
profiles are quite distinct between jobs with wage scales policies and those with no 
such formal earnings rules. In addition, unionism has a strong positive effect on the 
probability of adopting a scale rule in the workplace. In the final part of this secti('ln, 
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I investigate the earnings equations in the union and non-union sector, where I 
control for the existence of formal wage policies in these environments. The 
question I aim to answer here is whether the formal seniority policies, which are 
more likely to be adopted in a unionised workplace, are the reason behind the 
steeper seniority-earnings profiles we observe in the union sector. An issue of 
concern that arises from the estimates presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, as well as 
from the estimates presented below is the selectivity issue. The findings from the 
probit models on the existence of wage scales outlined the importance of various 
individual and workplace features on the adoption of such policies. The problem 
that the researcher faces in these cases is the selection of the appropriate controls 
that could serve for the identification of the selectivity variables in the earnings 
equations. In other words, we need to find some variables that influence the 
occurrence of a wage scale policy, but are not expected to have any direct impact on 
the wage determination process. Theodossiou (1996) suggests various controls on 
employees' social background and the employers' or employees' attitudes and 
characteristics, which can be included in the probit equation for the identification 
purpose. I explored this path, by examining various variables that optimally could 
serve this identification purpose, such as training provided by the employers and the 
presence of a second job. However, data limitations prevent me from finding such 
appropriate controls. Therefore, in the estimated earnings models presented below I 
do not correct for potential selectivity bias. Another possible source of sample 
selection is the fact that individual are not randomly assigned in union or non-
union jobs. Following the analysis presented in Section 4.2.2, I similarly control for 
this union-driven sample selection bias in the discussion below. 
Optimally, this selectivity correction may capture some of the possible former 
selection bias, since union jobs are more likely to implement a formal wage scale 
policy. In a way, when I identify the union selectivity variables in the estimated 
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wage equation model, I may be incidentally doing so for the wage policy selectivity 
as well. The reason is that, as the union and wage scale probit models suggest, the 
individual and workplace characteristics that determine whether we observe a 
worker in a union job or not, are broadly the same that influence the allocation of 
the individual in a job with seniority scales or not. In what follows, I estimate a 
wage equation model on four sub-samples depending on whether there is union 
representation and formal wage scale policies in the workplace, separately for the 
male and female employees. I acknowledge the fact that I cannot 'enfjreiy control 
the pay-rise selectivity issue and probably we should bear that in mind when 
investigating the findings presented below. However, when we make comparisons 
within the unionised sector between workplaces with and without formal seniority-
wage rules, the selectivity issue probably is not very important. My intuition is that 
the individual characteristics and workplace features that determine the adoption of 
such rules in an establishment are likely to be present in both union sub-samples. 
After all, unionism, and consequently the determinants of union representation in a 
workplace, is one of the main explanatory variables in the estimated pay-rise probit 
model. The pay-rise selectivity issue may be more serious when we make 
comparisons between the union and non-union sector, where their main sample 
characteristics are likely to differ. If we control though for union-status sample 
selection we control for the differences in the two sub-samples (union and non-
union). The differences that are also likely to influence the adoption of a formal 
wage rule in a workplace. Hence even in the case where we make comparisons 
between the two sectors it is not clear to the author how 'corruptive this potential 
pay- rise sample selection may eventually be. 
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 summarise the mam findings from the estimated earnings 
models. The first half of these tables corresponds to jobs with pay-rise policies and 
the other half to jobs with no such formal policy. Similarly, the first two c()lumns 
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refer to union jobs (I-digit and 2-digit of industry and occupation classification, 
respectively) while the other two to non-union ones. I present the derived ten-year 
effect of these four seniority and human capital variables of interest (with the 
standard errors in parentheses). Starting the discussion on the male workers, we 
observe some rather interesting patterns in the individuals' wage profiles. Employer-
tenure is estimated to have a positive and significant effect of around 6 per cent 
(ten-year effect) on wages only for employees in workplaces with union 
representation and formal pay-rise policies (the most restricted workplace of all 
possible four). Antithetically, occupational expertise is appreciated only in the non-
union sector, especially when no seniority rules are adopted (the least structured 
working environment). In addition, total labour market experience has a similar 
positive effect of around 15 per cent (ten-year effect) in both these two types of 
workplaces. These findings clearly provide support to the two propositions set 
earlier in the chapter. What we observe here is that while firm seniority and 
specificity are important in the most structured and well-protected and secure 
environments, occupational expertise and the more competitive kind of skills playa 
major role in the less restricted and more demanding workplaces. Generally though 
in the union sector, it is seniority, measured either by tenure or labour market 
experience, which has an important role in the wage determination process. Total 
labour market experience, although significant in both 'types of union jobs, it 
appears to playa more important role when no formal policies are adopted. The 
absence of formal wage rules does not mean that informal, unwritten rules do not 
exist in these workplaces. In fact, it is quite likely that even in these union jobs 
employers follow some kind of seniority rule concerning employment and wages. In 
jobs with no collective representation, apart from occupational expertise, labour 
market experience appears to have an important role on wages. It is interesting 
though to notice that the returns to labour market experience double in size (ten-
year effect) when seniority scales are applied, an indication that seniority in general 
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is quite important when wage scales are adopted. Overall, the findings suggest that 
there are different earnings profiles depending on seniority scales and union 
representation. Especially though within the non-union sector the diversity is more 
obvious, probably because in union jobs even if formal wage policies do not exist, 
some kind of unwritten seniority rules should govern employers' decisions. 
The estimates from Table 4.12 on the female employees, as previously in the 
chapter, do not provide a clear picture and are not as informative as similar 
estimates on male workers are. According to the findings, almost universally total 
labour market experience and occupational expertise are the variables, out of the 
four variables for accumulated human capital in work, that have an important role 
in the estimated wage equation models. General labour market experience, although 
significant in most cases, appears to be more appreciated in the non-union sector 
and especially when pay-rise policies are employed. Occupational expertise, on the 
other hand, has the highest estimated contribution in the union sector with no 
formal pay-setting procedures. Despite these observed differences though, I cannot 
identify any distinct pattern. The findings are not so insightful and do not provide 
sufficient evidence for my two propositions. 
The main conclusion that I can draw from this discussion concerns only the male 
employees. The findings here imply that the existence of formal wage scales and 
union representation in a workplace has a significant intluence on the seniority and 
human-capital earnings profiles. More specifically, seniority appears to be quite 
important in workplaces with formal wage scale policies both in the union and non-
union sector. Furthermore, the estimates suggest that unionised jobs appreciate and 
reward seniority even when no pay-rise rules are adopted. A possible rationale is 
that in jobs with union representation even if no such formal policies exist, there 
probably are some unwritten seniority rules that govern employment and earnings 
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determination. Non-union jobs with no incremental wage scales, on the other hand, 
are more responsive to workers' skills, expertise and true productivity. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explore how institutional arrangements influence employees' 
wages. Particularly, the focus of this examination is to distinguish the different paths 
seniority-earnings profiles follow depending on whether the individual is employed 
in a workplace where trade unions and collective bargaining are present and/or 
where formal wage scale rules are adopted. Trade unions are traditionally 
associated with the standardisation of pay-setting procedures, the enforcement of 
objectives rules concerning promotions and wages in the workplace and are 
generally hostile to Performance-Related Pay and individual merit schemes. Within 
this framework, I set two propositions related to seniority profiles and union 
representation. In particular, I argue that in the union sector it is expected that job 
seniority and skills specificity will be an important determinant of wages, while in 
the less structured non-union sector true productivity, proxied by the more 
competitive accumulated skills and professional expertise, will have a key role on 
earnings profiles. Indeed my analysis on male employees verifies both propositions. 
Estimating separate earnings equations for the union and non-union sector raises a 
selectivity issue of concern. Individuals are not randomly assigned in either sector, 
but it is rather the outcome of systematic decisions made by both the employer and 
the employees. Hence, the two observed sub-samples, the union and non-union 
sector, may be characterised by different individual and workplace features. 
Effectively then, the estimated differences in the wage equations between the two 
sectors may after all be the result of the likely heterogeneity in the two samples, 
rather than genuine distinct patterns in the earnings profiles. In other w()rds, the 
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endogeneity of unIon status can lead to inconsistently estimated returns to 
employer-tenure and the other human capital variables of interest. The issue of 
selectivity is therefore an important issue of concern and is specifically addressed in 
this chapter by employing the Heckman correction technique. In particular, my 
preferred wage equation estimator is the one based on the Heckman maximum 
likelihood estimator, which allows us to control for potential selection bias. The 
derived results from this estimator, summarised in Tables 4.5 & 4.11, provide some 
rather interesting insights. Overall, it appears that senior workers, compared to 
their junior colleagues, are better off when covered by formal incremental scales, 
since seniority wage profiles are estimated to be steeper in these jobs. Furthermore, 
as the results suggest, formal wage rules are more likely to be adopted in workplaces 
with union representation. A theory that provides a rationale for this finding is the 
discriminating monopoly view discussed earlier in the chapter. In this framework, a 
multi-part pricing policy that takes the form of seniority wages is adopted in order 
to achieve greater total income for the trade union (monopolist) and reduce 
turnover and quits of the more valued, senior workers from the employer's point of 
view, in working environments where true productivity is difficult to measure. 
Nevertheless, there are indications that seniority plays a significant role even in 
union jobs with no such scales rules. One possible explanation, in the same spirit of 
this discussion, is that unwritten policies, which actually serve the same purposes as 
formal rules, are quite likely to be adopted in these union jobs. Occupational 
expertise, on the other hand, is highly rewarded in less restricted or structured 
environments, where individual productivity can be measured. The analysis implies 
that in jobs with no formal incremental scales, and especially in the non-union 
sector, employees' wages are determined by their competitive accumulated, 
occupational-specific skills rather than their seniority. In conclusion, workplaces 
with union representation and formal seniority earnings policies ":nrtJur :llui 
protecf their senior employees, while the more competitive non-union sector jobs 
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are fairer in the sense that they reward the workers based on their true 
qualifications and output productivity. The evidence on female employees, on the 
other hand, is not conclusive and does not provide sufficient support to my two 
arguments. Nevertheless, I believe that the discussion here generates some 
interesting findings concerning workers earnings profiles and unionism in the 
British labour market of the 1990s. Trade unions, in this era of declining 
membership and representation power, still ensure either through formal policies, 
or unwritten rules a structured and well-protected environment for all covered 
workers. 
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Chapter 4: Tables 
Table 4.1 
Wage Equations & Unionism (Male EmEloyees) 
OLS GLS(I) GLS(II) FE 0) FE (II) 
I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt 
Union 
TI0 .038 .038 .052 .047 .032 .028 .065 .057 .011 .003 (.022) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.025) (.026) (.025) (.025) (.039) (.039) 
Expl0 .189 .202 .209 .218 .209 .218 (.022) (.022) (.031 ) (.030) (.031 ) (.030) 
IndtO .003 -.005 .004 .028 -.002 .014 .015 .044 -.004 .020 (.023) (.021) (.021 ) (.018) (.022) (.018) (.023) (.019) (.024) (.020) 
OcctO .045 .039 .050 .033 .042 .028 .035 .022 .021 .014 (.021) (.020) (.018) (.017) (.018) (.017) (.019) (.018) (.020) (.018) 
Adj. RZ .548 .547 .501 .498 .502 .500 .243 .243 .228 .228 
SamEle 2964 
Non-Union 
TtO .033 .016 -.003 -.001 .015 .009 -.011 -.002 .040 .040 (.033) (.033) (.030) (.030) (.036) (.036) (.035) (.035) (.067) (.067) 
ExptO .184 .201 .279 .300 .215 .232 (.033) (.031) (.041 ) (.039) (.041 ) (.040) 
IndtO .004 .060 .039 .041 .056 .056 .036 .029 .050 .043 (.031) (.029) (.027) (.022) (.027) (.023) (.028) (.023) (.029) (.024) 
OcctO .166 .124 .119 .074 .118 .087 .086 .042 .066 .049 (.030) (.029) (.025) (.024) (.026) (.024) (.026) (.024) (.028) (.025) 
Adj. RZ .551 .550 .484 .487 .494 .496 .276 .267 .224 0. 218 
SamEle 2063 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, 
industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour market 
experience, age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
In panel estimators (I), the observation unit is the individual. In panel estimators (II), the 
observation unit is the individual working for a particular employer. R2 is defined as the within for 
the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
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Table 4.2 
Wage Equations & Unionism (Female EmEloyees) 
OLS GLS(I) GLS(II) FE (I) FE (II) 
I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt 
Union 
TI0 .013 .016 -.036 -.037 -.007 -.004 -.060 -.059 .003 .010 (.026) (.026) (.025) (.025) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.030) (.058) (.058) 
Expl0 .073 .112 .165 .179 .138 .166 (.028) (.025) (.037) (.033) (.037) (.033) 
IndIO .028 .025 .022 .016 .032 .013 .044 .014 .051 .001 (.028) (.025) (.027) (.023) (.028) (.023) (.031) (.025) (.032) (.025) 
Occl0 .149 .101 .060 .063 .058 .054 .032 .046 .030 .036 (.024) (.023) (.021) (.019) (.021) (.019) (.023) (.020) (.023) (.020) 
Adj. R2 .595 .589 .562 .557 .565 .559 .348 .347 .297 .296 
SamEle 2149 
Non-Union 
TI0 -.075 -.062 -.009 -.015 -.038 -.042 .011 -.003 .033 .022 (.041 ) (.042) (.036) (.037) (.045) (.045) (.041 ) (.042) (.077) (.077) 
ExpIO .106 .151 .141 .150 .132 .144 (.042) (.037) (.049) (.046) (.049) (.046) 
IndIO .029 .053 -.015 .034 -.001 .037 -.034 .026 -.023 .024 (.042) (.037) (.031) (.026) (.032) (.026) (.033) (.026) (.034) (.027) 
OccIO .191 .101 .091 .038 .093 .026 .048 .010 .046 -.006 (.039) (.036) (.030) (.024) (.031 ) (.024) (.031 ) (.025) (.032) (.025) 
Adj. R2 .538 .535 .474 .467 .484 .476 .292 .290 .269 .267 
SamEle 1438 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, 
industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour market 
experience, age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
In panel estimators (I), the observation unit is the individual. In panel estimators (II), the 
observation unit is the individual working for a particular employer. RZ is defined as the within for 
the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
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(Table 4.3 continued). 
Non-Manual .185 2.85 .183 2.82 
Pnng .042 0.58 .046 0.63 
Qualifications 
High -Degree .082 1.42 .089 1.57 
First-Degree -.030 -0.67 -.031 -0.70 
Teaching Qual. .090 1.34 .093 1.39 
Higher Qual. .043 1.50 .045 1.60 
Nursing Qual. .118 0.77 .137 0.89 
A-Level .117 3.74 .118 3.78 
O-Level .030 1.06 .034 1.21 
Commql -.086 -0.67 -.100 -0.78 
CSE -.010 -0.25 -.009 -0.21 
Apprent -.087 -1.68 -.091 -1.79 
Other Qual. .164 1.91 .168 1.97 
Time Trend 
Wave -.021 -5.45 -.021 -5.4 7 
Pseudo RZ .290 .291 
Sample 5027 
Notes: Derived marginal effects. 
Table 4.4 
Union Status Probit Model (Female Employees) 
t-digit 2-digit 
dF/dx z-stat. dF/dx z-stat. 
Human Capital 
Ten/tO .226 2.16 .242 2.28 
(Ten/tO)Z -.095 -0.99 -.140 -1.45 
(Ten/tO)3 .008 0.35 .017 0.72 
Exp .012 2.28 .008 1.67 
Expz -1.74e-04 -1.32 -1.46e-04 -1.24 
IndExp .016 1.78 .015 1.78 
IndExpz -.001 -1.70 -3.73e-04 -0.54 
IndExp3 3.22e-05 2.47 7.68e-06 0.53 
Occexp -.011 -1.43 -.010 -1.09 
Occexpz 4.25e-04 0.72 -5.68e-05 -0.08 
Occexp3 -1.15e-05 -0.97 1.35e-05 0.79 
Leave .017 3.71 .013 2.93 
Region 
London -.044 -1.33 -.044 -1.33 
North .138 5.48 .136 5.40 
Midlands .063 2.24 .062 2.21 
Wales .126 2.81 .139 3.09 
Scotland .133 3.91 .128 3.75 
Political Beliefs 
Conservative .025 0.98 .027 1.06 
Labour .093 4.08 .100 4.37 
Liberal Dem. .105 3.18 .104 3.15 
Industry Sector 
SIC 2 -.429 -4.37 -.435 -4.46 
SIC 3 -.514 -6.37 -.4 78 -5.80 
SIC 4 -.484 -5.79 -.465 -5.56 
SIC 5 -.386 -2.53 -.373 -2.·Q 
SIC 6 -.398 -4.95 -.3(;2 -4.4 ~) 
SIC 7 -.025 -0.28 -.OO~) 0.10 
SIC 8 -.350 -4.35 -.325 -4.04 
(Table 4.4 continued). 
SIC 9 .086 1.13 .103 1.36 
Firm Size (ascending) 
Firm Size 2 .146 1.43 .139 1.37 
Firm Size 3 .024 0.81 .026 0.88 
Firm Size 4 .101 3.42 .097 3.31 
Firm Size 5 .187 6.23 .184 6.16 
Firm Size 6 .193 6.86 .191 6.76 
Firm Size 7 .297 9.54 .294 9.35 
Firm Size 8 .379 13.77 .376 13.59 
Occupation 
SOC 2 .109 2.44 .080 1.79 
SOC 3 -.043 -0.87 -.085 -1.73 
SOC 4 .001 0.02 -.101 -1.99 
SOC 5 .233 2.89 .181 2.11 
SOC 6 -.003 -0.05 -.050 -0.86 
SOC 7 -.076 -1.09 -.101 -1.43 
socs -.003 -0.04 -.044 -0.50 
SOC 9 .210 2.39 .194 2.19 
Skills 
Semi -Skilled .240 2.48 .227 2.33 
High -Skilled .236 2.16 .224 2.04 
Foreman .050 0.41 .048 0.40 
Non-Manual .199 1.82 .185 1.71 
Prmg -.018 -0.16 -.042 -0.37 
Qualifications 
High -Degree .176 2.38 .155 2.08 
First-Degree .174 3.52 .134 2.68 
Teaching Qual. .232 4.31 .187 3.31 
Higher Qual. .184 5.00 .146 3.94 
Nursing Qual. .172 2.94 .132 2.20 
A-Level .247 6.64 .231 6.14 
O-Level .204 6.22 .170 5.19 
Commql .157 3.61 .127 2.88 
CSE .293 5.92 .270 5.16 
Apprent .251 1.79 .242 1.69 
Other Qual. -.013 -0.12 -.067 -0.57 
Time Trend 
Wave -.011 -2.37 -.011 -2.29 
Pseudo RZ .307 .304 
Sample 3587 
Notes: Derived marginal effects. 
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Table 4.5 
Wages Equation Corrected for Selectivity (Male Employees) 
Union Non-Union 
I-d~ 2-d~ I-d~ 2-d~ 
TI0 .040 .040 -.025 -.051 
(.023) (.024) (.035) (.036) 
Expl0 .189 .202 .188 .205 
(.022) (.022) (.034) (.032) 
IndIO .004 -.004 -.011 .053 
(.023) (.021) (.032) (.030) 
Occl0 .045 .039 .163 .114 
(.021) (.020) (.031) (.030) 
rho .025 .035 .561 .613 
(.131) (.130) (.069) (.059) 
LR-test (XZ) 0.03 0.07 17.83 22.07 
Log Likelihood -2991.271 -2990.264 -3265.642 -3261.547 
Sample 2964 2063 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in 
employer-tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd order 
polynomial in potential labour market experience, age left education, a time 
trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment 
size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
Table 4.6 
Wages Equation Corrected for Selectivity (Female Employees) 
Union Non-Union 
I-d~ 2-d~ I-d~ 
TI0 -.011 -7.95e-04 -.089 
(.026) (.027) (.041) 
.058 .102 .093 
(.028) (.025) (.042) 
Expl0 
IndIO .016 .007 .022 
(.028) (.026) (.041) 
Occl0 .163 .114 .198 
(.025) (.023) (.038) 
rho -.481 -.407 .206 
(.087) (.116) (.140) 
LR-test (XZ) 8.93 4.81 1.50 
Log Likelihood -1848.061 -1875.004 -2187.664 
2-d~ 
-.068 
(.042) 
.147 
(.037) 
.048 
(.038) 
.105 
(.036) 
.103 
(.206) 
0.16 
-2202.4 76 
Sample 2149 1438 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in 
employer-tenure, industry and occupational experience and 2nd order 
polynomial in potential labour market experience, age left education, a time 
trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and occupation, establishment 
size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
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Table 4.7 
Wa8e Eguations & Seniority Scales (Male EmEloyees) 
OLS GLS(I) GLS(II) FE (I) FE (II) 
l-dgt 2-dgt l-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt l-dgt 2-dgt 
Pay-Rise 
TIO .074 .070 .045 .030 .039 .027 .028 .013 -.018 -.021 (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.030) (.030) (.032) (.032) (.052) (.052) 
ExplO .175 .189 .224 .227 .207 .211 (.026) (.025) (.033) (.032) (.034) (.033) 
IndIO .017 .048 .015 .053 .011 .048 .019 .050 .002 .033 (.028) (.026) (.026) (.022) (.026) (.022) (.030) (.024) (.031) (.025) 
OcelO .040 .011 .055 .047 .044 .038 .061 .060 .039 .041 (.025) (.025) (.022) (.021) (.022) (.021) (.024) (.023) (.025) (.024) 
Adj. R2 .542 .541 .507 .504 .510 .508 .248 .251 .227 .229 
SamEle 2233 
No Pay-Rise 
TIO .003 -.003 .018 .019 .010 .011 .044 .049 .027 .030 (.026) (.027) (.025) (.026) (.029) (.029) (.030) (.030) (.054) (.054) 
ExplO .199 .215 .238 .262 .214 .236 (.027) (.026) (.035) (.033) (.035) (.034) 
IndIO .016 .021 .023 .024 .034 .033 .033 .019 .028 .027 (.026) (.023) (.022) (.019) (.023) (.019) (.024) (.020) (.025) (.020) 
OcelO .121 .094 .095 .055 .093 .057 .051 .013 .031 .006 (.024) (.023) (.021) (.019) (.021) (.020) (.022) (.020) (.023) (.021 ) 
Adj. R2 .540 .539 .492 .491 .501 .500 .222 .218 .185 .183 
SamEle 2780 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, 
industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour market 
experience, age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
In panel estimators (I), the observation unit is the individual. In panel estimators (11), the 
observation unit is the individual working for a particular employer. R~ is defined as the within for 
the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
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Table 4.8 
Wage Eguations & Seniority Scales (Female EmEloyees) 
OLS GLS(I) GLS(II) FE (I) FE (II) 
l-dgt 2-dgt l-dgt 2-dgt l-dgt 2-dgt l-dgt 2-dgt l-dgt 2-dgt 
Pay-Rise 
TIO .022 .028 -.004 -.012 -.019 .016 -.037 -.044 .030 .015 (.026) (.027) (.025) (.026) (.031) (.031 ) (.031 ) (.031) (.057) (.057) 
ExpIO .120 .148 .171 .186 .153 .174 (.029) (.026) (.037) (.034) (.037) (.034) 
IndIO .090 .055 .087 .086 .097 .076 .069 .066 .069 .048 (.031) (.027) (.028) (,023) (.029) (.023) (.032) (.025) (.035) (.026) 
OcclO .114 .059 .046 .039 .036 .023 .032 .029 .013 .009 (.026) (.024) (.022) (.019) (.023) (.019) (.024) (.020) (.026) (.021 ) 
Adj. R2 .582 .578 .557 .552 .560 .556 .354 .356 .307 .309 
SamEle 2066 
No Pay-Rise 
TIO -.073 -.047 -.043 -.034 -.040 -.028 -.044 -.039 -.005 .012 (.042) (.043) (.036) (.036) (.042) (.042) (.043) (.043) (.083) (.084) 
ExplO .103 .141 .193 .198 .182 .191 (.039) (.036) (.048) (.045) (.048) (.045) 
IndIO .044 .055 -.023 -.011 -.010 -.005 -.043 -.027 -.024 -.021 (.038) (.035) (.030) (.026) (.030) (.026) (.032) (.026) (.033) (.027) 
OcclO .217 .120 .113 .057 .114 .047 .067 .030 .071 .018 (.037) (.034) (.029) (.025) (.029) (.024) (.031 ) (.026) (.031) (.025) 
Adj. R2 .547 .540 .499 .489 .502 .492 .269 .263 .250 .243 
SamE Ie 1510 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, 
industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour market 
experience, age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
In panel estimators (I), the observation unit is the individual. In panel estimators (II), the 
observation unit is the individual working for a particular employer. RZ is defined as the within for 
the fixed-effects model and overall for the random-effects model. 
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Table 4.9 
Pay-rise Probit Model (Male Employees) 
I-digit 2-digit 
dF/dx z-stat. dF/dx z-stat. 
Trade Unions 
Union .201 11.29 .201 11.27 
Human Capital 
Ten/IO .033 0.51 .068 1.05 
(Ten/IO)2 -.014 -0.29 -.042 -0.88 
(Ten/IO)3 .002 0.24 .008 0.83 
Exp -.012 -3.19 -.011 -3.20 
EXp2 1.45e-04 1.89 1.37e-04 1.85 
IndExp -.017 -2.89 -.020 -3.52 
IndExp2 .001 3.66 .001 3.53 
IndExp3 2.61e-05 -3.87 -2.5ge-05 -3.38 
Occexp .012 2.22 .007 1.22 
Occexp2 -9.12e-04 -2.44 -3.67e-04 -.092 
Occexp3 1.56e-05 2.31 4.80e-06 0.64 
Leave -.007 -1.89 -.006 -1.67 
Region 
London -.012 -0.40 -.007 -0.26 
North -.074 -3.59 -.079 -3.83 
Midlands -.068 -3.20 -.068 -3.24 
Wales -.057 -1.51 -.062 -1.65 
Scotland -.034 -1.13 -.038 -1.24 
Industry Sector 
SIC 2 -.099 -2.17 -.099 -2.17 
SIC 3 -.203 -5.52 -.201 -5.48 
SIC 4 -.144 -3.77 -.140 -3.68 
SIC 5 -.073 -1.57 -.077 -1.67 
SIC 6 -.122 -3.02 -.128 -3.15 
SIC 7 -.171 -4.32 -.174 -4.40 
SIC 8 -.192 -4.83 -.197 -4.98 
SIC 9 .049 1.28 .047 1.24 
Firm Size (ascending) 
Firm Size 2 .043 0.51 .042 0.49 
Firm Size 3 .031 1.15 .029 1.09 
Firm Size 4 .077 2.88 .078 2.92 
Firm Size 5 .071 2.60 .070 2.57 
Firm Size 6 .116 4.57 .117 4.59 
Firm Size 7 .148 4.91 .151 5.01 
Firm Size 8 .183 6.27 .183 6.28 
Occupation 
SOC 2 .174 5.47 .158 4.93 
SOC 3 .064 1.66 .052 1.34 
SOC 4 .005 0.12 -.015 -0.33 
SOC 5 -.055 -1.05 -.072 -1.39 
SOC 6 .003 0.07 -.006 -0.13 
SOC 7 -.005 -0.10 -.018 -0.3G 
SOC 8 -.053 -1.02 -.074 -1.45 
SOC 9 .037 0.60 .021 0.34 
SJal1s 
Semi -Skilled .079 1.38 .089 1.55 
High-Skilled .080 1.28 .078 
1.24 
Foreman .077 1.24 .07G 
1.23 
Non-Manual .135 2.10 .137 
2.15 
Prmg .043 0.62 .048 
('l.69 
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(Table 4.9 continued). 
Qualifications 
High -Degree -.186 -3.52 
-.201 
-3.84 
First-Degree -.062 -1.53 -.070 
-1.72 
Teaching Qual. .006 0.10 .012 0.20 
Higher Qual. -.026 -0.97 
-.029 -1.07 
Nursing Qual. .101 0.69 .120 0.82 
A-Level -.021 -0.68 -.026 -0.83 
O-Level -.048 -1.78 -.049 -1.79 
Commql -.025 -0.23 -.028 -0.25 
CSE -.155 -4.15 -.154 -4.13 
Apprent .066 1.29 .063 1.24 
Other Qual. .045 0.56 .047 0.59 
Time Trend 
Wave -.021 -5.94 -.020 -5.70 
Pseudo R2 .133 .132 
Sample 5013 
Notes: Derived marginal effects. 
Table 4.10 
Pay-rise Probit Model (Female Employees) 
I-digit 2-digit 
dF/dx z-stat. dF/dx z-stat. 
Trade Unions 
Union .277 12.68 .278 12.77 
Human Capital 
Ten/IO -.081 -0.79 -.051 -0.48 
(Ten/IO)2 -.021 -0.23 -.051 -0.53 
(Ten/IO)3 .010 0.42 .017 0.73 
Exp -.001 -0.24 -.004 -0.75 
EXp2 1.72e-05 0.13 7.13e-05 0.62 
IndExp -.004 -0.46 -.015 -1.79 
IndExp2 2.60e-04 0.52 .001 1.95 
IndExp3 -5.77e-06 -0.62 -2.70e-05 -1.96 
Occexp -.024 -3.07 -.014 -1.63 
Occexp2 .001 2.50 8.68e-04 1.24 
Occexp3 -2.2ge-05 -2.10 -1.84e-05 -1.20 
Leave -.003 -0.79 -.004 -0.96 
Region 
London -.015 -0.45 -.013 -0.42 
North .055 2.18 .052 2.07 
Midlands -.047 -1.64 -.047 -1.63 
Wales .002 0.04 -1.98e-04 0.00 
Scotland .023 .066 .024 0.70 
Industry Sector 
SIC 2 -.289 -2.87 -.294 -2.93 
SIC 3 -.325 -3.72 -.326 -3.72 
SIC 4 -.332 -3.81 -.341 -3.93 
SIC 5 -.198 -1.37 -.223 -1.55 
SIC 6 -.209 -2.4 7 -.216 -2. 5t) 
SIC 7 -.203 -2.15 -.195 -2.07 
SIC 8 -.124 -1.4 7 -.120 -1,42 
SIC 9 -.022 -0.27 -.024 -o.:~o 
Firm Size (ascending) 
Firm Size 2 .119 0.98 .111 0.91 
Firm Size 3 .092 3.14 .0~)5 3.27 
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( Table 4.10 con tin ued) . 
Firm Size 4 .140 4.72 
.140 4.72 
Firm Size 5 .017 0.52 .017 0.51 
Firm Size 6 .073 2.37 .072 2.32 
Firm Size 7 .065 1.68 .068 1.76 
Firm Size 8 .187 5.63 .190 5.72 
Occupation 
SOC 2 .102 2.31 .098 2.25 
SOC 3 .039 0.84 .035 0.78 
SOC 4 -.025 -0.48 
-.052 
-1.08 
SOC 5 .185 2.11 .184 2.10 
SOC 6 -.092 -1.62 -.102 
-1.83 
SOC 7 -.142 -2.10 -.151 
-2.26 
SOC 8 .127 1.54 .115 1.40 
SOC 9 -.038 -0.41 
-.053 
-0.58 
Skills 
Semi -Skilled .260 2.62 .253 2.55 
High -Skilled .279 2.55 .279 2.57 
Foreman .336 3.74 .333 3.72 
Non-Manual .599 6.12 .598 6.15 
Prmg .450 4.93 .448 4.94 
Qualifications 
High -Degree -.070 -0.88 -.083 -1.04 
First-Degree -.043 -0.79 -.048 -0.90 
Teaching Qual. .053 0.87 .052 0.84 
Higher Qual. .013 0.32 .013 0.33 
Nursing Qual. -.069 -1.08 -.077 -1.22 
A-Level .007 0.17 .010 0.23 
O-Level .012 0.33 .013 0.36 
Commql .071 1.55 .075 1.66 
CSE -.170 -2.20 -.173 -2.23 
Apprent -.016 -0.09 -.016 -0.09 
Other Qual. .046 0.43 .068 0.64 
Time Trend 
Wave -.004 -0.80 -.004 -0.84 
Pseudo R2 .202 .202 
Sample 3576 
Notes: Derived marginal effects. 
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Table 4.11 
Earnings, Unionism & Seniority Scales (Male Employees) 
Union Non -Union 
1-dgt 2 -dgt 1-dgt 2 -dgt 
Pay-Rise 
TI0 
Expl0 
IndIO 
Occl0 
rho 
LR test (X2) 
Log Likelihood 
Sample 
No Pay-Rise 
TI0 
Expl0 
IndIO 
Occl0 
rho 
.059 .064 .083 
(.029) (.030) (.064) 
.135 .157 .310 
(.029) (.028) (.063) 
-4.67e-04 .002 .050 
(.032) (.029) (.061 ) 
.033 .025 .137 
(.028) (.027) (.058) 
.127 .102 .725 
(.145) (.152) (.069) 
0.57 0.35 12.87 
-1180.436 -1193.836 -1032.258 
1670 563 
.004 .002 -.055 
(.035) (.036) (.042) 
.247 .249 .141 
(.036) (.035) (.041) 
.011 .001 -.029 
(.033) (.031) (.038) 
.020 .011 .169 
(.031) (,029) (.036) 
-.139 -.131 .511 
(.116) (.116) (.108) 
LR test (X2) 1.26 1.13 6.32 
Log Likelihood -1585.464 -1576.395 -2007.323 
Sample 1292 1488 
.045 
(.064) 
.290 
(.059) 
.143 
(.057) 
.073 
(.056) 
.726 
(.072) 
11.78 
-1033.139 
-.070 
(.042) 
.169 
(.039) 
.010 
(.035) 
.119 
(.036) 
.573 
(.089) 
8.49 
-2001.608 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, 
industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour market 
experience, age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in 
brackets. 
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Table 4.12 
Earnings, Unionism & Seniority Scales (Female Employees) 
Union Non-Union 
I-dgt 2-dgt I-dgt 2-dgt 
Pay-Rise 
TI0 
ExpIO 
IndIO 
OccIO 
rho 
LR test (X2) 
Log Likelihood 
Sample 
No Pay-Rise 
TIO 
ExpIO 
IndIO 
OccIO 
rho· 
.003 .007 -.011 
(.029) (.030) (.064) 
.040 .084 .222 
(.033) (.029) (.068) 
.068 .030 -4.42e-05 
(.036) (.031) (.067) 
.161 .106 .133 
(.029) (.027) (.063) 
-.717 -.715 .709 
(.061 ) (.061 ) (.069) 
18.04 20.94 16.86 
-810.068 -820.608 -889.971 
1542 524 
-.062 -.037 .005 
(.064) (.064) (.060) 
.139 .182 .166 
(.060) (.056) (.059) 
-.070 -.017 .102 
(.061) (.056) (.059) 
.239 .169 .221 
(.050) (.047) (.055) 
-.392 -.163 -.940 
(.194) (.257) (.018) 
LR test (X2) 2.53 0.45 60.51 
Log Likelihood -753.549 - 774.795 -980.031 
-.039 
(.065) 
.273 
(.063) 
.043 
(.061 ) 
.035 
(.056) 
.695 
(.074) 
14.55 
-891.345 
.034 
(.062) 
.219 
(.053) 
.124 
(.051) 
.111 
(.050) 
-.957 
(.015) 
81.90 
-988.190 
Sample 606 904 
Notes: The estimated wage equation model includes: 3rd order polynomial in employer-tenure, 
industry and occupational experience and 2nd order polynomial in potential labour market 
experience, age left education, a time trend, plus dummy variables for region, industry and 
occupation, establishment size and individual's qualifications. Standard errors reported in 
brackets. 
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Chapter 4: Figures 
Figure 4.1 
Political Beliefs and Unionism (Male Employees)t 
Labour 
o Union 
571 
o Non-Union 
1259 
Liberal Democrats 
Conservatives 
t: Di tribution of individuals between union and non-union jobs based on their political view. 
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Figure 4.2 
Political Beliefs and Unionism (Female Employees)t 
Labour 
o Union 
o Non-Union 
385 
820 
Liberal Democrats 
109 
Conservative 
t: Distribution of individuals between union and non-union jobs based on their political views. 
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Chapter 4: Appendix 
Table A.4.1 
Sample Characteristics (BHPS): Waves 1-8 
No. of Individuals 
No. of Observations 
No. of Employees in a Union Job 
No. of Employees in a Non-Union Job 
Age 
Employer Tenure 
Industry Experience (I-digit) 
Industry Experience (2-digit) 
Occupational Experience (I-digit) 
Occupational Experience (2-digit) 
Actual Labour Market Experience (full-
time) 
Male 
985 
5027 
2964 
2063 
Mean (S.D.) 
Union 
40.40 
(9.69) 
8.54 
(7.25) 
13.82 
(9.73) 
11.54 
(9.39) 
12.05 
(9.90) 
9.56 
(9.23) 
23.02 
(10.38) 
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Non-Union 
38.92 
(9.88) 
6.26 
(5.88) 
12.37 
(10.16) 
9.34 
(9.31) 
10.32 
(9.75) 
8.03 
(9.04) 
21.30 
(10.64) 
Female 
734 
3587 
2149 
1438 
Mean (S.D.) 
Union Non-Union 
39.41 39.19 
(9.78) (10.55) 
6.69 5.90 
(5.53) (5.20) 
12.89 10.53 
(8.61) (8.03) 
10.65 7.48 
(8.24) (6.89) 
11.58 10.58 
(8.85) (8.87) 
9.13 7.22 
(8.40) (7.26) 
18.31 18.26 
(8.75) (9.36) 
Chapter 5 
------~ "--------
5 Conclusion to the Thesis 
The significance of seniority for individuals' wage growth has been a very popular 
topic in labour economics for the past three decades. Despite though the volume of 
studies on this subject, it still remains a current issue with a lot of interest and 
appeal to both researchers and policy makers. The extent to which wages rise with 
employer-tenure is fundamental to the understanding of the dynamics of earnings 
and labour market behaviour. Estimates of tenure-wage profiles provide an insight 
into the evolution of earnings and can be informative on job mobility issues and 
issues related to the transferability of skills acquired in-work and individuals' 
employability. The importance of a study of seniority-earnings growth is further 
underlined by some of the features of the British labour market in the 1990s. The 
high labour turnover, the increased wage inequality and the persistence of low pay 
warrant an examination of wage determination and of how crucial job stability and 
seniority are for wage progression. 
In Chapter 2, I examine the contribution of employer-tenure to earnings, while 
addressing the issue of potential heterogeneity bias in the estimates of interest 
driven by possible correlation between unobserved individual and workplace 
characteristics and the duration of tenure. Particularly, individuals with high 
unobserved ability are expected to experience lengthy and less interrupted 
employment spells. Furthermore, high-paying jobs tend to last longer and have 
lower labour turnover. In spite of some variation in the estimated tenure effect 
across the different methods employed, most of the findings con\Terge to the same 
conclusion. In the case of male full-tinle employees, tenure plays a limited role on 
earnings profiles. On average, the estimated ten-year contribution of tenure on lo~ 
') -1 
_f 
wages is slightly less than 10 per cent. The findings for the female sample are fairly 
similar, with ten years of employer-tenure having an effect of around 10 per cent. 
Further examination though of seniority -earnings profiles reveals that there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the contribution of tenure across the wage 
distribution, but only in the case of men. In particular, seniority is estimated to have 
a larger effect on those male employees located at the bottom of the wage 
distribution. The interpretation of this finding relies much on how one views the 
wage distribution. For example, we can assume that the distribution of wages 
reflects a distribution of different kind of jobs, with the low-paying jobs located at 
the lower quantiles of the distribution and the high -paying ones at the upper part of 
the distribution. Within this framework, one can argue that the estimates of the 
tenure effect suggest that seniority is far more important to those individuals in low-
paying jobs compared with all other male workers. Nevertheless, irrespective of how 
we regard the wage distribution, the fact that employer-tenure has a larger 
contribution at the bottom of the wage distribution and only a modest effect at the 
mid and upper part of the distribution, has important wage-inequality implications. 
Apparently, seniority reduces wage inequality amongst male workforce. Thus, one 
force that could potentially drive men out of low pay and help them progress in the 
pay ladder is the accumulation of seniority in their current job. 
Continuing the examination of the kind of acquired skills in work and their effect 
on individuals' earnings growth, in Chapter 3 I depart from the common 
assumption that distinguishes obtained skills into employer specific and general 
labour market and explore the existence of industry and/or occupational specificity. 
The findings from the estimated wage equations are rather insightful on the human 
capital-earnings paths. Occupation specific skills appear to have a significant 
contribution to wages, highlighting the importance of expertise and specialisation in 
the British labour nlarket of the 1990s. The evidence though on industry specificity 
is not strong and even in some cases inconclusive. However, a closer examination of 
these effects reveals that occupational and industry specificity matters mainly in 
high-paying, prestigious but demanding and competitive, at the same time. jobs, like 
professional and managerial jobs, or jobs in the banking and fjilance sector. The role 
of employer-tenure when industry and occupational experience are considered in 
the wage equations reduces. There is some evidence, only in the case of male 
employees though, that seniority and employer specific skills in mainly' blue-collar 
jobs are important determinants of wages. 
Trade unIons are traditionally associated with the standardisation of pay-setting 
procedures and the enforcement of objectives rules concerning promotions and 
wages in the workplace. The British labour market though has gone through many 
changes since the late 1970s and the 1980s that resulted to declining unionisation 
and reduced trade union power. In Chapter 4 I explore how union representation in 
the workplace interacts on the human capital wage premia, examined in the 
previous chapters. The findings on the male employees reveal that seniority-wage 
profiles are stepper in the union sector, compared with the non-union sector. In 
addition to that, formal wage rules are more likely to be adopted in workplaces 
where trade unions are present. Nevertheless, the evidence implies that even in 
un ionised workplaces with no formal incremental rules, probably unwritten scale 
rules exist, since employer-tenure continues to be a significant determinant of wage 
growth. In the less restricted and more competitive non-union sector, the analysis 
indicates that occupational expertise is far more important than job seniority. 
Apparently, the non-unionised jobs are meritocratic, in the sense that they tend to 
reward the workers based on their true qualifications and output productivity. 
Whereas the more structured union sector is more inclined to protect their senior , 
workers and to provide job security and well-designed seniority-wage progression 
routes. The evidence (In the female employees, in contrast, is not conclusive, thus we 
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cannot draw similar conclusions as in the case of their male colleagues. Overall 
though, the findings from the analysis in this chapter suggest that trade unions in 
the 1990s, despite the declining membership and representation power, still yield 
the 'sword of justice, ensuring a well-protected environment to all covered 
workers. 
The evidence from the three empirical chapters, as outlined above, provides some 
rather helpful insights on the patterns that govern individuals' wage growth and 
labour market behaviour that could prove to be valuable to policy makers on 
unemployment and wage inequality issues. Based on the estimated earnings 
equations at least on the male sample, there appear to be contrasting images. On the 
one side, there are the individuals with less skills and qualifications, usually 
employed in 'blue collar and low-paying jobs. For this part of the workforce, 
seniority and accumulated employer-specific skills appear to have a significant 
impact on their wage progression. In addition, this positive tenure-wages 
relationship is further strengthened when working in a structured environment 
with well-outlined promotion ladders and pay rules, like in the union sector. On the 
other end of the spectrum, there are those individuals with high educational 
qualifications mainly employed in demanding, but also high-paying and prestigious 
jobs. In their case, the accumulated, over the years, expertise in their occupation 
and industry sector is far more important in their wages growth than job seniority. 
Apparently, in these competitive working environments, it is true productivity, 
reflected in occupational and industry experience that employers reward. As 
probably one would expect this is particularly true in less restricted workplaces 
where there are no trade unions present and no seniority pay scales are adopted. 
Although, this description of the British labour market may be regarded as a rather 
simplistic view, the author believes that it is still indicative of the mechanisms that 
operate in the current labour market. 
The British labour market in the 1990s is characterised by high labour market 
turnover, increased wage inequality and a larger number of atypical types of 
employment, like part-time and temporary jobs, who are mainly associated with low 
pay. Within this framework, a way, as the findings suggest, to reduce the wage 
inequality in the labour market is job stability for those at the bottom of the wage 
distribution. Since seniority for those workers is far more vital in their wage profiles 
compared with the rest of the workforce, policies that aim to reduce labour turnover 
and increase stability for this group of the workforce can prove to be quite effective. 
Concluding, this thesis attempts to shed some light on the different kind of skills 
individuals acquire in work and on the earnings profiles that characterise the 
workforce. Despite possible limitations this study may have, the author believes that 
the findings are of great interest and can be helpful and informative to policy 
makers in the evaluation of current labour market programmes, like the New Deal, 
and the design of the government's future agenda. 
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